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Foreword
The introduction of electronic data interchange (EDI) into an organization’s
information system brings with it an entirely new set of problems and issues for
executives, systems professionals, consultants, managers, and auditors. The tran
sient nature of the audit trail, the resulting paperless environment, and the total
dependence on systems to support operations — with little or no human inter
vention — significantly increase risk. Whether a manager or an auditor in an EDI
environment, one cannot afford to be reactive and corrective after the fact.
This book provides proactive guidance for —
■ The corporate manager facing changing business conditions and the
resultant difficulties and risks.
■ The internal auditor who must satisfy various mandates, including advice
to management regarding the EDI environment.
■ The external auditor who must have a thorough understanding of the
ramifications of EDI in performing audits or reviews and in providing lev
els of assurance.
■ Information systems professionals and consultants who are involved in
the control dimensions of EDI.
■ Line managers who must assume full managerial responsibility for all
facets of EDI.
EDI for Managers and Auditors (second edition) has been reprinted and
updated under the title EDI Control, Management, and Audit Issues with the permis
sion of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. It was written by a team
of specialist authors committed to covering the full spectrum of technology, man
agement, control, auditability, law, review, reporting, disclosure, and levels of
assurance. Two of the authors are lawyers with authority in both the United
States and Canada, making this a true North American reference document. The
original section on auditing EDI has been replaced to conform with U.S. audit
ing standards.
The Information Technology Division expresses its appreciation to Ken
Fullerton, CPA, and the AICPA Auditing Standards Division for permission to
reprint their material as Chapter 8, “EDI Effect on the Audit.”
Richard D. Walker, Director
Information Technology Division
Nancy A. Cohen, Technical Manager
Information Technology Membership Section
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Preface
One of the most commonly asked questions by managers at our education
courses is “How do we adequately control our EDI environment and satisfy senior
management and our financial auditors in the use of EDI?” When EDI (elec
tronic data interchange) is integrated into the business process, what tools can be
made available to internal and external auditors to provide control assurance
that simultaneously affords stakeholders a level of comfort and support for the
corporate EDI business strategy?
More and more business transactions are exchanged through EDI. Hence,
EDI’s impact on the business environment is significant and does affect the con
trol structure of the organization. Until now, little has been available on this
subject, both in North America and around the world, but I am convinced that
EDI Control, Management, and Audit Issues should be required reading for the busi
ness m anager who has the responsibility o f m anaging, controlling, and
understanding all facets of the EDI process. This book should also be mandatory
reading for auditors.
The EDI Council of Canada published the first edition, which was very well
received by the membership. Given the nature of the material, it is no surprise
that the financial audit profession would want to make this book a significant
part of its curriculum of study and professional development for its members.
Indeed, we are pleased to have worked with the authors and we endorse their
efforts and congratulate them for their vision in making this work available to the
profession and to EDI users around the world.
Marshall A. Spence, President
Electronic Data Interchange Council of Canada
Toronto, February 1995
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Chapter 1.

Introduction

Whom This Book Is for

The first edition of this book addressed controls, the management issues and
levels of assurance from the perspective of compliance, and die function of the
internal auditor. It also provided the internal auditor with adequate reference
material to satisfy various mandates including advisory to management regarding
the EDI (electronic data interchange) environment. This second edition pro
poses to include the concerns and the objectives of the external auditor as well.
The interest and the concerns of management are discussed from a somewhat
wider perspective. The important issues facing the corporate manager in the
light of fast changing business conditions should be addressed. This is especially
so, as applies to the use of technology as an avenue to a more effective presence
in the marketplace. The globalization of markets, a general trend towards a
regionalized economy, the impacts from maturing information technology, its
pervasive nature, indeed represents simultaneously, significant pressure points to
cope with, and brings into focus the requirement for sources of guidance, vision,
and orientation.
Taken from the perspective of corporate managers, the level of difficulty
and associated risks, are substantial. The primary reason, is that there is no past
experience in history equivalent to the current situation to fall back on as a
guide. An understanding of the mutating business environment along with
a sense of vision, has never been more pressing. The mandate given to corporate
management where uncertainties abound, and where past experiences count for
less, gives rise to adverse situations totally unexpected just a few years ago.
Consequently in these times of change, one would expect that an open mind be
the basic requirement for imparting change in a positive way, not just to survive
as a corporate entity but more so, reap the benefits of a better performing orga
nization, which invariably finds its measurement in its economic bottom line.
While managers and auditors have different mandates, concerns, and objec
tives, one should not take the insular view of how within the overall social and
economic context, they come to depend on virtually the same environmental fac
tors and infrastructures. It becomes a matter of angles for points of view and
emphasis, not a matter of differing substance.
This second edition can also be used as a practical guide by information sys
tems professionals and consultants who are specifically interested in the control
dimensions regarding Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). The premise under
lying this work is that there is a need for a single reference document which
ultimately would contain all the essential and pertinent informative material on
the various management, legal, and audit aspects of EDI. The authors also
believe that this document should be practical and immediately useful in making
control decisions, an d /o r be adequately supportive when performing an audit in
this rapidly growing sector.
Numerous books and articles on the subject of EDI have been produced
over the past few years.1-6 By and large, these documents discuss the potential
benefits that this technology has to offer, especially in managing the flow of infor
mation in a more cost-effective manner. These documents also touch upon the
nature of business transactions between EDI trading partners, as well as some of
the associated risks.
What has been mostly lacking, however, is a comprehensive reference tool
which would provide both the necessary background examination of the new
control, audit, and legal issues posed by EDI and the corresponding control and
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audit procedures. This book attempts to go some distance towards filling the gap,
by addressing both the controls needed to realize the potential benefits of EDI
and those needed to bring the levels of risk within a manageable tolerance. It is
an earnest attempt to provide managers and auditors with the background and a
practical tool to assess and appreciate the significance of the EDI environment,
and its unique characteristics.

EDI Defined

EDI can be defined as an exchange of electronic business documents between
economic trading partners, computer to computer, in a standard format. The
documents are received, validated, and accepted into the job stream of the
receiving computer, and immediately processed if so desired.
The format in EDI is governed by a predetermined set of rules known as
standards. While the exchange is computer application to computer application,
it is important to emphasize that this exchange of electronic business documents
can take place between totally different systems environments, with very different
equipment hardware, operating systems, and applications. It is precisely in order
to satisfy those constraints associated with differing environments, that EDI
becomes the coupling link allowing application to application transfer of docu
ments. Therefore, in this sense a true EDI standard protocol, is both hardware
and software independent.
The foregoing definition is possibly the most general definition of EDI
imaginable. There are however, other means of electronic transmission which do
not involve standard formats, or necessarily computer to computer exchanges in
terms of computer application job streams. Those are generally referred to as
other Electronic Commerce (EC) technologies. Examples of this would be, using a FAX
to order goods, dialing or keying in orders, processing interdepartmental docu
ments in proprietary formats, or various forms of electronic mail. These
transactions are not considered to be EDI.

EDI Is Not

EDI Is
C om puter application to com puter
application exchange of business
docum ents in a public or
industry standard fo rm a t using
com m unications link between
econom ic trading partners.

Free form at, electronic data
transm ission such as:

Examples are:

■ Text docum ent exchange

■ Requests fo r quotation
■ Purchase Orders
■ Invoices
■ Payment Orders

■ Public E-mail — Internet
■ Electronic mail
■ FAX messages
■ Videotext
■ Processing documents using
proprietary form ats
■ Dialing or keying in transactions
■ Bar Coding
■ Bulletin Board (BBS)
■ Magnetic tapes
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EDI Infrastructure

The EDI infrastructure is composed of three main components.
■ A standard message format
■ Translation software
■ Communication network
Standards are the common language spoken when dealing with trading
partners. A standard has to be a generic, comprehensive protocol, agreed to by a
sufficienyly wide group of user corporations. This is the case when you consider
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X12 as being just such a standard,
sometimes referred to as a public standard. Standards also applies to industryspecific protocols. A few examples of those are:
■ Transportation Data Coordinating Committee (TDCC) for the transpor
tation industry.
■ Uniform Communications Standards (UCS) for the grocery industry.
■ Warehouse Industry Network Standards (WINS) for the warehousing
industry.
A standard suggests that there is a dictionary which defines each message,
component, element, and segment, of a data set, that users will comply with in
order to exchange documents.
The translation software performs data conversion from the trading part
ners internal application format to the standard format in use. It is merely an
interface layer specifically designed to convert the internal data and file format
to the public standard format. Such translation softwares have been developed by
vendors to satisfy an extremely wide variety of internal formats. It is important to
appreciate that what becomes the key here, is that such vendors continually
maintain their software releases to meet the most current changes enacted by the
agencies overseeing standards pronouncements. Those are generally ASC of
ANSI and EDIFACT. See page 5 for more on these standards.
Also, there is another point that can be made here regarding translation.
The personal computer (PC) is the most widely used front-end platform for EDI
use and all indications are that it will continue to be so. Further as a result of the
evolution touching on the use of EDI many accounting software manufacturers
have also included into their packages the added functionality of translation.
That feature indeed does readily allow for data entry into the application by
means other than the keyboard.
The component of communications provides information transport capabil
ities and other associated value-added services such as mailbox facilities,
forwarding, and protocol-line speed conversion. What is commonly referred to as
a value-added network (VAN) is simply a communications hub offering facilities
for various services over and beyond simple communications. A VAN then can be
thought of as a computing facility where the various EDI users can place EDI
envelopes in mailboxes for trading partners which will be processed by them in
due course and under their own respective schedules.

3
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In the context of EDI where the basic object is to exchange documents between
the trading partners, obviously first and foremost the documents themselves have
to be generated by the sending party. Generally this involves the selection of data
items from the database along with related messages to complete a specific docu
ment ready for translation to the public format. Take for example a purchase
order. The preparation of a document represents three separate steps. Those steps
are, mapping, data extraction, and the translation from environment-specific
data format to generic format.
Mapping simply refers to the identification of those data items needed to
fill out a particular EDI message as defined by the public standard format, in this
case a purchase order, namely message 850 in ANSI ASC X12. You can think of
mapping as though it is much like a spreadsheet, generally referred to as a twodimensional flat file. Once these data items are identified, then they have to be
extracted from the various data files, or database as the case may be, depending
on the type of environment under consideration. Once these data items are
assembled on a flat file, then the next step is the translation of the file to the
actual public standard format, preparing it for transmission over the communica
tions network.
In general terms, the relationship of the three EDI components can be rep
resented schematically as follows:

EDI in Action
File produced
by:
TRADING
PARTNER #1

Originator’s
Internal

Translation
Software

A pplication

Public/
industry
Standard
Format

Transm ission
File processed
by:
TRADING
PARTNER #2

Receiver’s
Internal
Application

Translation
Software

Public/
Industry
Standard
Format

In the appendix to this chapter there is an illustration depicting the actual
structure of an EDI message format and the built-in controls using the ANSI ASC
X12 standard code.

4

I n t r o d u c t io n

EDI Standard Formats

Just like everything else in an advanced economy, there have to be standards to
which everyone rallies, thereby enhancing development and growth and reduc
ing overall cost. We have seen that several industries have developed their own
specific standards in order to address their own specific needs. At the time those
industries were generating their own standards, that was surely a most welcome
tool to serve industry members, facilitating transactions and so on. However, over
time the need became evident that in some ways cross-industry standards had to
be enacted. For example, think of a major railway which has to support three
standards: TDCC because it is in transportation, X12 because it is in North
America, and EDIFACT for European transactions. This adds cost, problems of
logistics, and systems maintenance, making the whole process more incident
prone, and obviously a less desirable situation than having a single overall com
prehensive standard.

Accredited
Standards
Committee
(ASCI of ANSI

The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), chartered an Accredited
Standards Committee (ASC), whose mission it was to establish EDI standards that
would cut across all industry segments. This came to be known as X12. ASC X12
updated and published all their standards. The Industry Standards Transition
Subcommittee was formed to review the transaction sets of TDCC (Air, Motor,
Ocean, and Rail) for compliance to X12 standards. Another subcommittee,
Distribution and Warehousing, would review the transaction sets of UCC (UCS,
WINS, and VICS7). The ultimate objective pursued by the committees in respect
of the terms of reference setting them up, was to emerge with one common,
completely generic, fully comprehensive, public EDI Standard. X12 standards
have evolved under a rigorous control process closely monitored by ANSI, which
as opposed to industry formats made provision for adequate audit trails and con
trols as a significant added benefit. Another important benefit resulting from the
ASC X12 effort is that the software vendor community could rely on a fully sup
ported and continually evolutive and consistent standard, giving them an
opportunity to include the necessary controls and audit features to their software
offerings.8 While X12 is by far the pervasive North American standard format
there is however yet another EDI standard format of very significant importance,
namely UN/EDIFACT.

International
Standards
Development
UN/EDIFACT

The acronym stands for United Nations/EDI for Administration, Commerce, and
Transport. This is mostly referred to by its common name EDIFACT. This is the
adopted standard in many parts of the world and is expected to become the pre
dom inant standard for international EDI transactions. Clearly, it is easy to
observe that one common international standard would be the best avenue to
resolve international exchanges.
International commerce needs fast, efficient and accurate information to
ensure the smooth flow of goods and services. EDIFACT has been developed as
the specific solution to these universally recognized problems which ANSI also
concurrently addresses. EDIFACT is the standard prom oted by the United
Nations for member nations.
EDIFACT has established five regional boards as advisors for international
standards: Pan American, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Japan/Singapore,
and Australia/New Zealand. Each regional board has a Rapporteur to initiate
and coordinate EDIFACT development work in their geographical area of juris
diction. A Rapporteur is a person nominated by their government and appointed
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by UN/ECE WP.4 (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, sub
group/Working-Party 4 on Facilitation of International Trade Procedures). For
more than 10 years, WP.4 has been developing standards covering data elements,
codes, messages and syntax rules for EDI. The EDIFACT standards provide the
world market with the necessary ingredients for applying EDI.
In Europe, the Western European EDIFACT Board consists of eight message
development groups: Trade, Customs, Construction, Insurance, Transportation,
Finance, Statistics, and Tourism. In the Americas, the Pan American EDIFACT
Board (PAEB) serves as the coordinating body of Pan American national EDI
standards organizations, and provides a forum for Pan American representation
and consensus to the EDIFACT Rapporteur. EDIFACT standards development,
maintenance and technical assessment in North America occurs within ASC X12
in the USA and the jo in t Canadian General Standards Board (CGSB) and
Canadian Standards Association (CSA), Technical Committee on EDI (JTC/EDI)
in Canada.9

EDIFACT SYNTAX
Data Element Dictionary

International

Standards
Organization
(ISO)

UN/ECE

Data Segment Dictionary
UN Standard Messages

UN/EDIFACT RAPPORTEURS
Pan
Am erican

Western
Europe

Eastern
Europe

Japan/
Singapore

Australia/
New Zealand

Pan
Am erican
EDIFACT

Board

Standard
Council of
Canada
(JTC/EDU

ANSI X12

One of the most well-known and widely used overseas standards is the Trade
Data Interchange (TDI), used primarily in the European Economic Community
for warehousing and distribution. TRADACOMS, developed in 1982 by the
Article Number Association (ANA), is commonly used throughout the U.K. and
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includes more than 20 documents across a wide variety of industries. Other stan
dards include the Organization for Data Exchange Through Tele-Transmission
in Europe (ODETTE), which is used in the European automobile industry,
and Data Interchange for Shipping (DISH), used in European transportation
industries.
With the existence of two prevalent standards in parallel, the reader may
wonder what the future holds in store for ANSI and EDIFACT as EDI gains
prominence in the global marketplace. As matters stand now, ANSI X12 is
mature and relatively more stable than EDIFACT with recognized transaction sets
covering many industry sectors. EDIFACT standards appear to be in a catch-up
mode, but in recent years, have taken a great leap forward.
With the integration of the European Common Market, free trade agree
ments such as the Canadian-United States Free Trade Agreement, and NAFTA,
the growth of international trade will further underscore the importance of one
set of EDI international standards for global commerce.

Standards Limitations

Ideally there should be a single set of EDI standards covering all EDI message
types. That set of standards is now emerging from the UN/EDIFACT Board. In
the interim, as can be expected there are significant problems yet to be resolved.
Current users of generic and industry-specific standards, such as X12, used by
many industrial segments in North America, Odette for the Pan-European motor
industry, and Tradacoms for the UK retail and related industries, are experienc
ing problems in attempting to migrate to UN/EDIFACT. So it is fair to expect
that other standards be used alongside EDIFACT for a number of years. Further,
the development of EDIFACT standards has been too slow for many users, and
there are gaps in the standards that will contribute to delay the migration process.
A significant event touching the standards has to do with the ANSI principals
who conducted a survey within the industry membership and determined that
some 70% are in favor of migrating towards one common standard for worldwide
trade. The ultimate objective would be to establish EDIFACT as the common stan
dard. In November 1992 the membership of Accredited Standards Committee
(ASC) X12 voted to adopt EDIFACT syntax for EDI standards by 1997.10

The Most Current
Update on Standards

Open EDI: The First Step in a Global Information Infrastructure

The announcement came from Concord California on January 27, 1995, through
a press release from the International Working Committee.
"The ISO/IEC JTC1/SC301 International Standardization Committee, representing
more than sixteen countries from Europe, Pan American, and Asia, announced the
availability of a Reference Model for Open-EDI, which is the new framework for
coordinating standards development. This reference Model is an alternative
method to the traditional EDI standards development process that is slow and cum
bersome. The committee has worked on this project for three years, and has
reached its first goal of making this Reference Model available for worldwide review
and ballot. Reaching this milestone allows the Open-EDI concept to be openly
shared and standards to be established in a structured manner.”

1ISO—International Standards Organization, IEC—International Electrical Committee, JT1—-Joint
Technical Committee-1, SC30—Standards Committee-30.
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There are two main problems with EDI today, communications issues and
semantics. Both of these issues hinder the process of a true open trading environ
ment. Open-EDI addresses these problems because it is rule-based, open, and
will provide a framework to enable businesses to work together electronically. It
allows for national infrastructure efforts to be in harmony with each other. OpenEDI also enables interworking among organizations through interoperability
among EDI platforms, value-added services, network providers and user applica
tions. Standardized dialogues exchanging standardized units of data, readily
available for use, will open the electronic marketplace to wider participation by
all users. All of the units of data will be registered as public information. Generic
rules will enable users to formally specify the roles of the enterprises involved in
Open-EDI and the expected behaviors as seen by their trading partners.
The SC30 committee is moving ahead to translate business needs into
requirements for standardized tools that will facilitate business process reengi
neering (BPR) related to information exchange.
A great deal has been accomplished lately regarding standards. So, what
follows attempts to provide a quick capsule on that progress for the benefit of the
reader.
The ASC X12 Committee submitted a draft dated October 2, 1994, to the
membership for approval at the January 1995, Concord, California meeting. The
draft titled Plan for Technical Migration to, and Administrative Alignment with
UN/EDIFACT, was in effect voted on and approved by the X12 committee mem
bership.11
The approved document sets the stage and provides a framework under
which ASC X12 will adopt UN/EDIFACT as a single standard after the release of
Version 4 of the American National Standards (ANS) which is expected in 1997.
In Part A, General Statement it is said that ASC X12 will provide a process to
enable ASC X12 Subcommittees to incorporate needed business functionality in
X12 into UN/EDIFACT standards. Also that after the release of Version 4, ASC
X12 will continue for a period of time, in accordance with the approved plan, to
develop, maintain, approve and publish X12 syntax-based transaction sets and
supporting documents, however, they shall not be submitted to ANSI for process
ing as ANS.
The pace of the migration is a function of certain critical success factors.
Generally, those factors are held to be as follows:
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■

Approval of equivalent X12 business functionality in UN/EDIFACT;
Speed at which X12 subcommittees accomplish their migration work;
A binary data solution in UN/EDIFACT;
Establishment of a UN/EDIFACT policy allowing National Messages;
Harmonization of national and international EDI meeting schedules;
Use of UN/EDIFACT by the EDI community;
A responsive UN/EDIFACT administrative process;
Timely and accurate publication of UN/EDIFACT documentation.

By 1997, the current Version 3 of the X12 ANS will be five years old and
according to ASC X12 and ANSI procedures, it must be revised, reaffirmed, or
withdrawn. Therefore, the contents of Release 3070 of the ASC X12 draft standards
shall be the last release approved prior to, and form the basis of, the Version 4
syntax-based ANS.
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The migration plan also states that data maintenance on existing X12 trans
action sets and supporting documents shall continue as long as justified by
reasonable business needs. After Release 3070, only corrective maintenance or
essential enhancement shall be allowed to syntax, control structures, and security
transaction sets.
As a last and pragmatic point, the plan states that prior to terminating all
new transaction set development in X12 syntax, input and guidance from the
EDI community shall be obtained by a survey to be conducted in 1997.

Growth of
EDI Technology

EDI technology is not entirely new, but its acceptance by many industry segments
as a viable business solution is relatively recent and growing rather fast. Dis
cussions on the subject started back in 1968. The development and publication
of the first set of standards took place in 1975.12
The business environm ent and the technological environm ent have
changed considerably since, and just like even the smallest business operations
are equipped with a telephone, a FAX machine and a PC, then it will be just as
common for enterprises to be users of EDI as an application of technology. With
the availability of most of the off-the-shelf EDI software packages on PCs, this
technology now becomes easily accessible to a much wider spectrum of organiza
tions irrespective of size and economic means.
In the USA, Canada and elsewhere, adding trading partners is only one
source of growth in the EDI market. Another important source is from the con
version of non-EDI documents into standardized format, thus moving from FAX
or data entry to full-blown EDI. In 1990, the EDI industry reported a revenue
increase of 40% over the previous year. A recent survey demonstrates that the
growth in Canada should maintain a rate of 25% to 30% a year for several years.13
The survey reports that EDI is used for a wide range of transactions, the most
common of which is the purchase order 80% (of respondents), invoicing (42%),
transportation documents (25%) and financial (6%). Financial EDI will be a sub
stantial contributor to the growth.
Hence, it is not too speculative to suggest that competitive pressures would
eventually make EDI the preferred means for exchanging business documents.
These organizations which can master this technology would be at a significant
economic and competitive advantage over those which do not.

Trends in Software
and Hardware Usage

On the basis of 13,000 interviews conducted between 1988 and 1991, by the EDI
Group Ltd. the following interesting information was obtained regarding both
the software and platforms used. The survey showed that the PC is the platform
of choice for actual translation from environment-specific format to public for
mat. Actually the mainframe is not far behind. The statistics demonstrate that the
PC is involved in 59.1% of cases, and 54.7% for mainframes, while the midrange
is 21.0%. Further the survey showed that the vast majority of users actually pur
chased off-the-shelf translation software, as opposed to attempting to develop
their own.14
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N ew Dimensions
for Managers

The strategic importance of EDI will grow as organizations learn to manage
information as a critical sensitive asset and resource, not simply regarded as a
mere cost of doing business. Advances in EDI technology offer managers oppor
tunities to gain much wider and faster access to valuable information with fewer
errors in processing and reduced bureaucratic delays associated with paper docu
ment shuffling and control. Managing EDI does require new ways of managing
trading partner relationships in order to optimize the incremental value they are
adding to the end products or services. Managers have to find new ways to ensure
that the integrity, security and confidentiality of information is maintained
between trading partners. New definitions of controls are needed, and managers
must be able to advise their organizations on how to tap the benefits and control
the risks associated with EDI. Subsequent chapters in this book describe the con
trols which should be considered by an organization using EDI or contemplating
using EDI.

Internal Auditors
as Consultants on
Technology and
Advisory on Control

There is an increasing demand placed on internal auditors to perform as inter
nal consultants on matters relating to control and technology. Management at
different levels should make it a point to draw on this valuable resource where
appropriate. In information systems management, proactivity can contribute to
more effective and efficient operations, higher quality information for strategic
support and lower costs. The notion of proactivity is not trivial. It represents a
realistic anticipation of likely problems, and plan for effective corrective solu
tions, in cases where such problems would occur. Obviously, this includes
sufficient adequate controls, and preprogrammed fallback positions should
things go wrong. Hence, contingency management must be considered as an
integral part of the planning and design, right up front, in both business pro
cesses and related support systems. In attempting to be proactive, it follows
without saying that not all is equal, and consequently does imply a sound knowl
edge of the business environment and systems environment, including how
events, risks, preparedness, and responses can be escalated, and prioritized.
As an internal consultant on control, the internal auditor requires appropri
ate reference material to deliver quality services. Since the internal information
systems auditor is virtually the only dedicated resource specializing on controls in
an automated environment, the auditor must be in a position to offer informed
opinions and advice to management on the nature, type, and attributes regard
ing control that should be designed and built into this type of environment. The
basic underlying objective is to ensure sufficient auditability to ultimately provide
control assurance to senior management and other stakeholders.

Topdown Effect
and Cluster Effect

EDI has been trickling down from larger business organizations to smaller suppli
ers. When a large business organization makes a policy decision regarding the
use of EDI, and moves to inform its suppliers to be on EDI within a prespecified
period of time or else “you no longer supply us, ”can be referred to as a topdown
effect.15These ripples around a large player is not to be minimized. Think of an
entrepreneur who might have specifically come into business to supply a particular
component product to one of the large corporations and how the smaller busi
ness concern can be placed in a difficult situation. The small operation suddenly
faces the necessity to implement EDI to be allowed to stay in business, while in
other circumstances it would never have entertained the idea. The benefit is not
all that obvious when considering that it might represent very few transactions,
perhaps the equivalent of less than half a dozen per month.
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Horizontally, on the other hand, within an industry when EDI becomes the
tool to provide fast efficient service to the customer base, then for the other
industry members not on EDI the message is clear. You join the bandwagon or
survival is definitely at stake. We can refer to this as a cluster effect, where indus
try members over a certain period of time have to rally to similar behavioral
patterns and services.16

N ew Dimensions for
the External Auditor

There is no question that information technology has impacted everyone. Every
functional area of management, and auditing of all types have been impacted by
the advent of sophisticated systems. Consequently, coping constructively, includ
ing using the technology to advantage is the only really effective solution. In the
case of EDI and associated paperless environments which over time are expected
to become pervasive, will contribute to make it more difficult and critical for the
auditor. The issue regarding the kinds of evidence and related quality of that evi
dence must be addressed.
Clearly times are changing, and different intervening professionals have
various roles to play. Systems professionals, internal auditors, systems auditors,
operational auditors, and financial auditors, individually have specific mandates
and objectives, but when viewed together collectively, they should serve an overall
objective of control assurance.

Organization of
the Book

This book is functionally organized in two parts. Part One— The EDI Environment,
where descriptions and analyses of issues pertinent to the application of EDI tech
nology are made. These issues are: the environment, management, security
technology, controls, evaluation of packages, and legal issues in implementation.
In Part Two—Auditing EDI, the issues specific to the audit procedures are covered.
This is followed by a selected bibliography of recent publications, a glossary of EDI
terminology, and a table of acronyms and expressions used in this book and
related literature.
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Chapter 1 Appendix: EDI Transmission and Control Structure

The EDI Electronic
Envelope— ANSI
ASCX12 Standard

Communications Transport Protocol
Interchange Control
Functional Group

Header

ISA

Header

GS
ST

Transaction Set Header
Transaction Set

Example:
Purchase
Order

Detail
DATA
Segment
SE

Transaction Set Trailer

Transaction Set Header
Transaction Set

Detail
DATA
Segment

Transaction Set Trailer

S E

Functional Group

Trailer

GE

Functional Group

Header

GS
ST

Transaction Set Header
Transaction Set
Transaction Set Trailer
Functional Group
Interchange Control

Example:
Purchase
Order

Example:
Receiving
Advice

Detail
DATA
Segment
SE

Trailer

GE

Trailer

IEA

Communications Transport Protocol

1. The electronic envelope at the interchange level is a package contain
ing one or m ore docum ents, such as purchase orders, invoice
payments or other, grouped into functional applications. These trans
action sets are com posed of data elem ents which to g eth er are
sometimes referred to as segments. This can be thought of as equiva
lent to a record in a database.
2. A functional group is one or more transaction sets of like nature
exchanged between trading partners in a single transmission session.
For example, a number of purchase orders would be assembled into a
functional group.
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3. A transaction set is one complete electronic document corresponding
to a business transaction between partners, which is represented by a
record in a database. It can be regarded as an electronic image repre
sentation of a business transaction.
4. There are headers and trailers on everything at each level to provide
the basic control structure for EDI, containing the parameters critical
to the acknowledgment of messages exchanged between partners.
5. The ANSI X12 Standard Code for Headers and Trailers as shown in
the envelope are:
ISA
IEA
GS
GE
ST
SE

Header Start Interchange
Trailer End Interchange
Header Start Functional Group
Trailer End Functional Group
Header Start Detail Segment (Message)
Trailer End Detail Segment

The control codes trigger the beginning or the end of an item, so
there is a predetermined and controlled flow of data items.
UN/EDIFACT

The UN/EDIFACT standard provides control features in the headers and trailers
of its interchange, functional group, and message envelopes similar to those
found in ANSI. These are:
UNB
UNZ
UNG
UNE
UNH
UNT

Header Start Interchange
Trailer End Interchange
Header Start Functional Group
Trailer End Functional Group
Header Start Message
Trailer End Message

The headers identify and specify the respective interchange, functional
group or message, while the trailers serve as a completeness check on the corre
sponding envelope by means of total count and reference numbers.
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EDI Allows Very Different Computing Environments
to Exchange Documents

IBM — MVS/XA
CICS — DB2

EDI Process

E

D

I

Public Format
X.12, EDIFACT, or
Industry Format
TDCC, UCS, WINS

DEC/VAX/VMS
ORACLE

EDI Three Component Infrastructure
Sender

IBM/DB2

Application
Translation
EDI Format

Communications
Receiver

VAX/ORACLE

EDI Format
Translation
Application
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The system of acknowledgments works the same way in ANSI as in UN/EDIFACT.
It informs trading partners that a transaction has taken place. In case of disputes
between trading partners, the acknowledgment may also support the existence of
a transaction. Taking the X12 format as an example, each transaction set, other
wise known as “message”in UN/EDIFACT, includes an acknowledgment which is
provided by the postal service only when the mail is registered. In an EDI trans
action set, functional acknowledgments (FA) are used to inform the originating
trading partner of the status of the transaction set upon receipt.
Basically, an FA is an acknowledgment sent to a trading partner to indi
cate that:
1. A document has been received;
2. The received document has met EDI syntax standards compliance tests
and will be processed through the EDI interface phase;
3. Or, the received document has failed compliance testing, hence it will
not be processed, or it will be only once subjected to further notification.
In this way, for instance, a buyer knows that the purchase order was received
by the supplier, and that it has been accepted for processing, or it has been
rejected and requires correction and retransmission. It is imperative that the
functional acknowledgment be correctly interpreted by the sender of the related
transaction.

UN/EDIFACT Standards
Current Status for Messages

Status 2

Status 1

Status 0

New
Messages

Total

Finance

8

9

29

11

57

Material
M anagem ent

1

4

1

6

12

Procurement

3

3

2

2

10

Product Data

1

4

9

14

38

23

72

11

36

47

14

14

33

5

10

Transportation

10

1

Insurance
Governm ent

5

Syntax

1

4

Construction

6

5

Travel, Tourism

1

2

5

8

1

1

3

13

16

113

125

291

Education
Other
TOTAL

28

25

11

Source: Office of the Comptroller General, June 1993
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Usually, there are two UN/EDIFACT publications per year, depending on the
standards development schedule. The two releases reflect all the messages sup
porting directories at two implementable stages. Those are Status 2 and Status 1.
■ A Status 2 message is approved by the United Nations as a formal recom
mendation, and registered as a UN Standard Message.
■ A Status 1 message is approved by the United Nations for trial use.
In UN/EDIFACT, the version-release process takes place on a Status 1
Directory. All messages that are at Status 2 also appear on the Status 1 Directory,
along with messages that have just recently moved from Status 0 to Status 1.
On the other hand, the new messages are the ones which are currently in
the process of work and discussions by the interested parties, and the results will
become conclusive at some future date. Only then, a status change is possible.
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Part One:
The EDI Environment

Chapter 2.

The EDI Environment and
Business Opportunities

EDI History

Although EDI as an application of technology is not new, it might be of interest
to become aware of some elements of the history leading up to the present. It is
perhaps useful to have some notion regarding the emergence of EDI and how
through time it found serious proponents to enhance its growth. So, a brief
review of some of the historical components can help us understand its evolution
and related opportunities for business development.
As in most fields of human endeavor, EDI has had its pioneers who were
instrumental to its development, implementation, and popularization. A valuable
source of information on this subject is EDI Forum — TheJournal of Electronic Data
Interchange.1The 1988 founding issue provides an excellent review of the history
of EDI from a North American perspective.
In 1975, the concerted efforts of the Transportation Data Coordination
Committee (TDCC) led to the publication of the first set of standards as EDI
began to gather momentum. Ralph Notto, past President of EDI, Inc., highlights
six significant events leading to the current period underlying the staying power
of the early standards:
■ Development and publication of the first set of EDI standards by TDCC
(1974-1975)
■ D efinition o f the technology for processing EDI transm issions
(1976-1977)
■ The A.D. Little study of the feasibility of EDI in the food and grocery
industry and the resultant standards and pilot project (1977-1982)
■ Involvement of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and
development of the ANSI X12 generic EDI standards (1978-1988)
■ Formation of the Joint EDI (JEDI) Committee and the broad agreement
reached for the revision of the EDI data element dictionary (1983-1984)
■ Development of international EDI standards, EDI for administration
commerce and trade, EDIFACT (1985-1988)
In addition, the founding issue of EDI Forum cites the work of several pio
neers from the transportation, drug, food, and railroad industries as major
contributors to the EDI movement.2 It should also be noted, that since the time
of that issue, the Canadian financial institutions have joined forces in a collective
effort to define their role and involvement in financial EDI. Since that contribu
tion broke new grounds in EDI, a brief description of the work of the Canadian
Inter-Financial Institution EDI Committee, now commonly referred to as
Inter*EDI is included.
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The Transportation Industry

Joseph G. Carley Jr., Director of Operations for Programs and Systems for the
TDCC in Washington, D.C. from 1973 to 1975, worked closely with Ed Guilbert,
President of TDCC, to establish EDI as a cornerstone for significant change in
methods for data communications.
The Drug Industry

Richard C. Cook, Director of Operations and Research for the National Whole
sale Druggists Association (NWDA), headed an NWDA Committee that developed
an automated order entry system for 443 drug wholesalers and suppliers. In all,
443 companies under the leadership of Richard Cook were implementing solu
tions to transaction errors and improvements in profitability.
The Food and Grocery Industry

George Klima, former director of Accounting Systems and Procedures for Super
Valu chain stores, turned his firm into a showcase for the U.S. grocery industry’s
Uniform Communication Standard (UCS) program. The result was more than
1,400 vendors through 100 brokers and 200 manufacturers exchanged transac
tion data daily. This has been unmatched worldwide in terms of partnership and
magnitude.
The Railroad Industry

John Nelson, along with associates at the Missouri Pacific Railroad, developed the
concept of dividing the business document or transaction into logical segments
and data elements. This concept became the basis for all EDI syntactic structure
of ANSI X12 and EDIFACT.
International Trade

Don Trafford, currently Chairman of the EDIFACT West European Technical
Assessment Group, led the UN/Economic Commission for Europe team, in 1984
that produced an EDI standard which was unanimously accepted by all European
countries and became the basis for EDIFACT standards. He also made major con
tributions to the simplification of international trade procedures in the early
1970’s.
Canadian Financial Institutions

Craigg Ballance, EDI product manager at the Royal Bank of Canada, chaired the
Canadian Inter-Financial Institutions EDI Committee (Inter*EDI), formed in
1989. This committee is responsible for establishing standards for financial insti
tutions exchanging transactions with each other through EDI. U nder the
auspices of this committee, seven task force subcommittees were formed, namely,
Security, Standards, Settlement and Timing, Audit, Legal, Volume, and Networks.
Each committee delivered its own respective set of applicable EDI standards.
These standards were fully sanctioned by the participating Canadian financial
member institutions.3
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Canadian Payments Association (CPA)

The Canadian Payments Association has approved the Standards and Guidelines
Applicable to EDI Transaction (CPA Standard 023) in November 1992. This set
of standards and guidelines governs the exchange of EDI transactions between
Canadian financial institutions which are direct and indirect members of the
Canadian clearing system.

Benefits of EDI

As can be observed from the preceding overview, EDI was born from a driving
desire to tap the benefits of technology and automation to the fullest extent pos
sible. The current literature on the subject points to the advantages and benefits
to be derived from this technology, when properly implemented and accompa
nied with sufficient adequate controls. The authors want to provide the reader
with at least a minimal outline of these potential benefits so that one may be in a
better position to evaluate whether some of these often quoted benefits indeed
materialize once EDI becomes operational. Although very often an organization
will go the route of EDI resulting from top-down and clusters effects, it is impor
tant to ensure that eventual net benefits accrue to the organization. As a case in
point, this is an area where an auditor should conduct a post-installation review
to examine all aspects of the EDI resource and provide some level of control
assurance. This is treated later in this text.
In one of the most comprehensive surveys of EDI users and those planning
to use EDI involving 1,094 firms by J. Hansen and N. Hill, the respondents were
asked to express their reasons and rationale for using EDI.4 The results of this
open-ended question are shown below:

Advantage

Percent of Respondents

Quick response & access to inform ation

47.1

Cost efficiency

20.4

Customer's request

19.2

Effect o f EDI on paperwork

12.4

Accuracy

9.8

Better com m unications

5.7

Ease of processing fo r order entry

5.5

Aids in accounting and billing

5.5

Better custom er service

5.5

Tracing shipm ents

4.9

Remain com petitive

4.9

Industry standards

4.0

Convenience

4.0

Reduce m anpow er

3.7

Reduction in inventory

3.2
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The table does not include responses mentioned 10 times or less. In the
same survey, respondents were also asked to rate several possible EDI benefits on
a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where one is least important and five is the most
important. The results are shown below:

Rating Factors Important to EDI
Benefit Factor

Average Rating

Im proved custom er service

4.29

Im proved control o f data

4.14

Reduced clerical error

3.97

Decreased adm inistrative cost

3.71

Decreased inventory cost

3.35

Increased sales

3.25

Decreased m anufacturing cost

2.75

The authors point out, that all of the advantages cited in the open-ended
questions relate directly or indirectly to improved service, the benefit factor
which received the highest rating.
With EDI, customer service improves and cost efficiencies are realized with
the avoidance of paper manipulation and data reentry by the recipient partner
organization. It logically follows that data entry errors are eliminated. Capturing
or entering data remains the most labor intensive dimension of automation.
Customer service improves with faster response to request for quotations, confir
mations and other marketing services. Getting quotes from a larger number of
suppliers is also facilitated. Being better able to disseminate product information
and take orders through a wide EDI network can increase market penetration
and distribution significantly.
A more recent survey on the implementation of EDI in Canada, reveals that
a majority of the respondents believed that the most significant benefits were the
reinforcement of ties with a business partner, improved customer service, reduc
tion of errors and increased reliability of information.5Conversely, the difficulties
by rank were: trying to integrate EDI with computer applications, difficulty in
understanding EDI technology, EDI user training and trading partner agreement
(TPA). The survey results support the actual success factors relating to the imple
mentation of EDI. Those are: a strong commitment and involvement by top
management, appreciation of the technology, setting up a pilot project with a
business partner already using EDI, excellent user training, and a quality EDI
implementation team.
EDI also provides superior new facilities for management to reduce inven
tory levels and associated costs. As an example, the instantaneous availability of
information allows for the implementation of just-in-time (JIT) reaching the pro
duction line only when needed. The cost of managing the logistics and support
for accounts payable and accounts receivable functions can be materially reduced
or perhaps even eliminated altogether. This is made more plausible once you con-
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sider that trading partners’ financial institutions can settle payments through EDI,
which include the necessary supportive accounting and reconciling figures to
vouch for specific transactions. An obvious byproduct spinning off from EDI is a
reduction in the bank float. Payments are made directly between the trading part
ners bank accounts the moment the shipping notice is received electronically.
A shortened business cycle allows for cost savings and optimal management
of operations. Trading entities have to appreciate the potential risks this technol
ogy can introduce and be vigilant in managing those risks prior to launching,
and during the implementation of EDI.

Window of
Opportunities

Although EDI had its beginnings in the U.S., it is gaining worldwide attention as
a viable vehicle for international trade. The often-cited benefits such as faster
response time and improved accuracy of information are equally applicable to
global trading. In a December 1989 report on the subject of international EDI
prepared by a California market research firm, the compelling reasons for using
EDI elsewhere are the same: to reduce errors and to streamline the processing of
trade documents involving numerous trading partners ranging from freight for
warders, brokers, banks, insurers, customs, to government agencies.6 As EDI
begins to play an important role on the international scene, those organizations
that have positioned themselves domestically will have a definite competitive
edge linking up with new trading partners through common goals and business
practices. Those organizations having mastered the correct technical infrastruc
ture will find it a great deal easier to enter global markets.
In Canada the forecast for EDI is continued growth of 25% to 30% per year.
Hence it is easy to foresee that EDI will impose itself as a business necessity both
in North America and overseas. Business opportunities for EDI products and ser
vices in this industry, such as networks, payments, accounting, translation
software, and consulting services are flourishing. There are reports suggesting
that the removal of trade barriers in Europe is likely to cause an explosion in
EDI. Vendors are now talking in terms of global trading partners management
and global software.7

EDI Gives Rise
to Potential
N ew Risks

More Interdependence and Increased Vulnerability

New applications of technology, while promising increased benefits, almost
always carry potential new risks. This is particularly true given that the business
objective with EDI is to enlist a large number of partners into a wide data com
munication network, to be used as a fully integrated tool to support transactions
and business decisions.
With an increased number of partners, there is a corresponding increase in
the level of interdependence upstream from suppliers and downstream to cus
tomers and clients. Technically speaking, EDI contributes to closer economic
integration with trading partners. The domino effect of the mishaps of one part
ner within the EDI business cycle can make other trading partners vulnerable.
Although the trading partner agreements can be relied upon to document each
partner’s respective responsibilities and obligations, managers and auditors
should have a heightened awareness of contingency planning and the additional
risk reducing controls necessary to minimize risk to an acceptable tolerance.
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Risks to Auditability

In non-EDI accounting information systems, paper based documents commonly
referred to as source documents are used to capture information about trans
actions. Those documents become the original source for entries into the
accounting records. Forms provide substantive evidence that transactions have
been properly authorized and executed if signed or initialled by the persons
responsible for authorization and execution. Also, forms are prenumbered so
that it is easily determined whether transactions were inserted, deleted or pro
cessed more than once. Batch control totals and hash totals of grouped
transactions are also used to check for addition, deletion or modification of
transactions during input, processing and output.
EDI alters the traditional transaction audit trail, defined by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in Statement on Auditing
Standards (SAS) No. 48, The Effect of Computer Processing on the Audit of Financial
Statements, as a chain of evidence provided through coding, cross-references, and
documentation connecting account balances and other summary results with
original transactions and calculations.8 In many EDI systems, the complete audit
trail useful for audit purposes may exist for only a short period of time and/or
retained in a computer readable form. Without source documents and evidence
of authorization such as signatures or initials, there is a risk that unauthorized
persons might initiate transactions or modify the transaction trail. Automated
controls involving electronic signatures, approvals, and authorizations should be
designed and implemented to establish effective operational control. A not
insignificant threat to auditability is the retention of records in magnetic media.
If not well controlled, the result could be loss of data, or sometimes worse, con
taminated data, which would severely hinder the auditability of EDI.
To date, most EDI applications have not involved the transmission of pay
ments, the normal last step in a procurement cycle. This, in some respects has
caused the deferral of the resolution of ensuring the integrity of electronic
authorization for most EDI participants. Whenever EDI involves the electronic
transmission of payments, there are several risks that must be addressed and con
trolled. These risks are particularly acute in EDI because of the trust which must
be involved between the sender and the recipient of the payment transmission.
The sender is placed in the position of having to rely on the recipient to have suf
ficient security and controls in place to ensure that the EDI transmission is not
altered once received. Conversely the recipient depends on the sender to ensure
that only mandated personnel are authorized to originate the transmission. Both
parties have to count on each other to have sufficient controls in place to ensure
that the messages transmitted are not read or altered by unauthorized persons.
In the absence of a comprehensive system of data security, data could be sub
jected to unauthorized amendment or disclosure to third parties. This could
result in additional cost from inaccurate processing, loss of competitive advan
tage leading to potential financial loss. Trading parties must trust one another
that sufficient controls are implemented to ensure the accuracy and complete
ness of input, processing, and transmission of messages and actual transactions,
to prevent errors or omissions leading to contingent losses.
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The most critical risk in EDI payments systems is the mutual reliance
between trading partners, if not well founded in objective and factual reality.
Even with the best of intentions, certain trading parties may fail to implement or
maintain adequate internal controls, thus exposing other trading parties to
higher levels of uncontrolled risk. As discussed in Chapter 7, “Legal Issues in EDI
Implementation,” the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has introduced a pro
vision requiring EDI users to establish the integrity of their EDI records. This in
effect places the responsibility to demonstrate the integrity of the control envi
ronment squarely on the shoulders of the taxpayer corporation.
Risks of Third Party Network Providers

Using third party network providers to transmit EDI transactions to trading part
ners gives rise to a number of potential risks:
■ Confidential information could be disclosed to unauthorized third par
ties, possibly even including competitors;
■ Invalid and/or unauthorized transactions could be introduced by third
party staff;
■ One could be invoiced for services not rendered, either deliberately or
erroneously;
■ Transactions could be lost resulting from disruptions of data processing
at third party network sites, or en route to the recipient partner, causing
business losses, and inaccurate financial reporting.
■ Audit trails could be lost when messages are passed from one network to
another.
Application Failure

A review of the potential new risks related to EDI confirms that application
failures or even systems downtime can have a significant negative effect on part
ners within the business cycle. The risk of failure of an application exposes the
trading partners to potentially material losses unless effective contingency plans
are in place to minimize the effect of an outage and allow fast recovery. This is
made worse and more critical, where the EDI application is closely integrated
with inventory management and production processing. In such situations the
loss exposure is greater. Adequate contingency planning should include alterna
tive m ethods for tran sm ittin g data, and if necessary, processing data.
Management should also plan for recovering the EDI application, within the tol
erance period from an outage, as derived from, and defined by appropriate
impact and risk analyses. Specific controls for ensuring alternative processing
and recoverability are discussed in Chapter 5.
Risks of Integration

Whenever within an EDI environment, information systems applications such as
order processing become integrated with other business applications like
accounting, issuance of payments, inventory management, and production con
trol, the risk of a domino effect resulting from errors, omissions and failures is
markedly increased. Large integrated systems such as those found in the life

27

E D I Co n t r o l , M a n a g e m e n t ,

and

A u d it I ssu es

insurance industry have been suffering the domino effect for many years. The
speed of transactions and the lack of hum an intervention in EDI systems
increases the magnitude of consequences several fold. Therefore, cost is propor
tionately higher, unless adequate compensating controls and contingency plans
are implemented along with EDI.
There is also an important risk associated with the inability to master secu
rity technology like message authentication and data encryption. This aspect is
described in Chapter 4.
Although readers might argue that paper-based and manual systems are
exposed to serious risks, and that EDI is no more likely to suffer a breakdown in
control and auditability than the systems it replaces, the high value and high
degree of automation involved in EDI systems increases the potential loss expo
sure resulting from inadequate control planning and maintenance. Subsequent
chapters provide a review of the controls necessary to manage these risks within
an acceptable level of tolerance.
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Chapter 3.

Managem ent Issues
This chapter addresses some of the key management issues which are of interest
to business managers in these changing times. There is no question that EDI will
play a major role in the way business transactions are conducted in the next sev
eral years. This will impact how the organization should structure to reduce risk,
and enhance the chances for survival as a going concern.
Managing change is never an easy task, and the degree of difficulty is a func
tion of the sources and types of pressures, placed on the management team. At
this time in history, we seem to be moving out of a recession. The fact is, we are
probably facing a restructuring economy, more than simply leaving the classic
recession cycle. The information society will take its toll in terms of change, as we
move from a mass production economy to a value-added economy. Almost noth
ing is guaranteed anymore, and a fresh approach must be enacted to effectively
manage within this new business environment.
Far and away EDI is too important a subject for the going concern to abdi
cate it to the so-called techies. This is not meant in a demeaning sense. Rather, it
suggests that the decision to go ahead with EDI is a policy decision that should be
made at the highest level in the organization. The commitment and involvement
should permeate the entire process of project management and implementation.
Not all has yet been written and researched on this subject, but it is clear that line
management and the business unit managers have to dominate and assume full
managerial responsibility for EDI and related operational aspects.

Efficiency,
Effectiveness,
and Economy

Market competitiveness, administrative cost savings, accuracy and timeliness of
information exchange and better quality control are the most frequently cited ben
efits of EDI. These attractive benefits are also the conditions necessary to fulfill the
management objectives of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy, the three E’s.
At a time when markets are globalizing, and the economy is regionalizing as
in the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it becomes
obvious that efficiency and innovation are essential to both the competitiveness
and the survival of an organization. Gaining the competitive edge is more than
being the first entrant into the marketplace. Rather, it is the result of a sound cor
porate strategy, with commitment from senior management, the implementation,
and execution of a properly thought out plan, continually reviewed, reassessed
and readjusted. To be able to respond to change in a constructive manner
requires, first to be well informed, and second to structure accordingly for effec
tive action and results.
While administrative cost savings have been documented by many key EDI
players, these savings could be wiped out by inadvertent loss of data during trans
mission, or the inability to master new controls such as authentication or
inadequate trading partner relationship management.
In information management, the attributes of accuracy and timeliness are
as important to managers as they are to auditors. Through the use of standard
message formats and elimination of time-consuming data reentry, EDI can signif
icantly reduce errors and shorten the processing between order and delivery,
billing and settlement. One can therefore expect that information from EDI sys
tems be more immediate and interactive as it consists of computer to computer
exchange. Management should be cognizant of the fact that the exchange is at
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the inter-organizational level. As the usage of EDI grows, it is likely that organiza
tions will share a portion of their information with their trading partners either
for business reasons or for expediency, resulting in inter-organizational data
merge or simply shared databases.1Then, the control implications for managers
and auditors is bound to be far-reaching.
With respect to the benefit of better quality control offered by EDI, it can
be noted that quality is never an accident, the result of fanciful nature, and spon
taneous creation. Rather it has to be specifically engineered into each EDI
application. Adequate controls over the integrity, authenticity, confidentiality,
and timeliness of information exchange can contribute significantly to the over
all quality of an EDI system. These controls are described in Chapter 5.

Objectives for
Information Systems

Information technology (IT) is an important pressure component on manage
ment. Information systems (IS) have become pervasive, and the going concern
has come to completely depend on the performance and quality of such systems.
In the case of EDI, it makes the overall situation that much more critical, given
that now the door is open to the world. There are also all the other problems in
attempting to manage the IS resource in a continually optimal way. Important
variables like functionality of the applications, levels of integration, maintenance
costs, and capacity to migrate to newer technology are of special significance to
management. Clearly, an important component in this context is the human
resource, not to be neglected.
So, the question arises, what should the objectives for IS/IT be? Ideally, the
ultimate objectives for IS/IT within organizations should be along three concur
rent dimensions;2
■ Strategic Support
■ Control Assurance
■ Cost/Effectiveness
This should provide a relatively exhaustive set of objectives to be met, ongo
ing and as simultaneously as possible. Operations and total quality management
(TQM) are included as a subset of these three objectives taken together.
Therefore, in a large organization, implementing EDI as a stand-alone
application, disconnected from the computer applications might not be the best
long-term solution.

Managing Change
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It has often been said that EDI will change the way business is conducted. At the
macro level, the key issue seems to be the establishment of a good trading part
n er relationship, or more precisely, the im plem entation of intercompany
effectiveness.3 This approach is drastically at odds with the classical model of
management where each company takes an insular view of the other. Stepping
out of the insular position to embrace trading partners as an integral part of the
value ch ain re q u ire s a totally different mindset and style of management.4
Recognizing that companies can be only as good as their weakest partner, and
that many interdependencies exist within the EDI business cycle, managers
should establish a program to systematically implement intercompany effective
ness. M ichael H am m er says, “EDI gets at the fundamental assumption that
organizations have boundaries.”5 This aspect is further elaborated in the section,
“Managing Trading Partners” on page 35.
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The underlying concept of EDI implies that a company cannot act alone.
Therefore, cooperative management is treated as a given. Concerted trading part
ners must strive for a win-win arrangement where the historical distrust between
customers and distributors is removed. In this context, we can view EDI as a
means of facilitating intercompany synergy, communications, and effectiveness.
Internally, the change brought about by EDI is more fundamental. The
basic issue is not EDI for EDI’s sake, but rather EDI for what? The answer to this
is short and simple. It is a new way of doing business and carrying out economic
transactions. The new expression for it is Electronic Commerce. In order to tap fully
on the benefits of mechanization, and be able to take advantage of technology,
more specifically information technology, then management must reengineer
the various business processes.6 In fact, this is so important that it is not an
option. Many EDI project managers will fail if they view EDI as merely a new
piece of software to replace existing documents. EDI as one of many facilitating
technologies must become a part of an overall change in management strategy,
otherwise as an independent implementation it will fail to achieve its alleged
potential. Such a strategy touches on the key variables, namely the structure, peo
ple, and processes.

Business Process
Reengineering (BPR)

The verb reengineer suggests done with intelligence and skills. In other words all the
variables, parameters, constraints, and resources of a given situation, pertaining
to an existing structure and associated business processes will be modified in
such a way as to yield the optimal new structure and processes for substantially
enhanced performance. Hence, by definition BPR cannot be mere guesswork,
improvisation and/or short-term patchwork. Sound BPR should deliver substan
tial cost savings, while im proving responsiveness to m arket forces. The
underlying rationale of BPR is to obtain maximum benefit from mechanization.
Many times the issues of skills, orientation, and training are raised with the
introduction of new technology, a new process, or a new system. In the case of
EDI, the impact on accounting cycles and accounting functions warrant special
attention. Traditional accounting control reports are time-based to coincide with
the established accounting periods and preselected cutoff points. This business
cycle is now compressed through computer to computer exchange, effectively
eliminating the need for paper-based documents such as purchase orders,
invoices, or checks, and associated traditional paper-based control reports.
Furthermore, when trading partners settle their accounts through a finan
cial institution with EDI facilities, the functions relative to accounts receivable
and accounts payable are greatly diminished. While EDI has the potential for
improving corporate cash management as a result of more timely information,
the value of some of the traditional accounting functions are significantly chal
lenged. At the same time, management’s ability to establish controls based on
external sources are reduced.7 To prepare for this change, managers and audi
tors should focus on the manual or automated controls that EDI replaces, and
examine how the proposed environment achieves the same result or better. It is
expected that the added complexity and sophistication of new EDI systems will
increase management’s dependence on automated controls to monitor the EDI
process in its entirety. This in turn requires tighter proactive control over systems
developm ent and related m aintenance. Everyone in the organization interfacing

with the EDI environment should be trained in EDI and given incentives to look
for opportunities for EDI to enhance contribution to the strategic objectives.
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Pilot Mode Caution

It is common practice for organizations to begin EDI in a pilot mode within a
small local unit. Pilots make good business sense as risk associated with them is
low, and the number of participants is few. If mistakes are made the consequences
are not devastating and less costly. To a large extent pilots provide opportunities
to develop trust and confidence levels with trading partners as well. We saw in
Chapter 2, that a recent survey in Canada regarding success factors in EDI imple
mentation, demonstrates the importance of setting up a pilot. However, managers
and auditors should be aware that controls are usually more relaxed in pilot pro
jects, which are usually run in a PC environment. Due to the short life expectancy
of these systems and the disposable nature of the software, controls designed into
pilot EDI projects may not be acceptable in full-blown, large-scale implementa
tions. We recommend that project managers and auditors maintain a list of
control weaknesses accepted in the pilot run and use it as a checklist at the start
ing point when evaluating controls required of the new environment.

Reorganization
and Levels of
Integration

Reorganization

Managing change entails the ability to anticipate what is to come. Once EDI is
fully operational among trading partners across industry boundaries in a global
context, the maturing of inter-enterprise systems or cooperative systems, now
merely a concept, will be a reality.8,9 Reorganization will take place along either
the distribution pipelines or value chains. The definition of a business concern
may have to be reviewed and changed, since the interdependencies among the
trading partners are so intricate that one can view the participants along the
chain or pipeline as members of the same economic community. In fact, this is
economic integration.
The present state of the art in EDI calls for com puter to com puter
exchange of information, and it could be that EDI will eventually advance to full,
direct application to application exchange. This would effectively eliminate the
intermediate EDI flat file, trading partners have to use in order to communicate
their business needs. G. Gerson, in his article on Data Mapping: The Integration of
EDI into the Corporate Information Structure, sees five levels of integration from the
paper system with no integration to full integration when EDI is used as the cor
porate interface m echanism.10 The control requirem ents for each level of
integration are different. These are briefly discussed in Chapter 5.
Levels of Integration

Generally, there are three levels of EDI implementation, and each one relates to
the level of integration with the actual computer business applications.11
1. Pure stand-alone EDI
2. Application seamless integration (ASI)
3. Properly engineered business processes and paperless environments
The first one is a stand-alone computer like a PC or a midrange computer
where inbound documents are received using the standard EDI format. Some
times this is referred to as door-to-door EDI.
Conversely, the second is a much more sophisticated level whereby inbound
documents are received, validated, and accepted into the job stream of the
receiving computer applications.
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Here attention must be paid to what can be described as the spread of EDI.
In other words, what applications and/or what business functions are affected by
EDI and what percentage. It could be that only a fraction of the functions are
affected as in the case of dealing with only a few partners representing a portion
of the procurement process or other function.
The third level can be described as full-blown EDI. In this category the busi
ness virtually deals with nobody not on EDI. In those environments, sourcing
through EDI is a matter of corporate policy and no exceptions are allowed. The
very organizational design is such that the actual business processes are fully
engineered to take maximum benefits from mechanization. Those environments
are virtually without paper, and many of the otherwise needed intermediate pro
cesses and steps are totally eliminated. Examples can be found in manufacturing
where the concepts and principles of just-in-time (JIT) are applied, and quick
response (QR) in distribution. Both are paperless environments.
So, we can surmise that EDI is all about integration. It is the degree of seam
lessness achieved in incorporating inform ation received into the business
operation that is management’s major preoccupation. As a matter of interest to
managers and auditors, each progressive level of integration signals a higher level
of complexity, sophistication, dependency, vulnerability, and contingency. Pre
verification of the controls added to each level of integration should be given
special attention. Vigorous testing and auditors’ early participation in the devel
opment process is strongly recommended.

Managing Trading
Partners and
Third Party
Network Providers

Managing Trading Partners

Trading partners within the EDI business cycle are sometimes called members of
the value chain. Value chains are linkages created with suppliers who furnish
goods and services which add value to a company’s product or service and deliv
ers it to the customer.12, 13 A value chain includes all of the goods and services
from raw material to the finished product. It can be extended to include value
added services provided by network suppliers and the paying agencies. The com
pleted EDI business cycle is generally the incremental result of processes acting
on materials, performed in a series by several companies.
Given the circumstances, the finished product of a business concern might
be only as good as its worst trading partner within the chain. Recognizing this,
many organizations are managing their value chains for competitive advantage.
Digital Equipment Corporation recommends the following ten-step program, to
effectively manage a value chain in order to optimize the value added:14
1. Determine the critical trading partners within your value chain.
2. Analyze the actual flows of goods and services within the chain.
3. Determine the level of interdependence between the various members
of your value chain.
4. Choose “good” partners: the critical ones who will benefit from your
success to a significant degree.
5. Measure the level of efficiency and performance within your chain in
terms of profit, cost structure, market share, service/quality/inventory
levels, flexibility, growth rates and others.

6.

Compare the above measures of your chain with those of competing
chains.
7. Plan, in collaboration with your trading partners, the improvements of
efficiency and performance levels.
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8. Define goals for improvements and implement them.
9. Monitor the improvement in these levels.
10. Plan for continuing improvement in these levels.
EDI is only one way for improving intercompany communications and effec
tiveness. Management should complete steps 1 to 7 before considering EDI.
Understanding the way your partner conducts business is vital to enhancing part
nership quality.
Managing Third Party Network Providers

EDI depends on numerous software and services supplied by third party network
providers, consequently these relationships should be carefully managed to
achieve optimal results:
1. During the evaluation of prospective network providers, among other
considerations, request a copy of the auditor’s report or third party
review on the overall control assessment of the software or service to
be provided.
2. Discuss with legal counsel regarding the “right to audit” clause in the
vendor’s agreement.
3. Details restricting the freedom of third party network to monitor the
volume and direction of data traffic or to build statistical analysis out of
it should be included in the third party network contract. Refer to
Chapter 7 for details.
4. There should be regular meetings with third party network providers
to review problems that occur to ensure that appropriate corrective
actions have been taken. Such meetings should be chaired by senior
management and attended by suppliers and managers responsible for
these activities.
5. Availability of network and systems performance should be the subject
of regular review especially in relation to the accuracy of billing state
ments and other records.
6. Review existing information security policy and communications policy
with respect to an outside party to ensure that network security is ad
dressed as a whole rather than piecemeal, taking into consideration all
key controls and interactions external and internal to the organization.

Total Systems
Dependence(TSD)

The advent of EDI and the generalization of its use, the associated economic
integration with trading partners through the implementation of just-in-time
(JIT) manufacturing and quick response in distribution, and the resulting paper
less environments, all taken together represent, a complete dependence on
systems. The downside is total paralysis should those systems fail, and the related
adverse impacts on the going concern as an economic entity. TSD environments
can sustain substantial losses if down even for a short period of time.
A Scenario

As a case in point, consider the following situation to illustrate the foregoing.
Suppose a large retailer, with stores in numerous cities and towns across the
country. The market strategy of that retailer is to be a large-scale discounting
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operation selling brand-name consumer products, by skipping over the wholesal
ing distributor, dealing directly with manufacturers. Basically, one could think of
an operation like this as a retailing hub for manufacturers. When this approach is
combined with the high volume purchasing power of the retailer, the savings
which can be passed on to the consumer through significant price reductions can
indeed be substantial. In such situations competition cannot match the price dif
ferential if the operations and processes are not comparable. So these operations
are like huge warehouse installations, geographically distributed in strategic loca
tions, selling virtually anything the consumer might need. It is a one-stop
shopping store with lots of parking space.
To make the strategy effective, the retailer signs contracts with manufactur
ers whereby a certain number of conditions are met to ensure advantageous
pricing structures, smooth logistics, and avoid snags. Among those conditions
you would find that EDI and Bar Coding are at the core of the arrangement.
Further, the manufacturer does a portion of the management. An example, think
of the manufacturer supplying paper products, like facial tissues, paper towels
and so on. The manufacturer will make decisions regarding product mix, prices,
quantities, when to ship, where to ship, and from which shipping point. The
manufacturer is essentially managing a certain number of feet of linear shelves
on behalf of the retailer.
When the goods come to the receiving door of the respective retail opera
tion, the receiving staff simply captures the information using their code readers
directly from the pallets’ wrap bar code labels or carton labels as the case may be.
The information is relayed by radio frequency transmission directly into the com
puting environment and processed into the job stream as inventory. Depending
on the approach used, there are situations where the manufacturer sends the
information ahead of the shipment. When the shipment comes in and the code
is read into the system it becomes the invoice and no further steps are required
to validate the transaction which then gives rise to the payment process.
On the other side of the cycle, when the consumer does a purchase and
goes through the cashier, more precisely called a point of sale (POS), the cashier
passes the goods over the scanners to capture the pertinent data relative to each
item purchased, right off the universal product code (UPC) which is on each
product. That code defines all the information concerning the item.
The POS is a computer, serving as a front end to the host computer where
the information relative to the sales operation is processed. There might be up to
thirty or more POS stations hooked up to the same host in one physical location.
This procedure credits sales for the various departments, reduces inventory, debits
cash, or other debit accounts, like credit cards and trade receivables, generates
the various management statistics for control and reporting purposes and any
other associated control and management tasks which are designed into the sys
tem. Each transaction record is tagged by date, time, store number, POS operator
code, and/or other record stamping desired. The POS is a sophisticated system
handling many functions which are not nearly obvious to the consuming public,
whose perception of the POS stations is as though they were mere cash registers.
In fact, this is why the POS station is called cashier somewhat a misnomer. The
combination of EDI, bar coding, and POS/UPC articulates a quick response to
market demand in distribution.
Further, there are many other significant events taking place behind the
scene. First, the retailer is sharing its data and information with the manufacturer
which has access to the retailer’s computing environment through EDI. This
allows for shared marketing management decisions not just the actual logistics.
Second, the manufacturer must commit to and guarantee, fail-safe bar coding
practices, and this is clearly spelled out in the contractual arrangement. Imagine
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what would happen if the bar code was dysfunctional and the kinds of snags and
mishaps this can cause. Third, how the logistics is controlled through a web of
mechanical data capture and computing procedures, supporting the operations,
but which also effectively supports the strategic plan of the business.
Again depending on the approach used, the accounting cycle is completed
through EDI, whereby the m anufacturer sends an electronic invoice to the
retailer, and the retailer pays an electronic check to the manufacturer, financial
institution to financial institution.
Critical Issues

There is plenty of material for one or more books on this type of operation
alone, but for our purpose the foregoing is about enough to review a certain
number of critical issues.
In terms of management practices this operation is at significant variance
with classic paradigms of management. Clearly the business processes were engi
neered to take full benefit from mechanization. As a result paper disappears
almost completely, giving rise to significant management trail and review issues.
What is even more significant is the fact that such an operation is totally sys
tems dependent (TSD). This leads into the related issue of contingency and
levels of assurance. Another significant difference from the past is the informa
tion sharing, and how the insular view is absent from the mindset. With respect
to the above example, an economist would probably raise the issue of barriers to
entry in the paper product market and/or retailing on a large scale.
The most critical issue from the management perspective is the total systems
dependence to support operations and the strategic plan. While many times such
dependence is achievable without EDI, the introduction of paperless transaction
processing and procedures makes the entire situation a great deal more critical.
From the accounting point of view, there is also total systems dependence to
account for operations, and draw up financial statements. For auditors there are
two levels of concern — the ability to raise the evidence necessary to support an
opinion regarding the fairness of financial statements (this process is also totally
systems dependent), and the monitoring required to control the environment on
an ongoing basis throughout the period. The compliance aspect, and process
control to provide control assurance is not exactly trivial, and does warrant spe
cial attention.
Financial Statements

The local host computers from the various stores across the nation are in com
m unication with one cen tral facility which provides m anagem ent with
instantaneous, accurate financial and operational information, throughout the
organization. In a business of this type quite often the physical facilities are
leased. Those leases tend to be pure operating leases. Consequently, the largest
most significant asset is the inventory. Further, suppose that the retailer’s contrac
tual arrangement with some of the manufacturers is such that title is retained
until sold to the ultimate consumer, much like a consignment situation. That
indeed adds complexity to the operations.
The continued movement of inventory received and sold throughout the
chain of stores, including the different triggers regarding title passage over the
product mix, changes moment to moment. This is so complex that one must be
able to lean fully on the systems to provide reliable information with respect to
cutoff and valuation problems. In short, an instantaneous snapshot picture of the
moving inventory asset is completely impossible outside the systems. This see-
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nario can be made as difficult and complicated as desired, like spanning several
time zones, in a multinational environment, with currency translation and several
other factors causing significant material impacts on the financial statements.
Control Assurance

Earlier it was suggested that control assurance be a concurrent objective for sys
tems management. Control is a management responsibility forming an integral
part of the mandate. Further management makes the policy decisions regarding
the contingency, and levels of risk that the going concern can live with. Manage
ment has a free hand to make those decisions, and choose whatever rationale it
feels appropriate under the circumstances to support the decisions regarding
control. There are however, some conditions, call them constraints that must be
met in order to insure impartial discharging of that mandate.
A first condition, perhaps the most obvious, is the accountability aspect of
the management mandate. While management is responsible for control, the
review and audit side represents the assurance aspect. The second condition is
more intimately associated with the control objective, whereby sufficient, ade
quate controls must be in place to satisfy a number of stakeholding interests, in
terms of compliance, contractual obligations, and other contingent responsibili
ties. The overall internal control system to safeguard the assets of the entity and
insure compliance with the objectives and the plan of organization and related
policies is also significant.
Within a TSD environment and EDI, management and perhaps even regula
tors should consider monitoring as a mandatory characteristic to be applied as a
countervailing response to the systems dependency.

Monitoring, Control
Data and
Joint-Ownership

Monitoring

Generally, in computing environments there are three categories of software sys
tems. Basic software, like operating systems, network managers, database
managers, communications facilities and others are one category. Another cate
gory is represented by the various applications, like accounting, word processing,
and other operational management functions software. The third category is the
utilities, which are powerful pieces of software allowing the mandated users to
accomplish certain tasks associated with maintenance, optimization, scheduling,
extractions, report generating, or other systems management activities, allowing
for a more secure and efficient computing environment. Within this generic cat
egory we find control software to manage libraries, change control, logical access
control, and many other items of software.
What is not obvious in complex environments is the various layers involved.
This is especially so, where applications are integrated into a seamless whole, over
different platforms, using local area networks (LAN), wide area networks (WAN),
gateways, and client/server systems. There might be many layers within a com
puting arch itectu re, each rep resen tin g its own level of com plexity and
significance for management and the auditor.15, 16 Generally, those layers go all
the way from physical to data, going through operating systems, interfaces and
applications.
Basic software and control software, come equipped with two dimensions.
The first one, is the reporting facilities available to the mandated user. The sec
ond dimension is the functionality command level where the mandated user
executes various commands to perform optimizing tasks, or operate on certain
parameters to enhance the computing environment according to changing situa
tions and conditions.
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Any reporting facilities available to management should also be available to
the review and audit functions, internal and external. Monitoring systems should
be part of the architectural design right up front, to satisfy the requirements
of control assurance in TSD environments. Perhaps we can view this as a princi
ple. Having equal access to such reporting facilities, does not exclude that the
audit function have its own reporting facilities in the production environment
where pertinent.
For example, embedded audit modules (EAMs) can be designed and imple
mented within the various critical applications. This is examined in more detail
from a control perspective in Chapter 5. Such modules are native to an applica
tion and must follow the changes, enhancem ents and other m aintenance
interventions done to the application. Change control procedures have to be
enacted to insure continued integrity. The advantage of the EAM is that the audit
function has ownership of the module and related data it generates. Auditors are
able to examine various aspects of the controls, do testing, change parameters,
and raise evidence over the entire control period. A difficulty with EAMs is that
they are application specific.
Control Data and Joint-Ownership

Monitoring data can be called control data on systems behavior, systems perfor
mance, and associated controls. A principle could be that both management and
auditors have joint-responsibility of these systems and associated data. Effectively,
this means joint-ownership. From this perspective management would not have a
free hand to affect change to those systems without proper coordination with the
auditing function. Refer to Chapter 5 for a discussion on monitoring systems and
control on controls.

Shift From Balance
Sheet Focus
to Operations

The changes caused by technology, paperless environments, and the changed
nature of the management trail, brings about the need for control assurance.
This in turn gives rise to the need for monitoring, forcing focus on the entire
control period, not just a point in time. The result is a shift in focus from balance
sheet to operations. EDI/EC plays an important role affecting this change of
focus. This is an indication of the expected changes to impact auditors in the
next decade.
The operations and general business activities can be seen as a process. The
balance sheet is simply the end position at a point in time, and valued according
to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). For example, let us con
sider the difference between quality control versus quality assurance. Quality
control is an event measuring the result of the process at the end when the prod
uct or output is finished. Conversely, quality assurance looks at the process and
guarantees that the process behaves and performs as planned. If a business entity
had its business processes control assured, then the balance sheet is simply the
end result except for the valuation of certain balance sheet items.

EDI Post-Installation
Reviews

Finally, management should not hesitate to seek an expert opinion regarding the
EDI installation and operation. A thorough post-installation expert review should
be conducted to examine all the key aspects of the installation and the opera
tional management aspects of EDI. The results of the review, in terms of findings,
observations, and recommendations can be very beneficial offering management
a level of comfort and assurance.
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4.

Security Technology
EDI environments are characterized by three factors which coincide. Those fac
tors are the disappearance of paper and related audit trail, high volumes at high
speeds and the elimination of human intervention in transaction processing.
This generally requires that managers and auditors consider particular security
and control measures, depending on the nature of transactions and transmission.
It is a prudent management practice to perform a risk analysis to examine the
potential losses that can be associated with the messages to be transmitted by the
proposed EDI system. This has to be done considering events whereby contents
could be disclosed to unauthorized persons, or messages be accepted from dubi
ous sources or altered during transm ission. If the results of the analysis
determine that authenticity of the originator or integrity of the message must be
assured, management should consider the use of message authentication codes
(MAC), often referred to as MACing.
On the other hand, if confidentiality of the messages is warranted, encryp
tion should be seriously considered as a means of control. W hen these
techniques are employed, managing the automated or manual key exchange
between trading partners is a subject of prime importance. This chapter provides
a basic understanding of the technology which can be employed to protect the
integrity and confidentiality of EDI messages.
The ANSI Security Standards on message authentication, encryption and
key management, represent the principal security control requirements in the
inter-industry standards for EDI business documents. ANSI is the U.S. representa
tive to the International Standards Organization (ISO).1 In early 1989, the ANSI
committee, known as ASC X12, was mandated to develop such standards, and
proposed two related technical standards for the security in EDI:
■ X12.58
■ X12.42

Security Structures
Cryptographic Service Message (CSM) Transaction Set

ANSI X12.58, defines data formats for security structures consisting of mes
sage authentication and encryption, following earlier ANSI standards X3.92 Data
Encryption Algorithm (DEA), X3.106 Modes of Operation of the DEA, X9.23
Encryption of Wholesale Financial Messages, and X9.9 Financial Institution
Message Authentication. ANSI X12.42 provides rules for the exchange of keying
materials in an X12 environment based on the earlier standard X9.17 for key
management. Where it is important to maintain the integrity and confidentiality
of data to be transmitted, these message authentication and encryption standards
should be considered in EDI technical systems specifications. ANSI supports the
use of authentication and encryption independently or in combination. When
both techniques are used, authentication should precede encryption for expedi
ency purposes. The salient features of these techniques are discussed below.
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EDI implies trading partners and this could give rise to contingent liabilities of a
significant nature or other material losses if not properly addressed in a proactive
manner. This is made more acute when payments associated with financial EDI
(FEDI) are part of the operations. Generally, there are six key threats that should
be addressed in determining the attributes of EDI security and control. The secu
rity and controls supplied by most value added networks (VAN) are appreciably
greater in terms of protection, than would typically be found in direct or pointto-point relationships.
Message Sequence Integrity

A message may be lost or replayed. There could be an accidental loss of a mes
sage or it could be replayed fraudulendy. This feature requires that the receiver
be able to identify data which is duplicated, skipped, or out-of-sequence.
Message Content Integrity

A message could be intercepted and modified. While maintaining a valid syntax a
third party could modify a message to its advantage. Also, there could be acciden
tal alteration and corruption of data while the syntax remains still valid. This
attribute specifies that the receiver of an inbound message must be able to check
that the data has not been altered.
Confidentiality of Message Content

Messages may be read by a third party. The objective is to avoid that any unau
thorized third party gain access to the data and in so doing gain an unfair
competitive advantage, or be in a position to impart harm to an organization
resulting from the knowledge. This avoidance relates to situations equivalent to
industrial espionage and/or financial gains resulting from lack of confidentiality.
This attribute imposes on both the originator and receiver that they be able to
guarantee that the data content is not subject to unauthorized disclosure.
Originator Authentication

This is non-repudiation of the origin. A sender might wish not to have sent a par
ticular message and therefore later repudiates having done so. An obvious
example is where a customer has ordered merchandise they no longer wish to
receive and want to deny the responsibility or liability. The originator authentica
tion requires that the recipient be able to verify that the originator is in fact the
originator.
Recipient Authentication

This is non-repudiation of message receipt. The recipient may claim they never
actually received a particular message. For example, a recipient might not have
acted on a particular order and to avoid liability denies having received the mes
sage. Recipient authentication imposes that the demonstration can be made that
the data was received and only received by the intended recipient.
Time or Timing Attribute

For this feature to be satisfied, the functionality must be able to demonstrate that
the data and messages were delivered by a given time.
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Message
Authentication
Code (MAC)

A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a cryptographic check-sum value calcu
lated by passing the entire message or authentication elements of the message
through a cipher system. The sender attaches the MAC to the message before
sending it. The receiver recalculates the MAC upon receipt and compares it with
the sent MAC. If the two MACs are not equal, it is an indication that the message
has been altered in some way during transmission, and the sender and receiver
are alerted of the failure of the MAC code to authenticate the message.2 The
objective of this technology is to insure integrity of the transmitted messages. If
the information is altered the MAC would alert the receiver.
For EDI messages, authentication can also be used to detect attempts at
deletion, duplication or insertion of messages. This can be accomplished by
introducing unique identifiers, sequence numbers or date/time stamps into each
EDI transaction. We can think of authentication much as though it is a form of
electronic signature since it does identify the sender. Messages can still be in
plain text form and readable by anyone being able to access the messages. In
order to make messages totally unreadable by prospective unauthorized persons,
encryption must be considered.

Encryption

Encryption is defined as the conversion of plaintext data into ciphertext data by
using a cryptographic algorithm and key. Data are cryptographically disguised in
such a way that only the parties with the key can view it in its native form. This
cryptographic algorithm can be of many varieties, but the most widely accepted
is the one generated according to the Data Encryption Standard (DES).
Encryption protects the privacy of data passing between a sender and a receiver,
irrespective of any communication nodes traversed by the message, as only the
sender and the receiver are aware of the cryptographic key. However, the mes
sage source and destination identifiers must exist in plaintext form so that each
node in the network knows how to route the message.
In ANSI, cryptographic security can be applied to different levels of an EDI
transaction. It can be used to encrypt at the transaction level, for instance pay
ment orders, or at a functional group level, batches of payment orders and
purchases in one envelope, or both levels at the same time (see Appendix of
Chapter 1). In EDI, transaction set level security is commonly used, since prob
lems encountered at that lower level will not cause the entire functional group to
be rejected.

Hardware
Encryption

Hardware Security Modules (HSM) are self-contained, physically secure, special
purpose computers that perform security-related processes and that securely
store security-parameters an d /o r other sensitive data.3 These were developed
when it was found that cryptographic processes could not be adequately pro
tected under software control. Encryption performed by tamper-proof, physically
secure hardware devices is far more secure than encryption performed by soft
ware. Typically, any unauthorized attempts to access an HSM results in its erasing
of all sensitive security related data. They are also used to install cryptographic
keys without disclosure to operators.4
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Security Key
Management

When encryption and/or MACing techniques are used to secure EDI messages,
maintaining the secrecy of keys is of critical importance. If unauthorized persons
were to determine keys in clear text, they would be able to intercept, change
a n d /o r originate transactions without being detected. In the domain of auto
m ated key m anagem ent, four main functions are involved. They are key
definition, key generation, key distribution and key initialization.

Automated Key
Management

Key Definition

The most common key m anagem ent system is the data key scheme which
involves three-level hierarchy of keys:
1. Master Key, also known as Master File Key:
Unique to each network node and is used to protect keys or crypto
grams which are stored in a database.
2. Key Exchange Key (KEK):
Unique to each link in the network. It is used to protect data keys in a
secure manner during exchange between two nodes that are at the
end points of a link. There are two encryption keys for each link in the
network. The send key for one node is the receipt key for the other
node, and vice versa.
3. Data Key, Working Key:
Maintained for data encryption and message authentication. For each
function, two data keys are maintained for each link in the network,
for both the send and receive directions.
Key Generation

Keys are updated in two different modes. When the initial value of the key must
be generated, it is done using a random number generation process. They are
then installed in their respective nodes. Keys are updated in the following ways:
1. Master Key:
Master keys are updated by generating and installing at each node a
new randomly derived value. Key encryption keys must be decrypted
under the old master key and then re-encrypted under the new master
key. Such operations have no effect on other network nodes. This key
is unique to each organization and should never be communicated
outside of it.
2. Key Exchange Keys (KEK):
The KEK must be developed in tandem between communicating part
ners by the exchange of key components to ensure that each KEK set is
unique for that link. The node can initiate a KEK change. The node
which does so produces a new key randomly generated and transmits it
to the other node encrypted under the old key. After verifying its cor
rectness, the receiving node overwrites the value of the previous key.
3. Data Keys:
Each node determines the frequency of updating keys and sends them
the other node encrypted under the KEK
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Keys are physically transported to the installation site for initialization. The prin
ciples of “dual custody with split knowledge” as stated in ANSI X9.17 should be
respected. They may then be installed electronically using an HSM or if manu
ally, they should be split into two parts so that two different persons can exercise
control over each part without knowing the value of the other part. During key
updates, the values can be electronically distributed. The custodians should not
be selected from the application development area to ensure adequate segrega
tion of duties.
Key Initialization

Once the two parts of the key have been entered into the terminal, the values of
the initial KEK is computed and installs it in a key register or key pad linked to
the HSM. The sender terminal then sends a message informing the other party’s
terminal so that key correspondence can be verified between the two. Upon
installation, the key should be encrypted under the master key for the node.

Manual Key
Exchange

To initiate an automated keying relationship, at least one KEK must be manually
exchanged between trading partners. This involves several key exchange person
nel who must carry out the key exchange function in a secure environment. Each
financial institution communicates a key component which is exchanged and
then combined to produce a key using an “exclusive or” (XOR) combination
method. Trading partners should establish rules governing the administration
and/or restriction on the use of keys amongst themselves. They should consult
ANSI standards for the manner in which the keys are used.
The above is an overview of the security controls which can be applied to
EDI. While the implementation of this technology rests with security specialists,
managers and auditors should be cognizant of the essential features in order to
properly manage the process, or to verify that such standards have been suitably
applied in the EDI system under review.

Security Incident
Reporting

This security control requirem ent, established by the Canadian Inter*EDI
Financial Institutions for their own use, pertains to the reporting of security inci
dents, such as:
■ Message authentication code verification failure
■ Cryptographic service message counter out of sequence
■ Known or suspected compromise during the manual key distribution
process
■ Known or suspected penetration of a physically secure device
■ Known or suspected compromise of a key
■ Key synchronization errors
This is further discussed in Chapter 5.
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There are several security control aspects for managers and auditors to focus on.
Obviously, the common objective is to pursue the most cost-effective security
solution for EDI, be it MACing, encryption, or simply passwords and acknowl
edgments.
This chapter discusses the general features of MACing and encryption, the
techniques of which are mainly used by financial institutions when transmitting
payments-related messages. The security techniques described in this chapter are
not the only methods available to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of mes
sages. The level of protection required by an organization, should dictate the
level of security to be applied. Other security techniques for confirming the
authenticity of messages are available in this market to cater to the needs of vari
ous types of transactions and industries. These include passwords and
acknowledgments, “challenge and response” added to dial access and digital sig
natures and so on. Another simple technique for protecting the confidentiality of
a message is to break it into pieces and send each piece at a different time.
However, the weaknesses inherent in these techniques should be well understood.
When considering EDI security, managers and auditors should be more
concerned with message transmission than with stored information. The ratio
nale behind this is that the level of protection on stored information is largely
governed by asset value and the potential threats against that asset. With or with
out EDI, existing policies and procedures should be able to handle this aspect of
EDI security. EDI messages entering into and leaving an organization is a new
area that should be carefully examined. The controls surrounding EDI message
transmission are further elaborated in Chapter 5.
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5.

Application Controls and
Environmental Controls
Although most risks associated with EDI are similar in nature to those found in
information systems and network systems, an evaluation of the controls in EDI
should start with an analysis of what makes EDI special and unique with respect
to other systems in order to obtain the right focus. The potential new risks dis
cussed in Chapter 2 provides the background for a description of the control
techniques presented in this chapter.
While the legal profession will address EDI control concerns in the light of
accountability and liability, the role of the auditor is to ensure that the perceived
new risks are properly addressed and managed by officers charged with this
responsibility. Whether it be EDI or other information systems, the control objec
tives and audit objectives will not change. Those remain: accuracy, completeness,
security, auditability, timeliness, and recoverability. Ultimately the objective of
auditing should be that of providing control assurance. It is true that the focus
may vary depending on the type of EDI transactions and the environment they
operate in. As a case in point, financial versus nonfinancial applications, and the
computing platform such as PC versus mainframe or other.
In view of the high speed and anticipated high volumes coupled with little
human intervention in a near-paperless environment, it is prudent for both man
agem ent and auditors to concentrate on preventive controls rath er than
after-the-fact exception reporting and corrective procedures. To be proactive in
this situation can pay off significant dividends. It is equally important to ensure
that these controls are pre-verified to function as designed, bearing in mind that
the consequences of deficient controls are more far-reaching than non-EDI sys
tems. The potential control solutions for each of the above control objectives are
described below.

Accuracy and
Completeness

Control Objective

Integrity controls should be part of the business specifications and design
upfront and built into the EDI system to ensure that transactions processed at the
application level and environmental level are accurate and complete.
Control Techniques

At the application level:
The following key controls over accuracy and completeness of an EDI trans
action should be considered:
1. Syntactic checks should be performed to determine compliance with
accepted industry or public standards. It should be noted that this type
of checking is usually performed by the translation software, which at
best will ensure syntactic correctness, the presence of acceptable value
types and codes, and the compliance with the standards which have
been used. This level of checking cannot guarantee that unreasonable
or impossible values will not be released. Special editing at the appli
cation level (such as reasonableness check or lim it check) is
recommended.
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2. Each trading partner should advise each other of special editing
against data dictionary items during application level checking to
effect appropriate acknowledgments. Additional translation may be
necessary after syntactic checks are successfully performed. This is
sometimes necessary to bring data items in line with the special
requirements of the recipient’s computer systems.
3. Criteria for positive and negative acknowledgments should be satisfied
at each stage of processing, with details to be worked out between trad
ing partners in accordance with prudent business practices. Items
critical to such acknowledgments should be subjected to special edits.
Examples are unreasonable purchase orders or invoice values. Trading
partners should notify each other of any unusual items encountered
prior to further processing. Examples are null values, cancellations or
duplicates. Triggers which cause internal processing to commence will
heavily depend on the extent of application level checking. The pur
pose is to promptly identify problems or errors so that timely and
effective decisions can be made, thus enhancing accountability and
reducing the severity of problems compounded at a later stage.
4. Continuous process monitoring using techniques such as embedded
audit modules (EAM) can assist in timely identification and resolution
of critical problems as they occur.1See later in this chapter for a discus
sion on EAM’s and Integrated Test Facilities (ITF).
5. Sequence numbers and transaction numbers should be checked for
uniqueness and serial continuity. Date and time stamps are important
elements in the authentication process in detecting duplications and
retransmissions.
6. Embedded headers and trailers at interchange, functional group and
transaction set level should be checked to ensure that they are
matched and the correct batches are processed.
7. Batch totals should be established, with the number and value to trans
actions to be determined and mutually agreed upon by the trading
partners. Where feasible, on-line reconciliation should be considered.
8. Reporting of irregularities should be timely in accordance with proce
dures established between trading partners. Consider keeping these
records in an Error File pending clearance. Context sensitive help or
alerts should be considered at critical processing points.
9. Error logging and incident reporting should be outlined in the trading
partner agreement. Common procedures for the review of errors and
inconsistencies should be established.
10. Audit trails or management trails should contain sufficient details to
prove the existence and evidence of an obligation. This refers to the
classical items such as date/time stamp, access information, operatorID and terminal-ID attached to a transaction which is m achine
readable and can be produced on demand. The issue here, is not
whether the information is electronically stored or paper-based, but
whether it is retrievable and certified to be a true copy of the records
kept. Consider keeping a copy of critical documents with a reputable
third party service provider as official backup.
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At the environmental level:
The control techniques listed above are mainly designed to prevent bad
input, inadvertent processing of erroneous data and to facilitate timely reporting
and review of exceptions. The environmental controls surrounding the EDI sys
tem cover the broader spectrum beyond the input, processing and output
specific to each application. The key environmental control techniques are pre
sented as follows:
1. The quality assurance and change control process of vendor supplied
software should be reviewed. This will include areas of network
upgrade, versions of translation software and application programs.
Ensure that vendors provide adequate docum entation and timely
update and release.
2. There should be evidence of sufficient and adequate testing especially
in areas of message acknowledgments by both sender and recipient;
special editing features; security technology such as MACing and
encryption if employed.
3. There should be segregation of duties between the functions respon
sible for initiating, authorizing, recording and reconciling EDI
transactions, particularly where these are not automated and/or inte
grated with existing applications.
4. An agreem ent should be reached between trading partners with
respect to the migration of new versions and the maintenance of exist
ing version of standards to be followed. This will ensure that the
responsibility and accountability for errors outside the control of each
trading partner can be traced.
5. Translation/communication software should be virus free. Consider
adding a virus protection clause in the legal contract or request ven
dors to provide reasonable assurance that such threats have been
addressed.
6. Liability for errors should be well-defined in the trading partner agree
ment. For more detail see Chapter 7.
7. Obtain an audit report from the vendor’s auditors for an independent
opinion of the control environment of the external party. Obtain the
right to audit the vendor’s products and services periodically to pro
vide additional assurance on the continued functioning of controls.
8. Check if the vendor is prepared to write the Confidentiality Guarantee
and Statement of Reliability or Integrity clauses into the contract.
Although no vendor will provide absolute guarantee, all reputable ven
dors are com m itted to h o n o r th eir corporate announcem ents.
Complementary to this topic there could be a statement of adequacy
of EDI control, which is a management representation and an audit
opinion, external or internal, confirming the continued operation
of controls.
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The following key controls should be in continuous operation to ensure that all
EDI transactions are authorized:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
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Operator Identification Code
Every operator of the EDI System should be uniquely identified by a
valid pre-authorized user identification code (User-ID).
Operator Password
Every operator of the EDI System should have a valid pre-authorized
password in conjunction with user-ID.
Operator Profile
An operator profile should be determined for every operator in the EDI
system. The profile defines and limits what actions an operator will be
permitted to initiate.
The operator profile should be used to limit operator activity within
the EDI system to only those functions which have been pre-authorized
by supervisory management.
Trading Partner Identifier
All requests to access the EDI system should be further validated by
means of a company identifier code. This code serves to identify the
company as an authorized trading partner.
Maintenance of User Access Variables
Maintenance of the user access variables, user-ID, password, and so on
should be the object of logging, including update, creation, and dele
tion, as well as the identity of the person performing the change.
Regular Changing of Passwords
Passwords should be regularly changed in a manner consistent with
security management practices.

Control Objective

The objective of security control is to ensure that all EDI related software and
data are adequately protected against unauthorized disclosure or change during
storage or transmission; and that physical access to the premises and the equip
ment is restricted to authorized users. Ensure that the most cost-effective security
solution is pursued.
Control Techniques

With EDI systems, sufficient attention should be given to the security of data in
transit, either mailboxed with a third party network provider, or enroute to the
trading partner. As EDI data leaves the corporate entity, it may not be subjected
to the same security policy and procedures each trading partner may prefer to
follow. Major differences in philosophy over security issues should be resolved
between trading partners and be well-documented and understood. It is a basic
requirement that EDI is at least as secure as registered mail.
1. The security control procedures should include AUTHORIZATION
procedures which emphasize the validity of the company as an autho
rized trading partner in the current business relationship. Validity
checking against trading partner directory or profile and evidence of
such checking must be documented.
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2.

Depending on the type of EDI transaction and risk, consideration
should be given to Message Authentication Coding (MACing) added
to message transmission to detect attempts to intercept or alter mes
sages that are being transmitted. To be effective, MACing should be
installed “end-to-end” across the network, otherwise it is unreliable.
3. This section is applicable only if Encryption and MACing techniques
are used:
a)

b)

c)

d)

Where Encryption during transmission is warranted, hardware or
software solutions should be evaluated and appropriate encryp
tion techniques adopted. ANSI X3.92 requires that DES algorithm
be used in codebook form. Hardware encryption is performed at
the host facilities, since software encryption is exposed to core
dumps.
When Encryption and/or MACing techniques are used to secure
EDI messages, the restrictions on the use of keys should be
observed. These include random generation of key values and no
duplicate use of the same key in more than one function. A given
key can be used for encryption or authentication, but not both.
Similarly, a key can be used at the functional or transaction set
level, but not both.
Keys should be exchanged using dual control and split knowledge
such that each key custodian is only responsible for generating
one component of the key. The security operator who is responsi
ble for providing security access to the custodians should not have
any key inform ation. After selection of components, written
records should be archived or destroyed. Backup components
should be inventoried, and routinely updated when keys are
replaced.
Procedures should be in place to ensure that each step in the key
exchange process is carried out correctly. This includes keeping
key exchange records current, availability of designated backups,
key personnel changes and documenting the key exchange process.

4.

Security violation reporting with regards to incidents involving logical
access controls an d /o r message authentication should be provided.
Such reports should be reviewed according to prudent management
practices followed by appropriate action. Employees should be encour
aged to report known or suspected security weaknesses or concerns,
and under no circumstances should they be exploited. Statistics on key
behavior like synchronization errors, MAC failure rates and so on,
should be monitored and investigated.
5. There should be documented security incident escalation procedures
between trading partners. Trading partners should respond to security
incidents with the degree of urgency that is appropriate to the per
ceived severity of the incidents. Trading partners should notify the
other partner immediately if it is determined that a risk has arisen to
that partner.
6. Locking devices over terminals, telecommunication closets and work
areas should be secure. A permanent record of equipment and soft
ware (serial number, model description and location) should be
maintained, and a repair and maintenance removal log of each unit.
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Control Objective

The objective of auditability may be stated as the maintenance of adequate audit
trails with regard to transactions sets, and the ability to pre-verify and adequately
monitor electronic authorization and integrity controls of EDI transactions.
Definition

Auditability can be defined as that which has the properties and characteristics of
being auditable. It refers to an area which can be fully audited and be demon
strated and substantiated in the course of an independent expert review.
Information is auditable in the context of modern information systems when it
can be substantiated by tracing it to source documents which can be based on
paper or paperless media, or when reliance can be placed upon pre-verified, cer
tified, and continually monitored control processes.
M ajor Issues

In manual systems, only the first part of the above definition of auditability is gen
erally recognized. The ability to trace backward through the system to identify the
component source transactions affecting an application database item, and the
ability to trace forward a transaction through various intermediate processes to
the database item affected has remained an essential part of the objective of
auditability in computerized systems. These abilities are important when it is
determined that reliance cannot be placed upon just one or more controls.
The second part of this definition of auditability is the reliance upon pre
verified and certified monitored control processes. This aspect first became
necessary in the era of computerized batch processing, when the sheer volume
of transactions made substantive auditing methods uneconomical. Such pre
verification usually involved auditing around the computer, comparing the results of
manual and computer calculations for a sample of transactions. At best, it
involved reviewing reports of exceptional items produced by special audit report
generators. This became possible with the introduction of statistical sampling
methods which permitted substantiation of a small sample of transactions, trac
ing them back to original source documents. Such pre-verification of controls
was generally done in an interim audit, before the year-end audit, in order to
determine whether the auditor could rely on the system of internal controls, and
if so, avoid too many costly substantive auditing procedures, which can involve
substantiating all transactions or large samples. Pre-verification of controls rarely
involved testing computerized controls directly through test decks or integrated
test facilities (ITF), embedded audit modules (EAM) or dummy entities, largely
because of the existence, in the batch processing environment, of compensating
manual controls, such as review of errors listings, and procedures for manual
authorization and reconciliation.2
For on-line, real-time processing environments, pre-verification of comput
erized controls must involve on-line real-time testing of controls. On-line testing
is necessary for the auditor to be able to raise convincing evidence supporting an
objective opinion regarding adequacy and functionality at the point in time of
the test. In the case of EDI and paperless environments where transactions are
authorized electronically, auditability should also include the ability to pre-verify
controls involving the use of user identification codes, individual passwords, user
authorization profiles, terminal source, and message authenticity.
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Control Objective

Management should ensure that appropriate backup, retention and contingency
plans are in place to minimize the domino effect of systems or transaction failure
on existing systems or other trading partners along the EDI time line. Prompt
action should be taken to mitigate the adverse effects of such occurrences. In the
event that it becomes necessary to recover, the recovery should be accomplished
within a mutually acceptable time frame.
Control Techniques

The potential risks in EDI as discussed in Chapter 2 underline the importance of
timely recovery of systems outage and that of a failed transaction set.3
Recovery of a Systems Outage

1. The roles and responsibilities for recovery in the event of a communi
cation line failure between trading partners and service providers
should be well defined.
2. Alternate mechanisms for the transfer of EDI information should be
documented and tested on a regular basis as agreed. Report on such
undertakings should be available to concerned parties on request.
3. Corporate contingency plans should include an estimate of the time
required for reconstruction of EDI transactions in addition to normal
processing needs. This may entail a review of the current assumptions
underlying the maximum period for which an outage can be tolerated.
It is also necessary to prioritize all applications under the contingency
protection plan so that the impact of EDI on other systems can be
gauged.
4. The trading partner agreement should spell out the periodic interval
required for each party to test the contingency plans. Evidence of such
testing should be retained for an agreed period of time.
5. Consider reversibility as a criterion in the event of unsuccessful systems
change. For example a new version of standard or new release of trans
lation software introduced into the EDI environment. An estimate of
the time required to back out as a result of the aborted change may
provide good insights to users and computer support groups in plan
ning for contingencies.
6. Ensure that compatible backup hardware is on-site or that manage
ment has obtained vendor assurance that hardware can be replaced
within agreed-upon time frames.
7. Operating procedures should be in place and duly executed. The
restart and recovery procedures should ensure continuity of process
ing without duplication or loss of data.
8. Backups of system software and EDI information transmitted and
received should be maintained to assist in system recovery. The reten
tion policy should allow for sufficient time for error correction and
resolution of disputes.

9. The recovery of any outage should be followed by either a manual or
system verification that all transactions are accounted for. It may be
necessary for management to provide a statement of compliance to the
counter party that this aspect has been duly complied with.
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Recovery of a Failed Transaction Set

There are two aspects to the recovery of a failed transaction set: timeliness in
obtaining the trace information and the turnaround response time as agreed to
between the trading partners to resolve such requests. It is customary to place the
burden on the receiving party to question the accuracy, completeness and trust
worthiness of a transaction. To properly establish error recovery procedures at
the transaction set level, the following control techniques are recommended:
1. The type and extent of tracing information to be provided by the
sender in the event of nonreceipt or errors reported by the recipient
should be specified. Whether tracing requests are accepted by tele
phone or in writing or FAX should also be specified.
2. Retention requirements should take into consideration that sufficient
time for error correction and resolution of disputes is allowed.
3. Trading partners should agree to the type of incidents to be logged
and reported, as well as the length of time required for any incident to
remain on record.
4. Where feasible, trading partners should share guidelines for investiga
tion of incidents and standard methods for rectifying such situations.
5. The requirements and conditions for reversal or backout of trans
actions if necessary should be well-defined.

Controls Surrounding
Third Party
Network Providers

In evaluating the products and services of a growing number of network service
providers, special consideration should be given to the controls built into these
networks to ensure transaction security and integrity during transmission and
upon arrival at the mailbox. It is important to understand the strengths and
weaknesses of the various network providers.
Many vendors provide automated controls in areas of recovery, protection
against data loss and error checking. In addition, they should also provide assur
ance that these controls are adequately tested or pre-verified. Management and
auditors will then confirm the continual operation of these controls in the pro
duction environment. Where feasible, a prospective user of EDI should obtain an
independent expert opinion on the security and internal controls of the network
service provider of their choice. Apart from the normal contract terms such as
service level, rights and obligations, and schedule for clearing mailboxes, the
third party network provider should also supply the following control tools or
information:
■ Provision of volume traffic in sufficient detail to permit investigation of
transmission errors or data loss.
■ Confirmation of the customer’s absolute right to data in case of disputes.
■ Provision of continuous service in the event of a disaster. The security of
hot sites for the mainframe, if provided, should be comparable to the
existing operational environment. Backup PCs should be virus-free and
stand-alone sterile units dedicated to EDI.
■ Availability of a log of transactions for a specified period needed to arbi
trate the settlement of disputes between trading partners. Specifications
of the format of this log and the storage media would be usefu l.
■ Description of resilience built into the network to withstand occasional
transmission problems or transient failures.
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■ Maintaining confidentiality of trading partner information through both
physical and logical security mechanisms.
■ Checklist for adding and deleting trading partners.
■ Service guarantees provided.
■ Provision of emergency delivery, if required.
■ Justification for billing.
■ Manual fallback procedures.
■ Timely follow-up of errors and inconsistencies.
■ Independent audit opinion on the vendor.

Special Control
Considerations for
Financial EDI

In addition to the controls described in this chapter, financial EDI transactions,
which take place in the last stage of the EDI time line, deserve special attention.
Traditional Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT), while performing similar functions
as a financial EDI transaction, carries very limited payments inform ation.
Financial EDI (FEDI), on the other hand, is information-driven, not fundsdriven. It has the capability of moving both funds and remittance information
concurrently for ease of reconciliation, and to evolve into a new world class cor
porate payment system.4
At the option of the payer, the remittance information can be collected,
analyzed and reported back to the payer as specified, thus compressing the rec
onciliation cycle and unloading some of the accounts payable functions. As EDI
information is integrated with existing applications, and shared throughout the
company, there is a great potential for corporate cash managers to expand their
influence over the entire treasury function.
A 1991 survey conducted by the National Automated Clearing House
Association (NACHA) reported an annualized growth rate of up to 80% for U.S.
corporate EDI payments sent through the Automated Clearing House (ACH) net
work.5Reports from the European banking community are equally encouraging.6
In Canada, an independent industry initiative called the Inter-Financial
Institution EDI Committee, now called Inter*EDI, working with the assistance of
the Canadian Bankers Association, has established the ground rules for financial
EDI. Although these rules only govern the direct participants in the Canadian
financial community, the following are some of the generic controls applicable to
all financial EDI:
■ Clear definition of liability and responsibility for payment.
■ Vetting of all critical parameters affecting the liability transfer, especially
by the legal counsel.
■ Bundling of payment transactions received and delivered for end of day
reconciliation with trading partner.
■ Extended edits to be agreed by trading partners performed outside of
the translation software.
■ Mandatory authentication to verify the origin and integrity of the transaction.
■ Optional encryption of selected payments or all of the information.
■ Possible creation of an audit transaction set in EDI to facilitate continu
ous process monitoring.
As for the auditors reviewing this area of EDI, we suggest that new audit
techniques and approaches be employed to continuously monitor the funds and
information transfer process in a realtime environment. The following control
techniques are specially suitable for auditing EDI:
59

E D I Co n t r o l , M a n a g e m e n t ,

and

A u d it I ssues

■ On-line programs monitoring critical stages of EDI processing.7
■ Automated checks via Expert Systems to emulate human judgment.
■ Audit database consisting of electronic audit trail information evidencing
the existence of a transaction.
■ Embedded audit modules (EAM) to inform the internal auditor when
key automated controls fail to function as intended, thus allowing the
auditor to give an opinion regarding the management’s compliance with
a set of control standards over an entire control period rather than just a
point in time.
Differences Between Funds Transfer and Financial EDI8

EFT

FEDI

■ Payment transaction

■ Payment transaction

■ Value transfer only

■ Value + remittance transfer

■ Funds driven

■ Inform ation driven

■ Retail or corporate customers

■ Corporate-oriented

■ Interbank proprietary form ats
(i.e., SWIFT, CHIPS, FEDWIRE,
ACH, etc.)

■ Public form at: ASC ANSI X12
or UN/EDIFACT
■ CPA-023 (Canada only)

■ CPA-005 (Canada only)

While there are a few similarities between EFT and FEDI, there is only one key
feature that sufficiently distinguishes these two forms of electronic payments.
Unlike EFT, FEDI has the ability to carry the desired level of remittance informa
tion with paym ent, hence adding m ore options to co rp o rate payments
information processing, and consequently prompting auditors to look beyond
the existing controls built into EFT.
Both EFT and FEDI carry the basic payment information which consists of
payment amount, value date, payer and payee account numbers and their finan
cial institutions (FIs), method of payment and transaction reference and so on.
For the EFT message, this is the bulk of the payment record, but for FEDI, this is
only one component information. Other possible information components in
FEDI are remittance advice, credit advice, debit advice and information which
can potentially facilitate balance reporting, accounts reconciliation and cash
management. Depending on the level of sophistication among EDI-capable FIs
and their clients, many of the traditional treasury, accounts receivable and
accounts payable functions may be downsized accordingly. In the future, when
EDI matures, we can expect full autom ation of these functions and their
increased effectiveness, as a result of the likely integration of information from
credit granting, determination of payment terms, delivery schedules, funds trans
fer to ultimate financial transaction reporting.
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There are two public EDI standard formats which handle payment messages. An
analysis of the current version of the ANSI ASC X12 and UN/EDIFACT payment
message formats reveals similar objectives behind the construction of payment
related information. The only visible difference between these two formats is the
ANSI treatment of aggregate information in one transaction set, and the EDI
FACT segmentation of the same information in several messages. In either
approach, the same types of payment information can be captured, if so desired.
Although the ANSI standard is more stable and mature, the recent activities
of the EDIFACT Joint Rapporteur Team suggested that EDIFACT is beginning to
catch up. In September 1992, this team met in Oslo to discuss the use of multi
functional finance messages. The concept was agreed to by the participants, and
a proposal is being prepared by the Pan American EDIFACT Board. Another
concept discussed in that meeting is the need to have the remittance infor
mation section better tailored to the needs of the various industries. The current
remittance information was designed mostly by the food and transportation
industries. But today, industry groups like health services, construction or finan
cial services may have different needs. The following is a high level comparison
of the two formats:

EDIFACT Status 91.2

ASC X12 Version 3020
820

Payment Order/
Remittance Advice

PAYORD

Payment order only

PAYEXT

Payment order and
Remittance advice

DEBADV

Debit advice

CREADV

Credit advice

CREEXT

Credit and remittance
inform ation

REMADV

Remittance advice only

When the ANSI 820 transaction set is used to carry strictly “payment order”
information — in the beginning data segment for payment order or remittance
advice (BPR) — and when the EDIFACT “PAYORD” message format is used to
relay payment instructions only, it is arguably correct to say that FEDI is just
another form of EFT, since both the BPR data segment and “PAYORD” carry
basic funds transfer information which is also carried by other wire transfer
mechanisms. Under these scenarios, FEDI is only a variation of EFT theme.
Consequently, the risks and exposures of FEDI and EDI are similar.
In applying general EDI environmental controls and existing EFT controls,
users should not have specific concerns regarding this limited use of FEDI. It
should be noted that in both EFT and FEDI, there are definite criteria to be met
before funds can change hands. In the case of EFT, successful authentication is
mandatory, while in the ANSI world, the Canadian financial institutions (FI) have
officially announced their position that a positive application level acknowledg
ment is the key requirement.9 With the exception of the “REMADV” message,
there is also provision in EDIFACT for authentication in all the remaining five
messages. The success or failure of authentication is stored in the “AUT” segment
of these messages. It should be noted that the “REMADV” message is not a
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finance message per se as it is exchanged between two corporate entities and does
not carry any payment instruction. This label of “finance message” may come
from the fact that in North America, both JTC/EDI Finance and X12 Finance
Groups are the “owners” of the message. In Europe, the Trade Group “owns” it.
As mentioned earlier, the differentiating feature between EFT and FEDI
resides in the information content of the latter. Therefore, the ability of FEDI to
carry various forms of payment related information is a new area which deserves
special attention, since it may affect many traditional accounts receivable,
payable and cash management functions of an organization.

The Canadian
FEDI Audit Trail

T h e F E D I A u d it T r a il
Originator (Payer)

<A>
Payer's FI
REF *RR* <A> <trace#>
<B>
Originating
Direct Participant

REF *RR* <A> <trace#> <B>

<C>
Receiving
Direct Participant

REF *RR* <A> <trace#> <B> <C>
<A>, <B>, <C> and <D> are CPA FI IDs that
identify the FI's. <Trace#> is assigned by
<A> to identify the 820/824 transaction

Scope of FEDI

<D>
Payee's FI

Movement of 820 and 824 Transaction Set

Source: CPA-023 Standards and Guidelines Applicable to EDI Transactions (November 1992)

An example of the new control in the Canadian FEDI is the presence of an
audit trail which logs the movement of the 820 or 824 transaction sets. A direct
participant in the Canadian payments system is a clearing member of the Cana
dian Payments Association (CPA). The originating payer’s FI may or may not be a
direct participant, but it must assign a trace number to the transaction set. As the
820 or 824 travels from one financial trading partner to the next, each FI must
append a CPA-assigned code to this trace number to form a continuous payment
audit trail. This comprehensive logging and referencing gives the user as well as
the auditor evidence of the existence of an authentic transaction.
Similarly, the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A places the onus on
banks, FI’s, and corporations to prove the audit trail in electronic environments
such as EDI. Should something go wrong with a transmission, the courts will
assign liability according to the audit trail.10 The party that breaks the audit trail
would be placed in an unfavorable position.
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The above represents the positive features about this FEDI audit trail. There
is, however, one issue which must be clearly understood. The addition of a trace
number by the FI does indeed alter the message and therefore the modified 820
must be treated as a new message. It should be recognized that the 820 coming
from the payer or FI, is not the same as the one going out to another FI or the
actual payee. In the EDI context, these are two different messages with their own
reference numbers, date of creation stamp and so on. In terms of the archival
requirements, each one of these messages must be considered and tracked.
When this audit trail is used in conjunction with the available referencing
provided by the translation software and communications software, there is
ostensibly sufficient proof where the transaction begins and ends. Trends and sta
tistical analysis can be performed on this data to provide information about the
behavior of controls over the complete period under review. When similar
databases are created by the trading partner, periodic comparison of key control
information may strengthen the authenticity and integrity of the underlying
transactions. Trading partners sharing views of the EDI environment would facili
tate enhancement of control for mutual benefit and comfort. This approach is
superior to simply relying on trading partners based on unfounded trust.
Further, to ensure project team buy-in, auditors should participate early in the
EDI development cycle to allow sufficient time for their views to be considered.

Monitoring Systems
and Control
on Controls

In environments which can be described as totally systems dependent (TSD), and
virtually paperless, there is a need for control assurance. As seen in Chapter 3,
control assurance is a concurrent objective for information systems management.
Monitoring is clearly a management responsibility as it is part of the control
structure of an organization.
To meet the objective of control assurance, there is a concern for auditors
having to raise value-added evidence to demonstrate compliance over the entire
control period, not just a point in time. A significant objective is to maintain
financial audits cost-effectively, as well as reduce the inherent audit risk. In criti
cal environments described as TSD, there is no way around systems no matter
how much we dislike it. One must be able to lean on the systems fully and com
pletely. The use of EDI and associated business behavior with technology, will
force a shift from balance sheet focus to actual operations. Issues touching on
operational support and contingency affecting the going concern, the quality of
evidence, and inherent audit risk cannot be dissociated from the systems, and
could be hardly overstated.
Various layers of control can be implemented to satisfy the objective of con
trol assurance. A key point is that those controls have to be cost-effective. Further,
sometimes changing technology provides better and cheaper ways to accomplish
what was virtually prohibitive in a previous tech cycle. In TSD environments,
monitoring systems can be a cost-effective approach to control assurance, when
all costs are considered. For instance, the auditor can request that the audit trail
and control information be stored in a separate audit database restricted for
audit use. The medium used could be in the form of CD-ROM or WORM
devices, capturing either image replicated data or selected items based on criteria
according to each set of situation specific circumstances. Those criteria parame
ters are specified by the auditor. Some key monitoring systems are listed below.
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EAMs are recommended for FEDI. The Corporate-to-FI Control Guidelines pro
pose that EAMs be used to monitor the integrity of controls, detect and report to
the auditor or other appropriate parties on the failure to perform as required.11
There should be no restriction as to the generality of use, but the guidelines are
specific to integrity of control regarding the following areas:
■
■
■
■
■

Message Authentication
Encryption and Decryption
Security Incident Reporting
Accuracy and Completeness Controls
Authorization and Access

From an operational point of view, auditors should be the owners of EAMs.
To avoid problems of jurisdiction we could recommend joint ownership of EAMs.
The audit committee which has oversight responsibility could be a co-owner, and
executive management be the other. Intellectually, it would be preferable that
each have their own respective tools and independent means, but it can be recog
nized that it makes economic sense without compromising control assurance that
there be joint-ownership of the modules.
Executive management and the audit committee would closely coordinate
events affecting EAMs with respect to internal and external auditors. Appropriate
procedural mechanisms should be im plem ented to consider application
enhancements and maintenance affecting controls within those applications hav
ing a ripple effect on the EAMs. Change control procedures would pay special
attention to the integrity of EAMs ongoing which is a significant component of
control assurance within the control period. In paperless environments changes
to applications can be very critical with a higher level of risk, requiring compen
sating procedural controls. It might be better to review and reengineer the entire
change control procedure to ensure a cost-effective approach to satisfy the con
straints imposed by control assurance.1213

Integrated Test
Facility (ITF)
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An ITF where available represents an excellent way to test live data transactions
actually processed in the production environment. Proper transaction tagging is
necessary to do reversing adjusting entries to master files, or database. Auditors
are able to perform ongoing tests to check and ensure application controls are
operational. Comparison is made against expected results and conclusions drawn
up. In such an environment, selecting and tagging EDI transactions can be done
to provide the audit function with an independent avenue to raising the evidence
necessary. This is contingent on the spread of EDI versus which applications are
available within the ITF. So knowledge of the environment comes first. For exam
ple, it is conceivable that EDI transactions only cover a certain percentage of the
procurement function, and other subsystems handle the rest.
We can see so far, that whether an ITF is involved or EAMs or both, the first
represents changes to the data files, while the second represents changes to the
application programs. Both are in the production environment, and should be
subject to appropriate change control, be protected and isolated from unautho
rized access and use.
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Using EAMs auditors are in a position to declare what parameters to activate for
monitoring purposes, change the pattern of surveillance at will according to pre
defined objectives, concerns, risks, or evidence required. As a first technique
we find real-time notification, capturing events as they occur, an example cash
disbursement made to a particular supplier or other account where fraud
is suspected.
Tagging is another technique. It generates an extended record permitting
the reporting of the processing steps followed by an application to incoming
transactions, which in other circumstances would not be saved as information.
This is often used in limit checks where on the basis of criteria by the auditor any
thing equal to or exceeding an amount is tagged and reported into a specific file
for later examination and review. Many times this technique is used in combina
tion with snapshot before images and after images of data files. This allows the
raising of evidence regarding logic errors, giving rise to errors in master file data.
So an image is made before a transaction, then again after, and the results are
compared against expected targets.
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Chapter 5 Appendix A: Useful Information

Copies of the ANSI X.12 Standards can be obtained from:
■ EDI Support Services
Washington Publishing
P.O. Box 203
Chardon, OH 44024-0203

Phone: (216) 286-6810

Other ANSI Standards can be obtained from:
■ American National Standards Institute
11 West 42nd Street
New York, NY 10036 Phone: (212) 642-4900
■ Standards Sales Branch
Standards Council of Canada
45 O ’Connor, Suite 1200
Ottawa, Ontario
KIP 6N7
Phone: (613) 238-3222 Fax: (613) 995-4564
Corporate-to-Financial Institution Control Guidelines can be obtained from:
■ Canadian Bankers Association
The Exchange Tower, Suite 600
2 First Canadian Place
Toronto, Ontario
■ EDI Council of Canada
5401 Eglington West, Suite 203
Etobicoke, Ontario
M9C 5K6
Phone: (416) 621-7160

Fax: (416) 620-9175

EDI Payments-Capable Guidelines can be obtained from:
■ The Bankers EDI Council NACHA
607 Herndon Parkway, Suite 200
Herndon, VA 22070 Phone: (703) 742-9190
CPA Standard 023 — Standards and Guidelines Applicable to EDI Transactions
can be obtained from:
■ Canadian Payments Association
Planning and Standards Development
1212-50 O ’Connor
Ottawa, Ontario
KIP 6Z2
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■ Missing data elements

(Continued on next page.)

■ Special controls fo r financial EDI

■ Pre-verification of controls

■ Use of embedded audit modules

■ Reporting o f irregularities

■ Error logging

■ Checks for: exception items
null values, cancellations,
uniqueness and serial continuity

■ Transmission/data quality

■ Reasonableness check

■ Criteria fo r positive and negative
acknowledgments at all levels

■ Special editing

■ Syntactic checks

Application Controls:

■ Control self-assessment program

■ Compliance program

■ Managing third party network providers

■ Trading partner agreement and
other contractual arrangements

■ Industry representation
and participation

■ Sound business strategy and
executive com m itm ent

■ Co-operative systems management

■ Project controls

■ Incomplete standards or versions

Integrity controls should be designed
upfront into the EDI system to ensure that
transactions are accurate, and com plete
at the interchange, functional group, and
transaction set levels.

Management should assess the impact of
EDI on the organization's existing control
structure and ensure that potential new
risks are properly managed.

■ Transmission or transaction errors

■ Inadvertent processing o f rejected
transactions

■ Loss, destruction or corruption of data

■ Inaccurate and inappropriate
transactions

2. Accuracy and Completeness

■ Compressed business cycles

■ Level of integration

■ Intercompany dependencies

■ Redefinition of a com pany

■ New way of doing business

1. Management and Organization

Perceived Risks to___________________Control Objective __________________ Control Techniques________

SUMMARY CONTROL MATRIX FOR EDI

Chapter 5 Appendix B: Summary Control M a trix for EDI
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■ Security incident logging
and reporting
■ Locking devices

■ Not mastering new
security techniques

■ Unauthorized alteration of
transaction data

■ Hardware security modules

■ Encryption

■ Transaction identification
■ Transaction authentication

■ Authorization procedures

■ Controls over third party
network providers

■ Adequate documentation

■ Maintenance of existing or new
hardware or software upgrades

■ Agreem ent on m igration of
new version

■ Segregation of duties

■ Evidence of adequate and sufficient
testing of software

■ Quality assurance and change
control process

Environmental Controls:

Control Techniques

■ Autom ated and manual
management

To ensure that all EDI-related software and
data are adequately protected against
unauthorized disclosure or change during
storage or transm ission; that physical
access is restricted; and that the m ost
effective EDI security solution is pursued.

Control Objective

■ Intercom pany sharing o f inform ation

■ Differing philosophy on security
between trading partners

■ Loss of com petitive advantage

■ Im proper use or disclosure of
business inform ation

■ Unauthorized transaction sets

3. Security

2. Accuracy and Completeness (cont'd)

Perceived Risks to

SUMMARY CONTROL MATRIX FOR EDI (continued)
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■ Not observing turnaround tim e
in responding or resolving requests
fo r tracing or recovery inform ation

■ Domino effect on trading partner

■ Increased dependence and
increased vulnerability

■ Disruption/delays in processing
or transmission

5. Timeliness and Recoverability

■ Lim itations of auditing around
the computer

■ Displacement of manual controls

■ D ifficulty w ith manual verification

■ Loss of audit trail in transit between
one network to the next

■ Loss of paper audit trails

4. Auditability

Perceived Risks to

To ensure that appropriate backup,
retention and contingency plans are in
place to minim ize the sliding scale effects
of a systems outage or transaction failure
on existing systems and other partners.

To m aintain adequate audit trails w ith
regard to transaction sets and the ability
to pre-verify and adequately m onitor
electronic authorization controls and
integrity controls.

Control Objective

■ Sharing o f guidelines between partners

■ Incidents to be logged

■ Retention requirements

Recovery of a Failed Transaction Set:

■ Backups of system software and
transm itted EDI inform ation

■ Restart and recovery procedures

■ Compatible hardware

■ Reversibility criteria

■ Corporate contingency plan

■ Alternate mechanism fo r EDI
inform ation transfer

■ Roles and responsibilities among
trading partners

Recovery of a Systems Outage:

■ Control self-assessment

■ Compliance auditing

■ Compliance reporting

■ Establishment of control standards

■ Backup and retention policy

■ A udit transaction set or audit database

■ Autom ated controls: (electronic
signatures/authorizations;
access control mechanisms;
on-line real-time m onitoring and
testing of controls)
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6.

Project Managem ent and
Package Evaluation
From a broad-based perspective, managing an EDI project is no different from
managing any major application system under development. So, it is expected
that project risks are assessed, development methodologies followed, and project
controls exercised to effect an orderly process and smooth progression towards
implementation. This chapter does not elaborate on project management issues
which are common to all large-scale development projects, but rather, the new
areas of control and concern highlighted from the point of view of the project
manager and the user coordinator. Further, the expanded role of the informa
tion systems audito r as an in tern al control consultant in proactive and
cooperative mode with the project team, is illustrated.

The Emergence
of Inter-Enterprise
Systems

In a report published by Gartner Group Inc. on EDI software and services vendor
evaluation, EDI is seen as a tool to develop inter-enterprise systems that are likely
to introduce fundamental changes, not just in the way a company operates, but
in the very definition of the company itself.1Inter-enterprise systems require that
the project team work closely with the systems’ user personnel from other organi
zations to form a development platform serving as the basis for joint systems and
project management for the best interest of all parties concerned.
Also known as cooperative systems, this concept has far reaching implications
for project managers who must now look beyond the traditional systems bound
aries of their own organization.2 As such, EDI project management will have to
search for solutions serving all partners concerned, recognizing that any EDI
system is as good as its weakest link. In dealing with various participating project
groups, such as developers, MIS representatives, users and general business unit
line management, each group is expanded to work with the trading partner’s
counterpart. Accordingly, EDI project controls must include proper relation
ship management with the project team from the trading partner organizations.
The appointment of EDI coordinators or representatives from both the busi
ness and systems areas is seen as one of the important success variables in EDI
implementation.

Implementation
Issues

Some of the frequently cited roadblocks during the life cycle of an EDI project
provide ample insights for project managers that such barriers must be removed
or given considerable attention before an EDI project is launched. These imple
mentation impediments include:3
■
■
■
■

Lack of strategic perspective;
Absence of senior management commitment;
Differing levels of sophistication among trading partners;
Failure to integrate EDI into existing application systems and operations
within an organization;
■ Fragmented marketing of EDI to management and potential users.
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Until these hurdles are overcome, EDI implementation phase will be pro
longed and the expected benefits will not be realized. To ensure a winning EDI
implementation, project managers have to concentrate on the new implementa
tion issues attendant on this technology, such as:
■ Focus on business strategy, not just on EDI as a system with promising fea
tures or functions;
■ Treat EDI first and foremost as a product, or even better, as an extension
of a product line, not a system;*1234
■ Look into the marketing, financial and organizational dimensions of EDI;
■ Relationship building with trading partners;
■ Executive commitment, management acceptance and employee buy-in;
■ Potential organization-wide benefits when merged with existing informa
tion systems;

Project Management
Issues: Lessons
From Winners

A close look at the above issues confirm that the success of any software develop
ment hinges on the management function. This fact is well summarized in an
article in COMPUTERWORLD on this very subject.5 The lessons to be learned
from some of the most effective software developers are worth citing:
1.

Shoot for Effectiveness
Distinguish working smarter from working faster. In the context of
EDI, exploring and sharing options with the trading partners’ counter
parts is a good starting point. This is truly an example of a cooperative
system aiming at a win-win solution.
2. Building Strong Platforms
In addition to the implementation focus mentioned above, a coherent
product plan, well-structured software architecture and anticipatory
technology are equally important.6The latter aspect, anticipatory tech
nology, is especially relevant to EDI, considering the evolving national
and global standards, while moving away from homegrown software to
packaged software.7
3. Make Effective Communications a Religion
While effective communication is a given in systems development, this
aspect is even more significant in cooperative systems where the proj
ect manager has to count on outside entities to provide a strong link to
his or her own organization’s EDI systems.
4. Foster Creativity
In a disciplined framework, teams should be given freedom to find the
best solution. In EDI systems development, it could mean transcending
the corporate boundaries of an organization to tap into the resources
and minds of the other team.
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To add value to the project team, the information systems auditor must possess a
broad-based perspective on EDI issues. Although as an application, EDI is a com
puter system, the auditor should first view EDI as a business strategy with
potential for integrated application packaging crossing functional boundaries.
The exchange of value-added information and communication may foster trad
ing as well as information partnerships, but also underlines the need to establish
guidelines for the exchange of specific information consistent with organiza
tional policies.
During EDI development, an auditor can provide valuable service to the
project team by focusing on the following items:
■ Evidence of proactive planning versus reactive response;
■ Existing manual controls that have been substituted with automated
ones. The rule of thumb here is that the new controls must be at least as
good as the old ones;
■ Applying controls as appropriate to PC-based systems or mainframe EDI;
■ Definition of responsibilities for maintaining versions of standards and
trading partner directory;
■ Cooperative problem solving and relationship-building with trading
partners;
■ Identification of qualified coordinator to deal competently with func
tional areas along the EDI time line, for example, marketing, purchasing,
production, transportation, and finance;
■ Industry affiliation and appropriate level of participation;
■ Criteria for implementation sign-off by executives, if applicable, should
include considerations which transcend organizational boundaries.

Package
Evaluation

In the last few years, we have witnessed a growing number of EDI software ven
dors offering a wide range of products and services to prospective users of EDI.
Not only are major com puter companies such as IBM, Digital Equipm ent
Corporation (DEC), General Electric Information Services (GEIS) in the market,
and smaller firms are also trying to provide part of the EDI solution. It is antici
pated that more users will purchase packaged EDI-capable applications and
translation software than will develop home-grown proprietary EDI systems as a
result of the maturing and acceptance of continental standards as in the case of
ANSI, or international as in the case of UN/EDIFACT standards. The vendor
selection process in this volatile market should be carefully examined.
The EDI market is populated with vendors offering products and services
ranging from software and consulting to network. While most of the generic cri
teria for software package selection can be applied to EDI, the following are
singled out for special attention:
■ Current and future support of EDI standards;
■ The standards approval process, concurrent number of generations sup
ported, average lag time between standard adoption and software
upgrade;
■ Flexibility of communications support such as interfaces with leased lines
and third party networks;
■ Protocols from which translation is available;
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■ Detailed description of the resilience built into the network/mailbox
which has to withstand occasional transmission problems or transient fail
ure of the network database;
■ Details of guarantees provided to ensure message delivery and reporting
capabilities in areas of success/failure of transmissions and the reporting
security breaches;
■ Mailbox facilities;
■ Auditing of document life cycle;
■ Mapping capabilities supported, flat file, on-line user defined interface
or menu-driven;
■ Upgradable from micro to mini or mainframe;
■ Multiple hardware and software platforms supported;
■ Security features, whether package can be used at a recovery site under
comparable security;
■ Availability of formal implementation plan;
■ Details of archive facilities, on-line for short-term and off-line for long
term;
■ External auditor’s report or independent review.
The above list highlights the areas that warrant both implementors’ and
auditors’ attention, in addition to generic package selection checklists that can
be found in most project manager’s handbooks as well as related audit programs.

Sources for More
Vendor Information

For more information on the products and services provided by EDI vendors, the
reader can consult the following publications. The details of these references can
be found in the Bibliography section of this book:
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
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7.

Legal Issues in EDI Implementation

S ection!—
The American
Perspective*

Business messages between independent firms can have legal implications.
Professionals must recognize, however, that legal issues are more important for
some transactions than for others. Among the factors determining importance
are the value of the particular transactions in question, whether they form con
tracts and whether particular government regulations apply to them.
Businesses use EDI to issue instructions to, and make commitments with,
outside parties. EDI is often used to form legally binding contracts. An example
of an EDI contract occurs when a buyer issues an EDI purchase order for 1,000
boxes of goods at $100 per box, and a seller responds with an affirmative EDI
purchase order acknowledgment. The order is an “offer, ”the acknowledgment is
an “acceptance” and together they constitute a contract. Both parties are legally
required to buy and sell the 1,000 boxes at $100 per box.
Electronic contracts raise some issues: 1. Are they enforceable in court?
2. What terms and conditions are included within them? 3. Can they be proven
in court? 4. How must they be recorded for tax purposes? 5. To what extent is a
third party network liable if it loses an acceptance message and thereby prevents
a contract from being formed?

Trading Partner
Agreements

A common method for addressing some of the legal issues in EDI is for each pair
of trading partners to enter a Trading Partner Agreement (TPA). The American Bar
Association has published a model EDI trading p artn er agreem ent (ABA
Model).1 It is designed specifically for use with EDI purchase orders, although it
can be modified for use with other documents, such as bills of lading and letters
of credit. The hope is that the model agreement can help to standardize the trad
ing partner agreements used in industry. This would save users time and trouble.
The ABA Model is only a model, not a mandatory standard. Users may mod
ify its terms as they deem appropriate. Nevertheless, the Model offers a good
place to start drafting an agreement, and gives an excellent checklist of issues.
The EDI Council of Canada has also published a model trading partner
agreement, which is similar to the ABA Model.2
The choice whether or not to have a TPA is a business decision to be made
by managers in consultation with their attorneys. The agreement can be analyzed
in two parts:
A. terms dealing specifically with EDI communication, and
B. trade terms and conditions.
* Section I was written by Benjamin Wright, Attorney and Counselor, Dallas, Texas. © Copyright Benjamin
Wright 1995.
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Part A covers the manner in which EDI will be conducted, interpreted and
enforced. Part B covers the underlying trade or “legal”terms and conditions that
apply to the transaction effected through EDI, such as a purchase and sale. Parts
A and B are discussed in more detail below. Despite the value of TPAs, they have
a drawback. They can be time consuming to negotiate and sign. They require
business people to enlist the attention of lawyers, and they can sometimes raise
thorny, intractable issues. Accordingly, some EDI users can reasonably decide to
forego TPAs, as the costs can appear to outweigh the benefits of the TPAs.
In addition, there are alternative measures, that fall short of full TPAs. A
company could, for example, send a declaratory letter to its trading partner
asserting the company’s position and policy on the issues that would otherwise be
in the TPA.3 Ideally the trading partner would sign this and return it, transform
ing it into a TPA. But there is a good chance the partner will not sign it. Still, the
letter establishes the sender’s position. In a dispute it may also give the sender an
argument that its trading partner knew what the sender’s terms were, did not
object, and therefore implicitly agreed to those terms.

Part A —
Communication
Terms
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The Part A issues to the TPA include an agreement on whether EDI is considered
“written” what will be considered a “signature”for EDI purposes, what communi
cations standard (such as ANSI X12) the parties will use, what special
modifications the parties will apply to the chosen standard, the division of liabil
ity in the event of an error or disaster, the requirement to maintain security and
so on.
Perhaps the most critical issue in Part A deals with the writing and signing
issues. There is some confusion whether EDI transactions are enforceable in court
as contracts. The chief reason is that the “statute offrauds ”generally requires some
contracts to be supported by written and signed evidence to be enforceable.4
However, there seems to be consensus among knowledgeable lawyers that a welldrafted TPA can overcome this problem for all practical purposes.
How important is the writing/signing issue for a specific user? It depends. If
the user is particularly concerned about the enforceability of its electronic con
tracts, the writing/signing issue deserves attention. If the value of these contracts
is low, however, the issue may not be worth the time and expense it would take to
deal with it. In addition, there is a persuasive argument that the statute of frauds
as it stands today should consider recorded EDI contracts as enforceable even if
the parties have no TPA.5
Another issue is a determination of where messages have to be and when to
have legal effect. Under the ABA Model, messages are not effective until they
have reached a certain computer designated by the recipient. This issue is impor
tant, for example, if a company fixes a certain deadline each day after which
messages will be rejected or will be processed at a more expensive rate.
The ABA Model contemplates that functional acknowledgment messages
will always be used to confirm received messages. The Model’s drafters felt that
functional acknowledgments are so inexpensive that they should always be used.
This could be a valid conclusion for many EDI implementations. However, the
ABA Model was written by lawyers, not business managers. Some companies con
sider functional acknowledgments unnecessary. Alternative means for ensuring
successful communication are available.
Some TPAs contain mutual trading partner obligations to acquire the
equipment and services, and to institute the controls, necessary to conduct EDI
securely and competently. The implication is that, if one partner fails to imple
ment a good system, he must answer for any damages his partner suffers. This
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mutual obligation may be appropriate in some instances, but it may not in others.
Prior to EDI, parties did not agree to obtain the equipment and services neces
sary to open and respond to the mail. If a seller failed to open an envelope that
contained a purchase order, the seller simply lost the order. But he was not
legally liable to the buyer. The buyer knew that she could not rely on the order
until she received a message from the seller accepting it.
It is prudent in more sophisticated EDI implementations to establish in the
TPA norms for the sequencing of transactions. If it is contemplated that series of
inter-related messages will be transmitted between trading partners (such as
request for quotation, response to request, purchase order, purchase order
acknowledgment, purchase order change, and so on), the TPA can describe and
regulate the process. If the TPA is silent on the issue, there could be confusion as
to precisely when obligations come into being as the result of an exchange of
EDI messages. For example, after the exchange of a request for quotation and a
response, is a purchase order all that is necessary to make a binding order, or
must the buyer send a purchase order and wait for the seller to respond with an
accepting purchase order acknowledgment? Some industries (such as the auto
motive industry) publish guidelines on these matters, which can be incorporated
into a TPA. The ABA Model permits sequencing issues to be dealt with in the
Model’s Appendix, but the Model gives little guidance on what rules the parties
should adopt.

P art B —
Trade Terms
and Conditions

Part B of the TPA deals with the trade terms and conditions (TT&Cs) that used
to be printed on the backs of paper documents such as purchase orders and
invoices.
Part B of the TPA is usually more important than Part A. Generally, it is
much more likely that a serious dispute will arise out of the TT&Cs in Part B.
They cover such issues as products liability for the goods sold via EDI, the policy
for the return for defective goods and the warranty that the goods sold do not
violate the patents of others.
EDI technology discourages communication of those terms in a fashion
analogous to the way they were communicated in paper trading. The reason is
that EDI standards are written for the communication of simple codes, not freetext legal clauses.6 Many companies — particularly sellers of goods — perceive
the urgent need to affirm what they intend the TT&Cs to be in EDI. A user might
take any number of approaches to TT&Cs — none is perfect.
One

The user can ignore TT&Cs. Then, if there were a dispute over terms, the law
would apply terms by default. For example, suppose Supplier is selling equip
ment parts to Customer through EDI. They have no TPA and have not otherwise
communicated TT&Cs. Some of the parts turn out a year later to be defective.
Customer demands that Supplier replace the parts. Supplier refuses, saying that
its policy is to warrant parts for only 90 days. Customer claims not to have known
of, or agreed to, that warranty. It argues that the law automatically (by default)
provides for a longer warranty. Customer would likely prevail. Article Two of the
Uniform Commercial Code would furnish Customer a warranty that extends
beyond 90 days.
A problem with the default terms is that they may not be exactly what the
user wants. Another problem is that many believe the default terms provided by
Uniform Commercial Code Article Two favor buyers over sellers.
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Two

The user could reach an explicit but confused compromise with its trading part
ner using the following technique. The user and its partner would each attach its
respective paper form (purchase order, acknowledgment or invoice) to the back
of a TPA and then state in the TPA that the TT&Cs that shall govern each trans
action will be those that would govern if the transaction had been effected with
the use of the paper forms. This approach is not unusual in EDI. It gives parties
(even sellers) a certain measure of comfort because it allows each party an oppor
tunity to argue that its TT&Cs control over the other party’s. This measure of
comfort may be enough, depending on the value of the transactions involved. Yet
this is an inelegant solution; it leaves the situation utterly ambiguous.
Three

The user could negotiate and agree with its trading partner on specific terms.
This is the ideal alternative because it gives the greatest certainty. If the user
already has a master purchase and sale agreement with its trading partner, then
this alternative may be very easy to adopt. The user would just incorporate that
master agreement into the TPA. If the user does not have a master agreement,
however, negotiation of TT&Cs may be necessary, and negotiation is often time
consuming. For many companies, this can be the greatest legal snag experienced
in EDI implementation. Fortunately, one practicing attorney, Ralph M. Savage,
has developed a form document to aid the negotiation process. It provides man
agers a checklist of major TT&Cs (for sales of goods transactions) so that they
can negotiate the terms quickly.7
Four

The user could mail its trading partner a declaratory letter, as mentioned above.8
It would function much as a paper purchase order or purchase order acknowl
edgment does today. It would state the exclusive TT&Cs the user intends to do
business under and invite the trading partner to sign it and return it. But it would
declare that its terms control even if the trading partner does not sign and return
it. The advantage of such a declaratory letter is that it is quick, avoids negotiation
and in some cases may be effective in legally establishing the TT&Cs the sender
desires. The disadvantage is that it may sometimes not be effective. But the form
paper documents companies used before EDI suffered the same infirmity.
Finally

The user could engage in “electronic combat” One large manufacturer has taken
this position with each of its trading partners: It prefers that its trading partner
sign a definitive agreement on TT&Cs. Yet if signing is delayed or refused, the
manufacturer will continue exchanging EDI with that partner and will send its
TT&Cs as an electronic message with each of its EDI transmissions. In effect, it
breaks the informal rule that extensive free-text should not be communicated
with EDI. It asserts its TT&Cs in a fashion similar to the way they were asserted
before EDI — as writing on the backside of a paper form.
Some industry groups are drafting model agreements for their particular
industries. These are tailored to cover industry-specific transactions. The
Automotive Industry Action Group has issued a model agreement, which is based
in large part on the ABA Model. Users should consult their own industry groups
to see if they have special models.
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EDI recordkeeping is important for several reasons. First, the parties need to be
able to prove what they agreed to. Second, auditors need to be able to confirm
transactions. Third, tax authorities need to see records of purchase orders,
freight bills and invoices.
If there were a dispute between two trading partners over what they agreed
to through EDI messages, the existence of evidence of the messages would be crit
ical to any resolution. One can imagine Customer contending that its purchase
order offered to buy 500 boxes and Supplier alleging the quantity was 1000.
To ascertain the truth, would a court consider any of the magnetic, optical
or paper printout records maintained by the parties? One can imagine the oppo
nent to such evidence arguing that it is too subject to error or fabrication to be
useful in court. Magnetic records, for example, can be altered after-the-fact, with
out leaving a trace.
Judges, however, have been permitting the admission of computer records
into courtroom evidence for over 20 years.9 The central question a judge wishes
to know is whether the record is “reliable”There is some academic debate over
the way in which judges ascertain the reliability of computer records, but by and
large judges have been very accepting of computer records.10,11 The key to ascer
taining the reliability of computer evidence is to assess the controls that make it
reliable. This observation should come as no surprise to auditors, for they know
they cannot rely on the information in a system unless the system is adequately
controlled. Hence, the practical solution to the legal evidence concern is the
same solution that applies to audit concerns: EDI systems need to be adequately
controlled to ensure that the records the systems create are accurate. See
Chapter 5 for a discussion on controls enhancing the EDI record credibility.
EDI raises a new control issue. In case of a disagreement between trading
partners, what prevents one party or the other from forging or altering its
records? A variety of controls might be instituted to address this problem. Some
(such as cryptographic authentication) are more difficult and expensive to
implement than others. The choice of controls for any particular implementa
tion depends on many factors. See Chapters 4 and 5.
To best understand the nature of this choice, one should first consider the
flaws of the medium EDI is replacing — paper. Commercial contracts written on
paper are often several pages in length, but seldom are the pages held together
with much more than a staple. What prevents the holder of a contract from lift
ing the staple and switching out a couple of pages? The physical properties of the
paper provide weak safeguards against page switching.
One might argue that if one party switched out pages, a court could detect
it. The new pages might have a different typestyle or a different quality of paper.
But these special “forensic”qualities of paper were easily defeated. The careful
wrongdoer would use the same typestyle and paper quality. Alternatively, the
wrongdoer might say,
The reason pages 2 and 3 have typestyles and paper quality that are different from
pages 1 and 4 is that the original party sent them to me in that condition. The origi
nal party deliberately wanted to create doubt in our minds today about the
authenticity of pages 2 and 3. So, I tell you truthfully, this is the entire, authentic
document!

So when we recognize paper’s shortcomings we realize fraud has historically
not been prevented so much by the forensic properties of the medium of com
munication as by the wealth of facts and circumstances surrounding a business
deal. One of the things that makes it difficult to change a document is the possi-
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bilily that the other party kept a copy. In addition, the other party may remember
what the terms of the original document were. Thus, the document alterer may
be buying herself nothing more than a nasty argument in court. And, if the
wrongdoer is caught, she can be sued for fraud, and her reputation as a rep
utable business person will be tarnished.
Granted, it does require some effort and care to change a paper document.
But, it also requires something to change an electronic document, namely: (1)
access to the document, (2) the necessary software, (3) detailed knowledge of
the deal between the parties, and (4) the recording of the document on an
erasable medium. EDI systems can be designed to deny some or all of these to
potential wrongdoers.
One idea is that a third party network would store copies of EDI messages as
legal records. This proposal has hazards, however. The records, which are them
selves valuable assets, would then be outside the immediate control of the user.
Under the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, a government
law enforcement agency can gain access to those records under some circum
stances. What is more, the government can (sometimes) even force the third
party network to delay for some period (such as 90 days) telling the user that the
government is snooping through the user’s records. Users therefore prefer to
keep their records under their own roof.
For most EDI implementations, the wiser approach is to design internal
recordkeeping programs that simply deny items [1] through [4] above to the
people who have an incentive to commit fraud. EDI systems can be designed, for
example, so that transactions are automatically written to a non-erasable optical
disk. Alternatively, trusted recordkeepers can be designated within user compa
nies. These recordkeepers can store on magnetic tape (or other media) records
of all EDI transmissions. The recordkeepers can be groups of employees who are
insulated from the incentive to read and alter records. They can be denied the
software and training necessary to make intelligent alterations of messages.
These trusted recordkeepers would be similar to an independent “third, party,”
even though the user companies employ them.12 Chapters 4 and 5 discuss other
controls that can contribute to making EDI records credible.

Record Retention
and Control
Requirements
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Many larger companies have formal record retention policies for all their
records. Smaller companies should have such policies but often do not. These
specify which records should be kept, the cataloguing systems that apply to the
records and the dates records should be destroyed. Development of these poli
cies takes into account many factors, such as retention costs, legal agreements,
regulatory requirements, tax and audit needs and even antitrust concerns. The
cost and antitrust factors militate toward destroying documents early. The others
militate toward longer retention.
EDI implementors are well advised to reconcile their data retention prac
tices with the overall corporate record retention policy. In larger corporations,
this would involve contacting the corporate records retention manager (or com
mittee). The corporate policy for paper documents will probably have specific
retention periods for such documents as purchase orders, bills of lading and
invoices. The EDI implementor needs to consider how these should apply to cor
responding EDI transactions.
One problem is that EDI data may normally be retained in a chronological
log, which mixes purchase orders, invoices and bills of lading. But the old record
retention policy may call for each of those documents to be destroyed at a differ
ent time. The selective destruction of particular EDI transactions may not be
practical without special planning.
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Another issue is that EDI records need to be retained in a fashion that per
mits them to be read years later. It may be necessary, therefore, to keep EDI
system documentation and software so that a future researcher can read records.
This requires some foresight on the EDI implementor’s part.
One particular recordkeeping law to bear in mind is tax law. Authorities
expect taxpayers to keep records of transactions such as invoices and payments so
the taxpayer declarations on tax returns can be substantiated. Traditionally, this
meant that taxpayers kept original, paper-written invoices, checks and check stubs.
EDI’s elimination of paper raises an issue. Taxpayers can keep computer
records of transactions, but what assurance does the tax auditor have that they
should be believed. For all the auditor knows, the taxpayer forged or changed
them.
The United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has long maintained poli
cies on the way in which corporate taxpayers must keep records of tax-related
information that happens to be in computer format. These policies, embodied in
Revenue Ruling 71-20 and Revenue Procedure 86-19, contemplate taxpayers
keeping electronic records of accounting information (such as ledgers and jour
nals), but they also contemplate those taxpayers keeping the original paper
documents (such as invoices) that supported the information on the electronic
records. As they stood prior to 1991, Rev. Rul. 71-20 and Rev. Proc. 86-19 were
ambiguous and confusing in their application to EDI.
In October 1991, the IRS revised REC. Proc. 86-19 by issuing Rev. Proc. 9159 (see appendix to this chapter). Rev. Proc. 91-59 generally provided the
following for corporate taxpayers having assets of at least $10 million:
1. The taxpayer need not make hardcopy (paper) records if they would
not normally be created.
2. The taxpayer must keep electronic records of EDI transactions that have
a tax relevance. These records, when combined with any other records
the taxpayer keeps, must contain all the information required to be
retained under the Internal Revenue Code for the relevant transactions.
3. The taxpayer need not institute any particular regime of controls over
EDI records, but the taxpayer must retain docum entation that
describes the controls that are in place. Further, the taxpayer must be
able to establish the “integrity ”of its EDI records, and must reconcile its
EDI records with its other books and records.
In effect, the IRS is saying that the taxpayer has considerable discretion.
The taxpayer can keep some or all records on computer media, but the aggre
gate of its electronic and paper records must contain all the tax information
relevant to the transactions conducted via EDI.
Further, the taxpayer must devise its own control methods and be prepared
to show the Service that the methods chosen are adequate to make the records
reliable. Ultimately, it is appropriate that the taxpayer bear the burden of estab
lishing that its records are reliable. Still, it may be useful for the government to
provide the taxpayer more guidance on what controls are necessary to satisfy gov
ernment auditors.13
The IRS staff can assist the taxpayer in designing a particular recordkeeping
program. Upon request, the local IRS District Director will assign an IRS EDP
specialist to advise a taxpayer in a “record, retention review” The specialist is not
likely to conduct a full analysis of the taxpayer’s recordkeeping system or to give
the taxpayer extensive advice. But with the District Director’s approval the spe
cialist may concur with specific suggestions from the taxpayer that certain
records be destroyed. The initiative for identifying and suggesting which records
to destroy probably must come from the taxpayer.
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As of late 1994 state tax authorities were beginning to consider whether
they should adopt recordkeeping regulations to cover EDI. The California Board
of Equalization was circulating a draft amendm ent to its Sales and Use Tax
Regulation 1698. The amendment adopts an approach that is similar to Rev.
Proc. 91-59, with some variation.

Vendor Agreements

Third Party Network Agreements

Unlike trading partner agreements, no models have been drafted for third party
network agreements or EDI software agreements. Virtually all vendors of services
and software, however, have their own “standard form” agreements that they ask
customers to sign. These agreements are written by the vendors’ counsel for the
purposes of maximizing the vendors’ rights and minimizing the vendors’ expo
sure to liability.14
Customers are well advised to have counsel review these agreements before
signing them. Vendors will often negotiate the terms of these agreements — up
to a point.
A guiding principle for any customer negotiating a vendor agreement is
that all important terms should be clearly written into the agreement. If a cus
tomer expects the vendor to satisfy a particular technical requirement or provide
a service promised in a sales pitch, the customer wants the contract to reflect that
requirement or service. The typical vendor contract contains an “integration”
clause stating that the contract embodies the entire and exclusive agreement
between the parties. So if the agreement does not contain a term the customer
had bargained for, it is doubtful the customer can enforce that term.
Another general principle to observe with vendor agreements is that techni
cal words need to be defined carefully. Information technology terms mean
different things to different people. The more thorough the definition of terms,
the less room there is for misunderstanding.
Most vendor agreements contain clauses limiting (1) the warranties for the
service or product provided and (2) the vendor’s liability under the agreement.
The first clause might say that the vendor does not warrant that the service or
software is fit for the customer’s particular purpose. This clause might come as a
rude surprise to a customer who has specifically described to the vendor the pur
poses the customer expects the service or software to achieve! In effect, this type
of clause reduces the number of grounds on which the vendor might ever be in
breach of the contract.
The second clause might say that if the vendor breaches the contract, the
vendor’s liability will not exceed some portion of the fees or price paid by the
customer. It is likely to exclude any vendor liability for consequential damages,
such as the profits the customer would lose if the vendor’s product failed. The
vendor’s argument in favor of this clause is that the vendor should not accept sig
nificant liability for its errors because the customer is in a better position to
protect against losses.15 Irrespective of that argument’s validity, it points out that
the wise customer will consider what backup systems and other controls are in
place to protect it from shortcomings in the vendor’s performance.
A customer desires that its data remain confidential. It may also wish to
restrict the freedom of a third party network to monitor the volume and direc
tion of customer data traffic and to build statistical analyses of that traffic. Such
information could be competitively very sensitive. A customer can insist that
appropriate clauses to protect the customer be stitched into the third party net
work agreement.
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Sometimes EDI system auditors need assurance that third party network sys
tems function properly and are adequately controlled. Auditors may obtain that
assurance by auditing the systems directly or by receiving reports from other
auditors who have audited the systems. Such reports are called “third party
reviews.”To prepare for any potential auditor requests, a customer could add to
the third party network agreement clauses requiring the third party to maintain
appropriate control and system documentation, and to periodically provide the
customer’s auditors either an appropriate third party review or access to the sys
tems, documentation and network staff necessary to conduct an audit.
Software Agreements

A software developer seldom “sells”software to its customer. It “licenses”the soft
ware’s use. The license usually restricts use to a particular customer site or to a
stated number of customer computers. Use beyond that authorized in the agree
m ent causes the custom er to breach the agreement. Software developers’
agreements often contain clauses that designate the developer as the only party
authorized to update or maintain the software. (EDI translation software must
regularly be updated because EDI standards regularly change.) This provision is
not in the customer’s interest. The customer prefers the flexibility to hire others
to maintain the software in case the customer and the developer have a falling
out. The customer also prefers that the maintenance clause limit the amount by
which the developer may increase its maintenance fee each year.

Special Regulations

Companies operating in particular industries, or particular countries, may be
subject to unique regulatory requirements that affect EDI implementation. The
regulations may mandate that special language appear on a purchase order or an
invoice, or may set specific recordkeeping and control requirements for company
transactions. Depending on the situation, the regulations may either explicitly or
implicitly demand paper writing. When EDI implementors encounter such regu
lations, the laws may need to be changed or the government may need to waive
or reinterpret the requirements.
For example, some Department of Transportation regulations pertaining
to the communication of hazardous materials information between a cargo ship
per and a railroad carrier might be construed to require the exchange of paperwritten information. The Department, however, has issued special waivers to
some railroads permitting specified hazardous materials information to be com
municated via EDI under certain conditions.
Sometimes, however, government agencies will be reluctant to interpret
ambiguous laws to allow electronic communication. Texas sales tax regulations,
for example, provide an exemption from tax on a sale if the buyer gives the seller
an appropriate certificate. The Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts prescribes
the form of the certificate, and that form today requires a signature.16 The rele
vant statute, adopted by the state legislature, requires that the certificate be
“written.”17 One Texas EDI user requested that the Comptroller rule that an elec
tronically transmitted certificate can be deemed “signed ” and “written” The
Comptroller’s office did not believe it had the power to issue such a ruling.
Moreover, the Comptroller’s office felt its auditors would not be equipped to
detect fraud in electronic certificates as well as they could in paper certificates.
Problems such as that in Texas necessitate better education of government
authorities, and in some cases, appeal to legislatures to amend the law.
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The Role of
Lawyers and
Auditors

EDI presents legal and audit professionals some novel challenges. The applica
tion of laws, rules and principles to EDI transactions may sometimes be unclear.
Lawyers and auditors may be unable to use traditional devices (such as ink auto
graphs) to accomplish evidence, control and other goals. EDI thus demands
innovative thinking and the exercise of judgment. It also demands reeducation.
Eventually, all legal issues in EDI can be addressed. Paper and ink are just
one among many means for recording and controlling information. Electronic
methods can replace them. Lawyers and auditors should not shrink from these
challenges. Their clients rightfully expect insightful analysis and creative solu
tions, not roadblocks. Ultimately, many of these challenges boil down to an
assessment of risk and reward. Seldom do the risks involve criminal or moral mat
ters. Instead, they usually involve merely economic risks, something businesses
deal with day in and day out.
EDI is an immensely valuable technology. It promotes efficiency and pro
ductivity. Companies implementing EDI can reap tremendous cost savings,
respond more quickly to changes in the market and realize critical strategic
objectives. Often, the rewards of using EDI far outweigh any of the legal risks
involved. Creative thinking can minimize those legal risks considerably.

Section I I —
The Canadian
Perspective†

The sale of goods, and related activities such as their transport, insurance and
financing, is invariably accompanied by a movement of information. For the past
several hundred years paper-based documents, in the form of contracts, purchase
orders, invoices, bills of lading, and so on, have served as the predominant
means by which to record this and other forms of commercial information. Over
the past twenty years, however, developments in the areas of computers and
telecommunications have created technologies that allow such paper-based docu
ments to be replaced by direct computer-to-computer communications using a
public or industry standard format. This latter practice, generally known as elec
tronic data interchange (EDI), promises huge benefits to businesses and other
organizations involved in commerce given that through EDI more accurate and
more timely information can be exchanged for less cost than is the case with
paper-based documents. Such a compelling combination of advantages likely will
ensure the continued rapid growth of EDI in an ever increasing number of com
mercial and administrative settings.
The substitution of EDI for paper-based documents presents numerous
technical, control and legal challenges. EDI raises numerous legal questions
because in so many respects it differs from the paper-based mode of collecting,
storing, presenting and transmitting information. Paper-based documents are
durable and can remain in existence for many years. Alterations to paper docu
ments can be detected quite readily. Documents on paper can be conveniently
authenticated by personal signatures or by other means. Most importantly, legal
systems around the world have had some two hundred years, and in some cases
even longer, to develop a comprehensive system of statutory and judge-made
ru les governing all aspects of the use of paper-based documents in commerce.
Familiarity, among other things, breeds reliable legal precedent. Today business
people and their legal advisors have a very good idea of how the law will treat a
† Section II was written by George S. Takach, Partner, McCarthy Tetrault, Toronto. © Copyright George S.
Takach 1995.
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particular question relating to a paper-based document, such as whether a cer
tain document is admissible in a legal proceeding, because either a specific
provision in a statute addresses, or a previous decision of a judge has addressed,
the question.
The same cannot be said with respect to EDI. While there exist various tech
nical means to help ensure the “durability,” “non-alterability ” and “authenticity ”of
information that is collected, stored, presented and transmitted electronically,
legal systems have yet to amend statutory rules sufficiently, or produce judicial
decisions, in order that EDI be accorded the same legal certainty as paper-based
documents. Many, many questions remain unanswered. These questions, and the
uncertainty caused by them, in most cases will not present an insurmountable
hurdle to the implementation of EDI in any particular setting. Managers respon
sible for EDI, however, should be sensitive to these questions, should come to
understand them with the assistance of legal counsel, and then should plan to
implement EDI in a manner that reduces, as much as possible, the uncertainty
caused by them.

Contract Law
Issues

Several rules of contract law strive to ensure that parties to a contract create a
reliable record of their contractual commitments so that, if there is any dispute
between the parties as to their respective contractual obligations, it is clear what
the parties agreed to in their contract. Thus in Canada, and in many other juris
dictions, certain contracts must be made in “uniting”and must be “signed”by the
parties to the contract. Rules have also been developed regarding the formation
of contracts, such as the rules regarding “delivery ”of written documents intended
to create contractual obligations so as to determine when and where a contract
has come into existence. Numerous rules also exist to govern the rights and obli
gations flowing from certain documents used in international trade. In each of
these areas EDI poses a challenge to the traditional legal rules.
Legislation exists in many jurisdictions requiring that certain contracts be in
“writing”For example, the legislation in several Canadian provinces that govern
the sale of goods provides that contracts for the future delivery of goods are not
enforceable unless they are “in writing.”Moreover, in these jurisdictions it is often
not clear whether a “writing” can include anything that is not visible to the
unaided eye. As a result, the important question arises whether, under these rules
of law, EDI may be used to create enforceable contracts.
There will not be a definitive answer to this question until the courts answer
it, or until laws are passed that expressly recognize EDI messages as being capable
of creating legally binding commitments. Until one of these solutions comes to
pass, the best that businesses and other organizations using EDI can do is to
address the “writing issue” in their EDI trading partner agreements (TPAs).
Fortunately, in December 1994 the Province of Ontario, Canada’s most impor
tant province commercially speaking, amended its Sale of Goods Act to delete the
writing requirement, thereby benefitting users of EDI in that province.
Many of the same statutes that require certain agreements to be in writing
also stipulate that they be “signed ”by the parties to the agreement. The “signature
issue,” however, is less problematic in Canada than the “writing issue”because
rather than being defined generally in a statute, the term “signature” may be
interpreted with flexibility by judges. Indeed in a recent case the answer back of
the sender of a telex was mentioned as constituting a signature. Nevertheless, it is
still sensible to address the signature issue in a TPA.
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EDI also raises some contract formation questions. In order to form a con
tract there must be, among other things, an offer from one party and an
acceptance of that offer by another party. In situations where there is simultane
ous conveyance of offer and acceptance in one place, such as in face-to-face
negotiations and contract signings, there is rarely an issue regarding when and
where the contract was made. Where there are not simultaneous negotiations and
communication in one place, the general rule has developed in Anglo-Canadian
jurisprudence that an offer is not accepted until the acceptance of the offer is
communicated to the offeror. Some 100 years ago in the U.K. an exception to this
rule was developed by judges for offers and acceptances sent by mail. The socalled “post box”rule holds that where an offer is made by the mail, the contract is
made immediately at the time the acceptance is posted in the mail (rather than
when the acceptance is actually received by the offeror) where use of the mail is
reasonable in the circumstances or expressly contemplated by the parties.
It may be asked whether this “post box” doctrine would apply to EDI. It
might in the case where an EDI message is sent not directly to the intended EDI
trading partner, but rather to a third party EDI service provider (a VAN) who
holds the message for some period until the intended recipient retrieves it elec
tronically from the service provider. By contrast, the “post box” doctrine likely
would not apply to EDI messages that are transmitted directly between trading
partners, given that such a relationship approximates more closely instantaneous
communication of offer and acceptance. In this regard it is interesting to note
that the courts have not applied the “post box”doctrine to telex communications,
but rather for such means of “nearly instantaneous ”communication the courts will
look at a variety of factors to determine when a contract came into existence.18
Given that this judicial rule for telex communications leaves each court with a
fair degree of discretion, and assuming a similar approach would be taken to
EDI, again it is recommended that trading partners deal with the contract forma
tion issues of when and where a contractual commitment first arose in their TPA.
In addition to the question “when does a contract concluded by EDI arise?,”it will
often be relevant to ask “where”such a contract arises. This is an important ques
tion because it determines, among other things, which jurisdiction’s laws would
govern the parties’ EDI relations. This question might never have to be asked if
all the relevant parties are located in the same jurisdiction, such as a single
province in Canada. By contrast, consider the following situation. One EDI trad
ing p a rtn e r is located in France and the o th er is in O ntario, and they
communicate through the French trading p artn er’s network provider, who
is located in England and the Ontario trading partner’s network provider, who is
located in Ohio. If there is a problem with an EDI transmission that causes dam
ages to one or more of these parties, which of French, Ontario, English or Ohio
law should be applied to the claim? Rather than having to rely on general, and
often difficult to apply, legal principles to answer such a question, it is preferable
for EDI trading partners to stipulate in their TPAs, and in their agreements with
network providers, which jurisdiction’s law will govern any possible claims.
It should be noted that while to-date (February 1995) there have been no
reported court cases in Canada that have dealt with the contract law issues raised
by EDI, in a couple of cases19courts have decided that faxes of signed documents
satisfy certain “signed writing”requirements. In these cases judges have noted that
the law has tried to be receptive to “technological advances in the means of communi
cations ”These same judges, however, also recognize that each technology must
be assessed on its own merits, and they understood that the fax technology
before them essentially involved making a copy of a signed original, albeit by a
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fax machine. EDI, however, does not resemble this photocopying technology in
many important aspects, so it remains to be seen how the principles in these
cases will be applied to EDI.
One further development is worth noting in respect of the writing issue. In
May 1992 the Canadian provinces adopted the United Nations Convention On
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.20 Under this convention, contracts
for the sale of goods between persons in different countries need not be in writ
ing. Accordingly, if a company in Canada wants to sell goods to a company in the
U.S., and these companies want to use EDI to create specific sales contracts, they
could invoke the Convention in order to override, in effect, the writing require
ment in any applicable provincial or state legislation.
In the same vein, it is important to review if the particular jurisdiction in
which an EDI trading partner is located has a writing requirement in its goods
legislation. For example, neither Ontario nor British Columbia have such a writ
ing requirement in their respective sale of goods legislation, and therefore a
company in a province with a writing requirem ent conducting EDI with an
Ontario or B.C. company should provide that Ontario or B.C. will be the govern
ing law of their EDI trading partner agreement.

Evidence Law
Issues

The rules of evidence law strive to ensure that only reliable evidence is admitted
and relied upon in court and other legal proceedings. With respect to common
law jurisdictions, there are two rules of evidence law that are often considered to
pose a challenge to the admissibility as evidence of computer-generated records,
which would include EDI messages. The first is the “hearsay rule,’’which stipulates
that, whenever possible, evidence should be obtained orally from witnesses as this
form of evidence can be subject to cross-examination and other forms of truth
testing. In the context of written evidence the hearsay rule, if strictly applied,
would require that a document is not admissible unless its author is present in
court to attest to its contents. The second rule of evidence is the so-called “best
evidence rule,”whereby a document is admissible only if it is produced in its origi
nal version.
In recognition, however, of the increasing reliability of record keeping in
modern businesses, statutes governing the law of evidence have been passed in
most of Canada provinces that allow certain types of “business records ”to be admis
sible as evidence under certain conditions. These statutory rules, however, were
not drafted with EDI in mind, and hence it may be asked whether copies of EDI
messages would be admissible in court and other legal proceedings. No court has
yet had occasion to determine whether an EDI message should be admissible
under such a statute. Courts in Canada have considered, however, whether com
puter generated records are admissible under these rules, and generally they
have been admitted so long as the computer and the related record taking and
record keeping procedures can be shown to be trustworthy.21
Accordingly, EDI trading partners should do at least two things to help
ensure that their EDI messages are held to be admissible in court or other legal
proceedings. First, they should address the issue in their TPA. Second, they
should institute appropriate computer security, control and other measures
to ensure that their EDI message making and recording systems are as trust
w orthy as possible. T his w ould entail, fo r exam ple, storing EDI m essages o n n o n -

alterable media that permit only read and copy, but not write, access.
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Record Retention
Issues

A similar issue to the evidence law one arises in connection with the record reten
tion requirements stipulated by numerous statutes in many jurisdictions. For
example, Canada’s Income Tax Act requires businesses to keep certain books of
account and records which, among other things, permit the taxes payable or the
taxes or other amounts to be collected by a person, to be determined. It is inter
esting to note that the government department in Canada that administers this
tax statute (Revenue Canada) permits companies to keep microfilm copies of
books and records of original entry and source documents, provided the micro
filming process utilized complies with a certain standard produced by the
Canadian General Standards Board and approved by the Standards Council
of Canada.22
With the recent updating of this standard to cover electronic imaging pro
cedures, Revenue Canada has indicated orally that it will accept for records
retention purposes images that are made pursuant to the updated standard. It is
expected that formal recognition of this new policy will be forthcoming with an
appropriate amendment to Revenue Canada’s written policy on records reten
tion. As for EDI, it would appear that Revenue Canada takes the view that EDI
messages should be acceptable for records retention purposes under Canada’s
income tax law as being original “source documents,”and thus Revenue Canada has
indicated that paper-based copies of EDI messages need not be created or
retained for records retention purposes. It would be useful, however, if this posi
tion regarding EDI were clearly confirmed in Revenue Canada’s written policy
on records retention. In any event, users of EDI may wish to approach Revenue
Canada or other relevant government departments to discuss their particular cir
cumstances so that they are able to establish electronic recording keeping
measures that will satisfy the applicable public authorities.

Trading Partner
Agreements

Based on the discussion above, it should be clear that all EDI trading partners
should enter into TPAs before commencing to do business with one another
through EDI. Unfortunately, it is probably the case that a great deal of EDI activ
ity is not underpinned by TPAs. This is a mistake. Particularly as the use of EDI
increases, such that organizations increasingly use EDI not only for their biggest
and best customers (but also for smaller and less established customers), it
becomes imperative that EDI trading partners implement TPAs.
The TPA should deal with the technical aspects of the relationship, such as
the precise EDI protocol to be utilized, together with the particular verification,
authentication and security procedures to be employed. As noted above, the
“writing,” “signature,”and other contract law and “evidence law”issues should also
be addressed in the TPA. For example, the parties should acknowledge in the
TPA that properly recorded and authenticated EDI messages are to be consid
ered to be signed writings, and that neither party will contest their admissibility
as evidence. It is also a good idea for the EDI trading partners to agree to a pro
cess in the TPA whereby contractually binding commitments will arise only if
certain predeterm ined EDI messages, including an acceptance message, are
exchanged.
The EDI trading partners should also decide what terms and conditions will
govern the underlying transaction effected by EDI. For example, the provisions
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relating to product warranties, limitations of liability, and so on. In a non-EDI
environment these issues are often left up to the so-called “battle of the forms,”
whereby each side hopes that the terms on its purchase order or other document
will prevail in the event of a dispute. The EDI environment does not lend itself to
fighting a battle of the forms through the transmission of EDI messages. Some
parties, nevertheless, try to perpetuate this battle by attaching the contract docu
ments of both parties to the TPA and stipulating that these various forms will
apply as if they were actually used (but they are not, as the EDI messages are
being sent instead). This results in a very uncertain, unsatisfactory state of affairs.
The preferred solution is for the EDI trading partners to negotiate a mutu
ally acceptable set of terms and conditions that will apply to the underlying sales
or other transactions. This may require an investment of some time and effort by
business people and legal counsel, but it is an investment that will pay significant
dividends, even if there is never a dispute between the parties.
It is worth noting that the EDI Council of Canada has published a model
TPA, together with a commentary on the various provisions in it. This is an
extremely useful document and it should probably serve as the starting point for
the drafting of most TPAs between EDI trading partners. The model TPA, how
ever, does not have all the answers. It contains, for example, numerous sections
in square brackets which deserve particular scrutiny to determine whether they
should be used by the trading partners. In short, the parties to an EDI relation
ship must always modify the model TPA to suit their particular circumstances.
It should also be noted that a TPA, however comprehensive it might be, will
never be able to dispel completely the legal uncertainty that currently exists in
respect of the “writing”and evidence law and records retention issues. The only
really effective resolution of these issues will come when laws in Canada, and else
where, are amended to recognize expressly EDI and other forms of electronic
commerce (such as document imaging systems). Accordingly, organizations uti
lizing EDI should support the law reform efforts of organizations like the EDI
Council of Canada so that a more certain legal environment for EDI can be
established as soon as possible. Until then, parties considering implementing EDI
should review with their legal counsel the particular use to be made of EDI, the
legal risks posed by such EDI usage, and the contractual and other methods avail
able to reduce and effectively manage this risk.

Network Agreements

Organizations that communicate to one another through EDI often do not do so
directly. Rather, one or both parties may use the services of a third party network
provider. A network provider will serve several functions, including collecting
and forwarding EDI messages, as well as conducting message authentication,
audit and other services. A particularly valuable service of a network provider
is serving as an intermediary between two EDI trading partners with incompat
ible systems.
A network provider invariably makes available its services to a customer only
after the customer has entered into a “network services ”or similar agreement. This
agreem ent will define the various services to be provided by the network
provider, and it will set out the terms and conditions under which the services
will be provided. A customer of a network provider will generally want to ensure
that this agreement addresses a number of issues important to the customer.
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One of these is confidentiality. The customer will want to be satisfied that
the agreement requires the network provider take adequate measures to safe
guard the confidentiality of the customer’s EDI messages. Another issue involves
the availability of the services; the customer may want to provide in the contract
that the network provider’s computer and telecommunications system will be
unavailable no more than a specified (and few) number of hours each week or
month if system availability is important to the customer (and it is to most users
of EDI!). Similarly, the agreement might provide that failure to meet such perfor
mance guarantees will result in the customer accumulating financial credits
against service fees otherwise payable, in addition to exercising any other reme
dies available to the customer.
With respect to this latter point, it is important to note that virtually all stan
dard form network provider agreements will contain a provision limiting the
liability of the network provider in the event it has caused the customer some
damage. These sorts of clauses, as well as the warranty disclaimers invariably
found in network provider agreements, should be carefully scrutinized to ensure
that they are reasonable from the customer’s perspective. In effect, as with EDI
trading partner agreements, agreements with network providers should be
reviewed carefully with legal counsel to ensure that they address all issues rele
vant to the customer.
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omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
The Uniform Commercial Code is a statute in force in whole or in part in all states
in the United States. Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code (of which
Section 2-201 is a part) governs sales of goods transactions.
5. The Law ofElectronic Commerce, Chapter 16. For a partially contrary view, M. Baum, Analysis
of Legal Aspects, in EDI and the Law, I. Walden, ed. 1989.
6. It is difficult to engage in the “battle of theforms”in EDI. B. Wright, EDI and American Law:
A Practical Guide. Electronic Data Interchange Association (1989), Chapter 2.
7. R. Savage, How to Resolve Legal Issues in EDI Agreements: Acknowledgments and the Battle of the
Forms, EDI FORUM 1991, No. 1, pp. 66-71. Also, The Law of Electronic Commerce,
Chapter 17 and Appendix D.
8. The Law ofElectronic Commerce, Chapter 14.
9. King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So.2d 393 (Miss. 1969).
10. R. Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Callfor Authentication of Business Records under the
Federal Rules ofEvidence, p. 80 Northwestern University Law Review 956 (1986).
11. P. Brockett, The Erosion of the Hearsay Objection to Computer-Generated Evidence, 26 Criminal
Law Bulletin 357July-August 1990.
12. The Law ofElectronic Commerce, for discussions of U.S. v. Poindexter, a high-profile criminal
trial in which a record of an electronic mail message was admitted into evidence.
One factor that appeared to contribute to the reliability of the record was that the
record keeper was segregated from the message creator and the prosecutors who
used the message in court.
13. The Law ofElectronic Commerce, Chapter 12.
14. EDI and American Law, Chapter 3.
15. S. Mosteshar, Liability Issues in EDI, EDI and the Law.
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16. Texas Sales and Use Tax Rule 3.287.
17. Texas Tax Code Section 151.155.
18 See the U.K. case Brinkibon Ltd. v. Stahag Stahl (1982) 1 All E.R. 293 (H.L.).
19. Beatty v. First Exploration Fund 1987 and Company, Limited Partnership (1988) 25
B.C.L.R. (2nd) 377 (B.C.S.C.); Rolling v. William Investments Ltd. (1989) 70 O.R.
(2d) 578.
20. In Ontario, for example, see the International Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, Ch. 1.10.
21. See, for example, R. v. Bell and Bruce (1982) O.R. (2d) 164.
22. Revenue Canada’s policies on record retention are set out in information Circular
No. 78-10R2, July 14, 1989. The original microfilm standard was; Microfilm as
Documentary Evidence, Canadian General Standards Board (CAN 72.11-88).
The new Microfilm and Electronic Images as Documentary Evidence Standard
is CAN/CGSB-72.11-93 of the Canadian General Standards Board; this current
standard supersedes CAN 72.11-88.
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Chapter 7 Appendix A: Trading Partner Agreement M o d el

The following represents an outline model of the various clauses expected to be
included in a typical TPA agreement. Generally, a TPA would cover these core
clauses. It remains a matter of tailoring according to the specific local governing
laws and adding whatever other clauses the contracting parties, assisted by legal
counsel, would choose to include. This is the case for the American Bar
Association (ABA) TPA model, the EDI Council of Canada TPA model, prepared
by the Legal and Audit Committee, the Australian model and various European
models.

Outline

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Identification of EDI standards
Identification of third party service providers
Obligation to conduct EDI competently
Adoption of signatures
Place and time of message receipt
Functional acknowledgments
Application acknowledgments
Garbled transmissions
Trade terms and conditions
Disclaimer of confidentiality
Legal enforceability of transactions
Termination of agreement
Disclaimer of obligation to enter into transactions
Limitation of liability
Arbitration

The American Bar Association Model EDI Trading Partner Agreement can
be purchased from the ABA by calling (312) 988-5555 and requesting document
number: 507-0233-B9. Or simply write to:
■ American Bar Association
Order Fulfillment Department
750 North Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, IL 60611
For the Canadian Model, you may contact the EDI Council of Canada. The
document is called, Electronic Data Interchange Trading Partner Agreement and
Commentary. This document contains explanations of the various clauses with
appropriate expert commentaries from the committee. Phone: (416) 621-7160,
FAX: (416) 620-9175. Or write to:
■ EDI Council o f Canada

5401 Eglington West, Suite 203
Etobicoke, Ontario
M9C 5K6
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The European Commission, Model Trading Partner Agreement, contact:
■ European Commission
Rue de la Loi 200
B-1049 Brussels, Belgium
For International Interchange, the Uniform Rules of Conduct for Inter
change of Trade Data by Teletransmission (UNCID).
■ International Chamber of Commerce
ICC Publishing Corporation
156 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10010
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Chapter 7 Appendix B: IRS — Administrative, Procedural, and M iscellaneous

26 CFR 601.105: Examination o f returns and claims fo r refund,
credits or abatement; determination of correct tax liability. (Also
P a rt I. Section 6001; 1.6001-1.)

Rev. Proc. 91-59
SEC. 1. PURPOSE

.01 The purpose of this revenue procedure is to
update Rev. Proc. 86-19, 1986-1 C.B. 558, and to specify
the basic requirements that the Internal Revenue Service
considers to be essential in cases where a taxpayer’s
records are m aintained w ithin an A utom atic Data
Processing (ADP) system. Rev. Proc. 86-19 provides
guidelines for record requirem ents to be followed in
cases where all or part of the accounting records are
maintained within an ADP system. References to ADP
systems include all accounting an d /o r financial systems
and subsystems that process all or part of a taxpayer’s
transactions, records, or data by other than manual
methods.
.02 The technology of ADP has evolved rapidly, and
new methods and techniques are constantly being devised
and adopted. The requirements set forth in Section 5 of
this revenue procedure are intended to ensure that all
machine-sensible records generated by a taxpayer’s ADP
system are retained so long as they may be or may become
material in the administration of any internal revenue
law. These requirements will be modified and amended as
needed to keep pace with developments in ADP systems.
SEC. 2. BACKGROUND

.01 Section 6001 of the Internal Revenue Code
provides that every person liable for any tax imposed by
the Code, or for the collection thereof, shall keep the
records th at the Secretary may from tim e to time
prescribe.
.02 Rev. Rul. 71-20, 1971-1 C.B. 392, establishes that
all machine-sensible data media used for recording,
consolidating, and summarizing accounting transactions
and records within a taxpayer’s ADP system are records
within the meaning of section 6001 of the Code and
section 1.6001-1 of the Income Tax Regulations, and are
required to be retained so long as the contents may be
material in the administration of any internal revenue law.
SEC. 3. SCOPE

.01 This revenue procedure encompasses all types of
data processing systems including, but not limited to,
microcomputer systems, Data Base Management Systems
(DBMS), and all systems using E lectronic Data
Interchange (EDI) technology. For purposes of this
revenue procedure: DBMS means a software system that
creates, controls, retrieves, and provides accessibility to
data stored in a database; and EDI technology means the
computer-to-computer exchange of business information.

.02 The utilization of a service bureau, time-sharing
service, or value-added network does not relieve the
taxpayer of the responsibilities described in this revenue
procedure.
.03 A taxpayer with assets of $10 million or more at
the end of its taxable year shall comply with the record
rete n tio n requirem ents of Rev. Rul. 71-20 and the
provisions of this revenue procedure. For purposes of this
revenue procedure, a controlled group of corporations,
as defined in section 1563 of the Code, will be considered
to be one corporation and all assets of all members of the
group will be aggregated.
.04 A taxpayer with assets of less than $10 million
shall comply with the record retention requirements of
Rev. Rul. 71-20 and the provisions of this revenue
procedure if any of the following conditions exist:
(1) information required by section 6001 of the Code
is not in the hardcopy books and records, but is available
in machine-sensible records;
(2) machine-sensible records were used for com
putations that cannot be reasonably verified or recom
puted without using a computer (e.g., Last-In, First-Out
(LIFO) inventories); or
(3) the taxpayer is notified by the District Director that
machine-sensible records must be retained to meet the
requirements of section 6001 of the Code.
.05 The requirem ents of this revenue procedure
pertain to all m atters un d er the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue including, but not
limited to, income, excise, employment, and estate and
gift taxes, as well as em ployee plans and exem pt
organizations.
.06 The requirements of this revenue procedure are
applicable to the machine-sensible records generated by a
Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC), a domestic
corporation that is 25 percent foreign-owned, and foreign
corporations engaged in a trade or business within the
United States at any time during a taxable year because
the definition of “records” in sections 964(c), 982(d),
6038A and 6038C of the Code and the regulations
thereunder has the same meaning as “records” as used in
section 6001 of the Code and section 1.6001-1 (a) of the
regulations.
.07 Machine-sensible records used by an insurance
company to determ ine losses incurred under section
832(b)(5) of the Code shall be retained in accordance
with the requirements of this revenue procedure and Rev.
Proc. 75-56 1975-2 C.B. 596. For this purpose, the
m a c h in e - s e n s ib le file s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r ta x a b le y e a r

include the files for that year and the seven preceding
years, all of which shall be retained so long as they are
material to the examination of the federal tax return. See
section 5.06 for a discussion of materiality.
.08 The requirements of this revenue procedure are
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applicable to any sections of the Code that have unique
or specific recordkeeping requirements. For example,
machine-sensible records maintained by the taxpayer to
meet the requirements of section 274(d) relating to the
amount, time, and place of a business expense must meet
the requirements of this revenue procedure.

storage of the records. These tests are n o t an
“exam ination,” “investigation,” or “inspection” of the
books and records within the meaning of section 7605(b)
of the Code because these tests are not directly related to
the determination of tax liability for a particular taxable
period.

SEC. 4. DISTRICT DIRECTOR AUTHORITY

SEC. 5. MACHINE-SENSIBLE RECORDKEEPING
REQUIREMENTS

.01 In the case of a taxpayer that has less than $10
million in assets at the end of its taxable year, the District
Director may notify a taxpayer that machine-sensible
records must be retained to meet the requirements of
section 6001 of the Code, and that Rev. Rul. 71-20 and the
provisions of this revenue procedure apply to that
taxpayer. S ubsequent failure to comply with this
notification may result in the imposition of the penalties
described in section 7.
.02 The District Director has the authority to enter
into or revoke a record retention limitation agreement
with the taxpayer to modify or waive all or any of the
specific requirements in this revenue procedure. The
taxpayer remains subject to all requirem ents of this
revenue procedure that are not specifically modified or
waived by a record retention limitation agreement. A
taxpayer that has questions regarding the application of
this revenue procedure to a specific factual situation
should contact the appropriate District Director.
(1) A record retention limitation agreement does not
apply to a subsidiary company acquired, or accounting
and tax systems added, subsequent to the completion of
the record evaluation (see section 3.03 below) upon
which the agreem ent is based. All machine-sensible
records produced by a subsequently acquired company or
a subsequently added accounting and tax system whose
co ntents may be or may becom e m aterial in the
adm inistration of the Code shall be retained by the
taxpayer who signed the ag reem en t un til a new
evaluation is conducted by the District Director.
(2) Upon the disposition of a subsidiary, the files being
retained for the Service by, or for, the disposed subsidiary
shall be retained by the taxpayer until a new evaluation
can be made by the District Director.
.03 To determine if a taxpayer may limit its retention
of machine-sensible records, a record evaluation may be
conducted by the District Director. This evaluation of the
data processing and accounting systems may be initiated
by the District Director or requested by the taxpayer, and
is not an “examination,” “investigation,” or “inspection”
of the books and records within the meaning of section
7605(b) of the Code because the evaluation is not directly

.01 All machine-sensible records whose contents may
be or may become material to the administration of the
Code shall be retained by the taxpayer. The retained
records shall be in a retrievable format that provides the
inform ation necessary to determ ine the correct tax
liability. The taxpayer shall ensure that the details and the
source documents underlying any summary accounting
data may be easily identified and made available to the
Service upon request.
.02 D ocum entation th at provides a com plete
description of the ADP portion of the accounting system,
including all subsystems and files that feed into the
accounting system, shall be retained and made available
to the Service upon request. The statem ents and
illustrations as to the scope of operations shall be
sufficiently detailed to indicate:
(1) the application being performed;
(2) the procedures employed in each application;
(3) the controls used to ensure accurate and reliable
processing; and
(4) the controls used to prevent the unauthorized
addition, alteration, or deletion of retained records.
.03 The following specific docum entation for all
retained files shall also be kept:
(1) record formats (including the m eaning of all
“codes” used to represent information);
(2) flowcharts for a system and a program;
(3) label descriptions;
(4) source program listings of programs that created
the retained files;
(5) detailed charts of accounts (for specific periods);
(6) evidence that periodic checks of the retained
records th at are prescribed in section 5.08 were
performed; and
(7) evidence that the retained records reconcile to the
books and the tax retu rn . This reconciliation shall
establish the relationship betw een the total of the
am ounts in the retained records by account to the
account totals in the books and to the tax return.
.04 Any change to the ADP system which affects the
accounting system and/or subsystems, together with their

r e l a t e d to t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f ta x lia b ili ty f o r a

effective dates, shall be d o c u m e n te d in o rd e r to p reserv e

particular taxable period.
.04 The District Director may periodically initiate
tests to establish the authenticity, readability,
completeness, and integrity of the machine-sensible
records retained as required by this revenue procedure.
These tests may include the testing of EDI and/or other
procedures, and a review of the internal controls and
security procedures associated with the creation and

an accurate chronological record. This documentation
shall include any changes to software or systems and any
changes to the formats of files.
.05 in addition to the documentation described in
section 5.02 Through 5.04, the service may require that
the taxpayer furnish any other evidence (e.g., internal
audit reports) that pertains to the authenticity and
integrity of the records.
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.06 Machine-sensible records are required to be
retained until their contents are no longer material to the
adm in istratio n o f the Code. At a m inim um , this
materiality continues until the expiration of the statute of
limitations, including extensions, for each tax year. In
certain situations, records should be kept for a longer
period of time. For example, records that pertain to fixed
assets, losses incurred under section 832(b)(5) of the
Code, and LIFO inventories should be kept for longer
periods of time.
.07 All m achine-sensible records th at m ust be
retained shall be clearly labelled and stored in a secure
environment. For example, supplemental labels with the
statement “Tax Year 19XX Records — Retain for IRS until
0000” or “Retain for IRS, Consult Tax Manager Before
Releasing” should be used and affixed to each tape reel,
cartridge, disk pack, diskette, or other device being
retained, and a retention date should be written on the
internal label. Back-up copies of machine-sensible records
retained for the Service should be stored at an off-site
location. The Service recommends that taxpayers refer to
the National Archives and Record A dm inistration’s
(NARA) standards for additional guidance on the
m aintenance and storage of electronic records. See,
Standards for the C reation, Use, Preservation, and
Disposition of Electronic Records, 36 C.F.R. Ch. XII, Part
1234, Subpart C(1990).
.08 The taxpayer shall make periodic checks on all
records reta in e d for the Service. The Service
recom m ends using the NARA standard for making
periodic checks of retained machine-sensible records.
See, 36 C.F.R. §1234.28(g) (4) (1990). In general, this
standard requires a recordkeeper to annually select and
test a random sample of all reels of magnetic tape to
identify any loss of data, and to discover and correct the
causes of data loss. In libraries with 1800 or fewer storage
units (e.g., magnetic tape reels), a 20 percent random
sample or a sample size of 50 units, whichever is larger,
shall be read. In libraries with more than 1800 units, a
sample of 384 units shall be read.
.09 If any machine-sensible records required to be
retained are lost, destroyed, damaged, or found to be
incomplete or materially inaccurate, the taxpayer shall
report this to the District Director and recreate the files
within a reasonable period of time.
.10 Although the NARA sampling standard referred
to in section 5.09 is specifically for magnetic computer
tape, the Service recommends that all retained machinesensible m edia be random ly sam pled and tested as
described by NARA. A taxpayer whose data maintenance
practices conform with the NARA standards and who
loses only a portion of the data from a particular storage
unit will not be subject to the penalties described in
section 7. However, this taxpayer remains responsible for
substantiating the information on its return as required
by section 6001 of the Code.
.11 The taxpayer m ust be able to process the
retained records at the time of a Service examination.
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Processing shall include the ability to print a hardcopy of
any record. When the data processing system that created
the records is being replaced by a system with which the
records would be incompatible, the taxpayer shall convert
pre-existing records to a format that is compatible with
the new system. Any changes in the ability to process the
retained records shall be reported to the District Director.
.12 The taxpayer shall provide the Service, at the
time of an examination, with computer resources (e.g.,
terminal access, computer time, personnel, etc.) that are
necessary for the processing of the retained records.
Failure to provide these resources will be a failure to
maintain books and records under section 6001 of the
Code.
.13 The use of a DBMS necessitates the im ple
m entation of procedures to ensure that appropriate
records and documentation are retained. A taxpayer is in
compliance with the provisions of this revenue procedure
if a sequential file exists and is available to the Service.
The sequential file shall contain the detail necessary to
identify the underlying source documents. The process to
create a sequential file should be reviewed by the District
Director prior to destruction of the DBMS records.
Sections 5.01 through 5.12 of this procedure shall apply
to the resultant sequential file(s).
.14 In addition to the documentation described in
section 5.02 through 5.05, the following documentation
pertaining to each DBMS system shall be retained:
(1) Data Base Description (DBD);
(2) Record layout of each segment with respect to the
fields in the segment;
(3) Systems Control Language;
(4) Program Specification Block (PSB); and
(5) Program Communication Block (PCB).
.15 In order to be in compliance with this revenue
procedure, a taxpayer that uses EDI technology must
retain machine-sensible records that, in combination with
any other records (e.g., the underlying contracts, price
lists, and price changes), contain all of the detailed
information required by section 6001 of the Code. The
extent of the detail in the retained electronic and other
records, if any, must be equivalent to the level of detail
contained in an acceptable paper record. For example,
the retained records for an electronic invoice must
contain identification of the vendor by name, invoice
date, product description, quantity purchased, price, etc.
The taxpayer may capture this information at any level
within the accounting system provided the audit trail,
authenticity, and integrity of the retained records can
be established.
SEC. 6. IMPACT ON HARDCOPY RECORDKEEPING
REQUIREMENTS

01. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the
provisions of this revenue procedure do not relieve
taxpayers of the responsibility to retain hardcopy records
that are created or received in the ordinary course of
business as required by existing law and regulations.
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Hardcopy records may be retained in microfiche or
microfilm format in accordance with the requirements
outlined in Rev. Proc. 81-46, 1981-2 C.B. 621. These
records are not a substitute for the machine-sensible
records req u ired to be reta in e d by this revenue
procedure.
.02 Hardcopy records generated at the time of a
transaction (e.g., credit card receipts) need not be
retained if all the details relating to the transaction are
subsequently received by the taxpayer in an EDI
transaction and are reta in e d by the taxpayer in
accordance with this revenue procedure.
.03 If hardcopy records are not produced or received
in the ordinary course of transacting business (as may be
the case when utilizing EDI technology), or are not
retained pursuant to section 6.02, hardcopy printouts of
com puterized records need no t be created unless
requested by the Service. These requests may be made
either at the time of an examination or in conjunction
with the testing described in section 4.04.
.04 C om puter p rin to u ts th at are created for
validation, control, or other temporary purposes need
not be retained.
SEC. 7. PENALTIES

The District Director may issue a Notice of Inadequate
Records pursuant to section 1.6001-1(d) of the regulations
if machine-sensible records are not properly retained as
required by this revenue procedure. Failure to comply
with the provisions of this revenue procedure may also
result in the imposition of an accuracy related civil penalty
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under section 6662(a) of the Code that is attributable to
negligence or disregard of rules or regulations as
provided under section 6662(b)(1). A criminal penalty
under section 7203 may also be applicable. See Rev. Rul.
81-205, 1981-2 C.B. 225, which explains the applicability of
the predecessor of the section 6662(a) civil penalty and
the section 7203 criminal penalty.
SEC. 8. EFFECT ON OTHER REVENUE
PROCEDURES

Rev. Proc. 86-19 is superseded for taxable years
beginning after D ecem ber 31, 1991. However, if a
taxpayer complies with this revenue procedure for prior
taxable years, the taxpayer will be treated as having
complied with Rev. Proc. 86-19 for those years.
SEC. 9. EFFECTIVE DATE

This revenue procedure is effective for taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1991.
SEC. 10. EXAMINATION OFFICE CONTACT

All questions regarding this revenue procedure should
be directed to the Office of the Assistant Commissioner
(Examination). The telephone number for this office is
(202) 566-6856 (not a toll-free n u m b er). W ritten
questions should be addressed to:
Assistant Commissioner (Examination)
Attention: EX
Internal Revenue Service
1111 Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20224

Part Two:
Auditing EDI

Chapter 8.

Electronic Data Interchange —
Effect on the Audit

Assessing
Inherent Risk

Because EDI will affect the nature of transactions entered into an entity’s
accounting systems, including the initiation of transactions, its effect on financial
statement assertions will be pervasive. The entire audit process from the under
standing of accounting systems to the evidential matter used to substantiate
transactions or account balances will be affected by the implementation of this
technology.
Clearly one of the most important effects on the audit process is the elimi
nation of paper documents that presently serve as an auditor’s major form of
evidential matter, when testing controls or substantiating a transaction or
account balance. Even more pervasive and potentially more difficult will be the
auditor’s response to the new forms of business relationships and the profound
effect on accounting systems and controls.
EDI can to some extent reduce the susceptibility of accounting applications
to risk of misstatements because of procedures that must be put in place to con
duct EDI with trading partners. The strict standards for formatting transactions,
the significantly reduced data entry and reentry, the close relationship between
trading partners, and the integration of operations between trading partners can
reduce manual misstatements and identify how problems should be handled with
predefined policies and procedures.
Conversely, implementation of EDI can increase management’s depen
dence on computer-based systems, potentially increasing inherent risk. Because
EDI can increase the sophistication and complexity of an entity’s computer sys
tems, it may be more difficult to implement management control methods that
use data or other evidence that is external to, or independent from, the comput
erized systems.
Various factors can cause this increased dependence on computer systems.
EDI implementation often results in new operational computer systems that pro
duce accounting information as a by-product. Just-in-time inventory control
systems or some of the interdependent relationships between entities for order
ing inventory are examples of these operational systems. In many of these cases
EDI is a necessary component to the implementation of such systems. These sys
tems may make it difficult for management to independently establish methods
that measure “actual perform ance” or “variances from expectations” (see
Management Control Methods; AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)
No. 55, Consideration of the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit,
paragraph 6, Appendix A) when they are being produced or reported as by
products of the same systems used for operations.
In the past, these operational systems were manual or, if they were auto
mated, they were on an independent computer system. Management could
reconcile output from operational and accounting systems or compare them for
reasonableness. EDI can facilitate the combining of these systems.
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Other characteristics of EDI could also change the way management moni
tors its internal control structure. One such characteristic is the elimination not
only of paper forms that document a business transaction, but also parts of the
transaction itself. In the short existence of EDI, some entities have eliminated
purchase orders and invoices.
In the retailing industry, some entities using EDI send stock status and sales
information by location to their vendors. The vendors, based on this information
and the planned inventory levels predefined by the retailer, ship the necessary
quantities to replenish the retailer’s shelves. The retailer pays based on either the
electronic shipping notice, usually sent when the vendor’s truck leaves the load
ing dock, or confirmation from the stores that the goods have been received.
These electronic messages, substituting for an invoice, are valued and extended
by the retailer, not the vendor. Price and shipping cost data and other terms are
defined in their trading partner agreements and built into each of their com
puter applications.
In this example, it would be difficult for management to create effective
detection controls external to the EDI computer applications. Control over the
receipt of the goods may have to be accomplished by automatically reconciling
actual receipt to anticipated receipts that come from the operational systems of
the retailer or the vendor.
Monthly vendor statements may not be provided when two companies con
duct business with EDI. Reconciliations are more apt to be performed by product
line, season, or some other operational factor, eliminating the possibility of an
externally generated control process based on the end of an accounting cycle,
like a monthly accounts receivable statement.
For some entities on the leading edge of strategic EDI use, another issue
exists when trading partners agree to different payment terms. These terms are
used to create a motivation for a vendor to provide their product to a customer
within very strict time commitments. One specific case, called “pay on produc
tion,” involves the purchaser paying for goods only after they are used in
production, instead of upon receipt. Receiving information is now replaced with
production information as the trigger to record a liability. Here is an example of
the shift to use of an operational application for financial purposes.
“Pay on production” causes a loss of audit trail within the electronic docu
ments that originated the transaction. This occurs because the liability is now
being recorded as each individual item is used instead of a group of items that
appeared on a line item of a purchase order and invoice. The custom er’s
accounting systems would be completely dependent on the operational system
tracking the use of goods already received.
With “pay on production,” the vendor is dependent on the customer’s oper
ational and accounting systems to provide information to allow recording of a
sale. If these transactions are material to the vendor, the vendor’s auditors may
need to consider whether the customer’s applications are part of the vendor’s
applications and that some audit procedures may be necessary.
The issue of when title has passed should be detailed in the trading partner
agreement. The agreement should also address which entity has risk of loss in
relation to title passage.
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Understanding the
Internal Control
Structure

The use of EDI will make computer applications more complex. The auditor may
need to gain a detailed understanding of the relevant applications to obtain a suf
ficient understanding of the internal control structure. The following section
outlines the approach that could be used to gain a detailed understanding of the
application and the internal control structure.

Control Policies
and Procedures

From a computer perspective, general controls cover the following functions:
Access
Program Changes
Application Controls
Operations (minimal impact from EDI)
Access

When an entity conducts business using EDI, controls over access to its computer
systems take on added importance. Lack of controls over access to these com
puter systems could expose an entity to establishing unintended commitments
with its customers and vendors that could not be easily voided.
EDI does not really change the nature of access controls needed, but
increases their importance. Usage of security software or operating system secu
rity features and appropriate segregation of duties will be important.
As relationships evolve between trading partners, access to each other’s
computer systems may become necessary. Access controls for third parties, such
as trading partners, may take on increased importance.
A significant amount of time and effort could be required to identify and
test these access controls. A more detailed understanding of the flow of transac
tions could be required to identify the critical data elements and program
functions that should be protected by access software. Automated audit tools that
can scan access control files and determine that access controls have been placed
in operation may be required.
What an employee is authorized to do with the computer resources he or
she has accessed must also have the same comprehensive level of control as
access itself. Appropriateness of an individuals’s access may need to be evaluated
by review of privileges contained in security databases used by access security soft
ware and of the procedures for management authorization of privileges.
Authentication techniques (e.g., passwords or tokens) to assure that the
requester is authorized access may be important. These techniques are typically
contained in access software.
In an EDI environment access controls provide assurance that transactions
are authorized. For the outbound transactions, controls over access and autho
rization to the application systems and programs could provide this assurance.
The auditor may want to consider identifying and testing controls (to reduce
control risk below the maximum) over access to this capability and data files.
As for inbound transactions, the communications software layer should
have some way of identifying and authenticating authorized trading partners.
Identifying an authorized trading partner is relatively easy. An EDI control
database (Figure 8-1) could have an entry for all valid trading partners and their
associated identification code and password.
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EDI
Receiving a valid identification code gives Company B some, but not abso
Translation

lute,Software
assurance that this is an authentic message from Company A. A password
associated with the identification code, preferably sent in an encrypted form,
could provide the necessary evidence that this transaction truly originated with
Company A. A more elaborate authentication scheme would make the password
dependent on the contents of the message, or important parts of it, which would
also provide Company B with the assurance that the contents of the transaction
had not been changed.
In practice, a password associated with a predefined list of authorized trad
ing partners is the most common technique used. Only occasionally will the
password be encrypted and rarely will that encryption be based on the contents
of the message.
The auditor may want to test access controls over the file that contains the
list of authorized trading partners and their associated passwords as well as the
procedures for checking the list when a transaction is received. The latter proce
dure could be performed by any of the three software layers.
Program Changes

Virtually the same controls apply to program changes as to systems development
with the added consideration of emergency or urgent fixes. The auditor may
need to test controls over program changes to provide a basis for assessing con
trol risk below the maximum.

106

E l e c t r o n ic D ata I n t e r c h a n g e — E ffect

on th e

A u d it

Application Controls

Application controls should be present to prevent or detect misstatements that
could cause material misstatements in the financial statement assertions. These
controls can be directly related to the financial statement assertions:
Completeness
Existence
Valuation
Presentation
Rights & obligations (covered by discussion on completeness and existence)
Completeness. In an EDI environment application controls can be built into any
or all of the three levels of software to assure that all transactions are complete.
In a more traditional computer application, the classic “batch total” control pro
cedure would be designed to meet this control objective. However for an EDI
environment this control must be established by the program when the transac
tion is initiated or received.
For an outbound transaction this control objective could be satisfied with
entries into an EDI control database, (see Figure 8-1) or some other control files
or techniques, when the transaction is successfully processed through each of the
three levels of software. The entries should contain cross-references which identify
the transaction as it changes from the proprietary format of the application pro
grams to the EDI standard format, and finally as a portion of a long message train.
For an inbound transaction the entries are made in the opposite order and
must be either cross-referenced as a response to an outbound transaction or
entered as a new transaction requiring matching entries starting with the applica
tion software.
The unmatched entries in the EDI control database should be aged and
those that are not reconciled with matching transaction sets should be investi
gated after some specified period. This specified period could vary by each
transaction, dependent on parameters in the initial transaction. For example, an
EDI purchase order may contain a specified delivery date. The purchase order
acknowledgment and other responses from the trading partner should be
received before that date. The purchase order could have more than one date,
i.e., one date to anticipate the acknowledgment and another for the shipping
notice and still another for receipt of the invoice.
Electronic techniques in the communications layer determine that each EDI
transaction is complete. This successful processing is typically logged into the EDI
control database. Most communication protocols include algorithms for pre
determining values for a check digit. These techniques can identify if any “noise”
or loss of signal altered the data in the transmission and automatically request
retransmission. These techniques are very similar to parity checking for informa
tion written to or read from a computer’s internal memory. The auditor may want
to determine if these types of controls were in effect for the audit period.
At the EDI translation level, the software packages generate a functional
acknowledgment for transactions received. The functional acknowledgment indi
cates that all of the EDI data segments and transaction set headers and trailers are
correctly represented according to the EDI standard in use. An entry should be
made in the EDI control database that an outbound transaction was understood
by the trading partners’ EDI translation software as evidenced by receipt of a func
tional acknowledgment. The functional acknowledgment is merely a safeguard
that both parties’ EDI software will understand the data elements in the transac-
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tion and will be able to pass them on to the application software where a decision
regarding the nature of the transaction can be made. The functional acknowledg
ment does not give the sender any sign-off or acceptance about the contents or a
requested commitment contained in the purchase order.
If the auditor wishes to assess control risk below the maximum, the auditor
may need a detailed understanding of how the client tracks EDI transactions
through its software layers and what reconciliation procedures are performed by
the application software, or perhaps by special control programs that analyze the
EDI control database, other control files or techniques. A detailed understanding
of the flow of transactions through the layers may also be required.
An EDI control database could help to provide assurance that transactions
were recorded in the appropriate accounting period. The different levels of
acknowledgments between the trading partners need to be defined and the con
cept of a complete portfolio of transaction sets must also be discussed.
Existence. The functional acknowledgment, discussed above, offers Company B
only limited assurance that the transaction sent to Company A was understood
per the agreed-upon standards. A separate EDI transaction acknowledging accep
tance of the contents of the purchase order and any implied commitments is
required before Company B can be satisfied that their operational needs, which
caused the initiation of the purchase order, can be met by Company A. Note here
that the purchase order and the acknowledgment may have contained data seg
ments as to required delivery schedules or shipping terms that could represent a
legal contract between Company A and B.
A liability does not exist until the goods are shipped or received, depending
on the trading partners’ agreement and the shipping terms expressed in the pur
chase order and agreed to in an acknowledgment transaction. The EDI control
database may indicate that a liability should be recorded when it is updated with
information entered from Company B’s receiving department, or the liability
may be incurred when Company B receives an electronic shipping notice from
Company A or an electronic manifest from a freight company — i.e., FOB ship
ping point. Therefore, the necessary portfolio of EDI transaction sets required to
record a liability and the timing of the liability may vary based on the terms in
the EDI transactions.
The trigger point for recording a transaction may be different for various
vendors of Company B and must be controlled by tracking the status of these
transactions in an EDI control database where all of the appropriate information
can be processed by the application software layer. An aging and analysis pre
pared from the incomplete portfolios of entries in the EDI control database
could assist in controlling the assertion of existence at the audit date. A welldesigned accounts payable system may also include the electronic bill of lading to
verify the shipping date. In the retailing industry it is fairly common that the lia
bility is recorded when the electronic bill of lading is received from the shipper.
The retailer then uses the shipping information for receipt priority planning to
assure efficient distribution.
The auditor may want to determine the shipping terms used and determine
if the procedures contained in the applications provide for appropriate correla
tion of dates to enable recording of transactions on a timely basis. Review of the
aging of incomplete portfolios or perhaps reconciliations of complete transac
tion portfolios and bills of lading could provide some assurance over the timely
recording of transactions.
Valuation. In many cases Company B’s trading partners may send priced and
extended electronic invoices which can be logged into the EDI control database
and recorded in the general ledger by the application software layer. In these
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cases the controls assuring completeness could assist in determining proper valu
ation if a comparison to the purchase order price is performed. Also, access
controls over the price file used when the purchase order was created would have
to be considered.
However, as relationships between trading partners evolve, the trend is to
remove redundant transactions, such as, the electronic invoice. In this case the
shipping notice or the receiving information is valued by Company B itself, not
Company A. In this case access controls and authorization to change the prices
associated with the trading partners’ products are the primary form of assurance
that the accounts are properly valued.
In some cases Company B may allow Company A to electronically review the
prices Company B is using. Company A may send electronic price catalogues that
Company B can use to update the prices. The review and authorization for these
periodic price catalogues must also be controlled by Company B’s access and
authorization software; these may need to be addressed by the auditor.
Presentation. In a non-EDI environment, entities often have invoices with a
stamped stencil allowing clerks to write general ledger account numbers to sup
port the distribution. Since invoices are not used in many EDI environments, this
classification is instead included in the electronic transaction and is by design a
programmed control procedure. Control over presentation could occur based on
the nature of the product being purchased or sold. Association with a vendor, a
part number, or the initial electronic purchase order could also determine if it is
classified as inventory, fixed asset, or expense.

Tests of Controls

The nature of tests of general computer controls should not differ greatly from
those being performed in audits where EDI is not a significant factor since the
nature of these controls is not affected by EDI. However, the extent of test work
on these controls may increase because of the importance of these controls in an
EDI environment.
Application controls will change in nature as described above. They will
become a part of the computer processing. They will replace or provide most of
the data for external detective controls. The auditor may need a detailed under
standing of how these controls function to identify potential evidence that would
provide assurance they were operating effectively during the year. This evidence
may be electronic and some of the procedures identified in the following section
on designing substantive procedures may need to be applied to test these con
trols effectively.

Assessing
Control Risk

An entity’s internal control structure consists of the policies and procedures
established to provide reasonable assurance that specific entity objectives will be
achieved. Although the internal control structure may include a wide variety of
objectives and related policies and procedures, only some of these may be rele
vant to an audit of the entity’s financial statements. Due to the nature of EDI,
certain control procedures that used to be performed manually may have to be
replaced with automated control procedures.
As EDI evolves and becomes more pervasive, the predominant way for man
agement to control their business could become the establishment of controls
over the development and maintenance of the computer systems they are making
themselves dependent upon. Further, management may have to define in great
detail their control functions during system design and not on a retroactive basis.
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Once application controls are built into the computer application, they may
become the primary means of protecting assets and assuring accurate financial
reporting. If this development process is not controlled and the resulting com
puter systems are not safeguarded from inappropriate use or access, management’s
ability to control their operations may be compromised and control risk may
be increased.

Designing Substantive
Audit Procedures

The auditor uses the knowledge provided by the understanding of the internal
control structure and the assessed level of control risk in determining the nature,
timing, and extent of substantive tests.
Substantive testing is the area where EDI creates the most challenges and
potentially the most benefits to the audit process. When evidential matter can be
obtained from independent sources outside an entity, it provides greater assur
ance of reliability for the purposes of an independent audit than that secured
solely within the entity. In other words, while auditing Company B in Figure 8-2,
the auditor should examine the documentation that proves that the evidence
came from outside Company B and was independent of Company B’s systems
and internal control structure policies and procedures. Historically, this would
equate to paper invoices with company logos, or bills of lading associated with
the receipt of goods documented on an invoice. But in the EDI environment
these items are electronic records that could be created by any computer.

EDI Electronic Evidence

VAN

Company A

Company B

Com m unication
Software

Com m unication

M anagement

M anagem ent

Information
System

Information
System

Software

Figure 8-2
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The auditor may want to examine how an EDI transaction is evidenced in its
flow through the trading partners’ computer systems and any intermediary sys
tems like a VAN. Identifying the different places the evidence exists may provide
the auditor with the evidential matter necessary to support the auditor’s conclu
sion. As will be discussed later, adding some additional electronic documentation
within the EDI messages themselves may also provide the substantiation needed.
Using Figure 8-2 again, follow the flow of an EDI transaction through the
system layers and identify where evidential matter may exist. If Company B is the
auditor’s client and Company A is sending the client an invoice there are seven
places where the EDI transaction may be evidenced.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

Company A’s MIS applications. This would be their sales or billing sys
tem. The record generated would be in a form at proprietary to
Company A’s application systems and would not exist in an industry
standard form that could be understood by Company B.
Company A’s EDI translation systems. The invoice would exist on the
files maintained in this system and would be in a format that Company
B, or more importantly Company B’s auditors, could understand.
Company A’s communications system. The invoice, along with other
invoices and other EDI documents sent to Company B (and EDI docu
ments sent to other Company A trading partners) would exist on log
files. They would be stored in a standard format inside of a double
electronic envelope as described in the Appendix of Chapter 1. The
outside envelope would be the Communications Transport Protocol
and the inside envelope would be the Interchange Envelope, in this
case identifying Company B.
If the VAN maintained logs of transactions between Company A and B
the invoice in the standard format would exist on files maintained by
the VAN. The format of these records would of course be the standard,
unless the VAN was translating from one standard to another for the
two trading partners. The Interchange Envelope would also be
wrapped around the EDI transactions headed for Company B along
with the subject invoice.
Company B’s communication system. The invoice would be found in
the same format and enclosures as described in Company A’s commu
nication system except for the transactions for Company A’s other
trading partners.
The transaction would exist in the standard format on files maintained
by Company B’s EDI translation system.
Finally, the invoice would be written to Company B’s accounts payable
file in their proprietary format created by the accounts payable or pur
chasing application.

The external quality of these new forms of electronic evidence provides
potential for some new substantive procedures. A further description and analysis
of their audit quality will be discussed in the Appendix to this chapter.
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There are several areas where the auditor may want to concentrate his or her
efforts in making recommendations to clients using EDI.
■ General Computer Controls — Because of the increased importance of
this control area the auditor may want to urge the client to apply tight
tolerances to compliance with comprehensive controls.
■ Involvement in Systems Development — The auditor may comment on
the extent of involvement by management in the development of com
puter applications, especially programmed control procedures which
management will use to control not only their financial information but
also their operations.
■ Trading Partner Agreements — The auditor may review and comment
on whether the trading partner agreements are consistent with the con
trol procedures identified during the audit. Are the terms of the
agreement consistent with the initiation of a transaction and the controls
over existence and completeness?
■ Value Added Networks — The auditor may review and comment on
whether the VAN represents a significant portion of the client’s account
ing applications, and consider if a third party review may be required.
Increased dependence on computer systems for operations and financial
records should justify appropriate control considerations for protecting the com
pany’s ability to continue to do business. Off-site storage, hot sites, and testing of
recovery and backup procedures should become normal business practices in an
EDI environment.

Summary
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Auditors should consider obtaining and documenting a detailed understanding
of the client’s applications systems when EDI is used. EDI will cause increased sys
tem complexity and management dependency that may require this level of
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should consider determining if the use of EDI has changed the business pro
cesses and determine the appropriate effect on the audit.
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Chapter 8 Appendix: Potential Substantive Procedures

Perhaps the new forms of evidential matter in EDI systems could allow the audi
tor to reperform the processing of most of the evidential matter supporting the
amounts in Company B’s financial statements. This would provide the auditor
with a high level of assurance that the financial statements are fairly presented.
This could be very beneficial if Company B was not very conscientious about
implementing an EDI control database or some other type of file tracking. Also,
it could be important in those situations where classic alternative procedures
need to be applied, like examination of bills of lading or shipping documents.
Naturally the cost of performing these procedures must be weighed against
the audit benefit and the assessment of risk already identified. These procedures
could be very costly. In fact, at the present time, they are rarely being applied.
Therefore, in addition to describing how these potential substantive procedures
would work, their pros and cons will be discussed as well.
The invention of powerful cost-effective audit retrieval systems and the dra
matic decreases in computing costs enabled auditors to begin manipulating
computer files to fulfill audit objectives. Use of common EDI standards, transla
tion software and VANs are among many other factors that may cause these
potential computer assisted audit procedures to become cost justified.
Historical Electronic Confirmation

The auditor would send requests to Company B’s trading partners for transac
tions that he or she is interested in verifying. In the case of EDI however, the
request to Company A could be for all of Company B’s EDI transactions both
sent and received for the period under audit. As Figure 8-3 indicates, the auditor
would probably ask for the records stored in Company A’s EDI translation sys
tems. Transactions in the MIS systems would not be in a standard format and in
the communication system they would be mingled with EDI transactions for
other trading partners. Note that in the diagrams the dark arrows identify move
ment of information for the audit process while the light arrows identify the
normal EDI information flow.
These transactions could be transmitted directly to the auditors or they
could be sent on a magnetic tape. If Company A retains these records for the
period of the audit, it should be very easy for them to select the transactions to
meet the confirmation request.
The next step will be to match the transactions received from Company A
with the EDI transactions in Company B’s EDI translation software layer. The for
mats should be the same; in fact, there should be a perfect one-for-one match.
Note that the quality of the external evidence is very high. The auditor has
received these transactions for testing directly from Company A and completely
independent from Company B’s computer systems or internal control structure.
Matching is performed by a Computer Assisted Audit Technique (CAAT)
which is processed independent of Company B.
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Historical Electronic Confirmation

VAN

Company A

Company B

C om m unication
Softw are

C om m unication
Software

Auditor

EDI
Translator
System

M atch

EDI
Translator
System

M anagem ent

M anagem ent

Information
System

Information
System
Vouch

Figure 8-3

One additional step that is required is to trace the EDI transactions into the
files that directly support Company B’s financial statements.
The major potential problems are:
■ Company A might not wish to supply tapes of all transactions to all its
trading partners’ auditors.
■ Different trading partners may use different “standards” and these may
vary over time.
■ Tapes supplied by Company A may contain duplicates owing to retrans
mission where errors have occurred.
■ Company A might only retain transactions on its MIS applications.
■ The final step of vouching the confirmed transactions from Company B’s
EDI translation system to the files in the MIS applications may have to be
done on a test basis depending on cross-referencing between the two sys
tem layers.
Auditor Transaction Sets

For auditor transaction sets, the auditor might use his or her own set of ANSI
X12 (or other accepted standards) to independently request an electronic confir
mation of a specific transaction from one of Company B’s trading partners. If
a purchase order is coded as an “82N,” then perhaps the auditor would send
an “82X” with the selected purchase order attached to Company A — assuming
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that is where it went originally. Company A receiving the “82X” would be asked to
interrogate their files and respond with an “82Y” — yes we received that
purchase order — or an “82Z” — no we did not receive that purchase order or an
“82W” with his or her version of the purchase order if there was a difference in
the data. Similar auditor transaction sets could be used to confirm other elec
tronic documents.
Auditor Transaction Sets

VAN

Company A

Company B

C om m unication

C om m unication
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System
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Figure 8-4
Figure 8-4 depicts the auditor using the client link to the EDI network for
transmission of the auditor transaction set. It also shows that the transaction was
selected from the MIS application software layer to eliminate the final vouching
step that was required in the historical electronic confirmation technique. In this
scenario the auditor is using the client’s EDI translator system also. Some proce
dures to provide control of processing these auditor transactions would be
needed similar to the processing control procedures performed for a CAAT pro
cessed on the client’s computer.
Figure 8-5 depicts the auditor as having his or her own link to the EDI net
work and EDI translation software. This scenario would not require the control
of processing procedures and would be less disruptive. Both of these approaches
could be performed continuously throughout the year or on an historical basis at
a point in time. A characteristic that all of these substantive procedures have in
common is the high quality of the evidence they produce. The verification of the
contents of the transaction comes from an entity completely independent from
Company B.
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Figure 8 -5

The potential problems associated with this approach are:
■ Significant systems enhancem ents would be required to uniformly
respond to the new auditor EDI transaction sets. The new transaction set
would need to be created and adopted by the trading partners, which
may be burdensome.
EDI
■ The audit request may have to be sent on a current basis
to avoid con
Translator
firming transactions that were several months or even a yearS old.
ystem ,
Dynamic Confirmations

As depicted in Figure 8-6, this technique offers as high a quality of external evi
dence as the others and appears to have the least cost or overhead associated
with it. The VAN may be willing, for a minimal fee, to direct transactions between
one company and its trading partners to the auditor, either as they occur, or for a
specified period. Knowing in advance which of its customers require this service
could prevent saving or logging all transactions in mass and then searching for
them based on a subsequent request.
Also, if this store and forwarding operation is still too expensive for all
transactions, a sample may provide the evidence needed by the auditor.
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Figure 8-6
Depending on the VAN’s abilities and flexibility, the auditor has several
options in structuring tests with this approach. The auditor could:
■ Take all of the appropriate transactions for the period under audit
directly from Company B’s MIS application layer and match them against
all of the transactions processed by the VAN for the same period. This
would require an EDI translation step.
■ Take a sample of transactions from Company B’s MIS application layer,
translate them into EDI standard format and request only these from
the VAN.
■ Take a sample of the transactions provided by the VAN, translate them
from EDI standard formats and match the sample with transactions from
Company B’s MIS application layer.
About the only potential problems with the dynamic confirmation tech
nique are that the trading partners may not use VANs or the VAN may not be
willing to provide the service at a feasible fee.
It is not too difficult to imagine that, regardless of the extent of services pro
vided by the VANs, auditors may need third-party reports evaluating the controls
over the VANs operations that affect their client’s accounting systems, especially
these services which affect the auditor directly.
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Electronic Signatures

It may be possible to obtain external evidence from Company B’s MIS system
without involving independent trading partners or VANs directly, if an “authenti
cation” system is used. Such a system effectively provides an “electronic
signature” that cannot be tampered with (this is explained further below). The
verification by an auditor of the authenticity of this signature would provide the
necessary external evidence to satisfy any audit procedures. One could therefore
read through the data (with a CAAT) and total all purchases from each supplier.
Figure 8-7 illustrates the simplicity of this approach relative to the others.
The public keys, which are explained further below, are used to determine that
the signature contained in the transaction was created by the entity associated
with the public key and that particular transaction. The public key matching the
electronic signature and the contents of the transaction gives the auditor the evi
dential matter necessary to support the auditor’s conclusion. If the electronic
signature and EDI record remain intact on each transaction when passed from
Company B’s EDI systems to its MIS systems, the auditor may be able to verify
records that directly support Company B’s financial statements.

Electronic Signatures
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Figure 8-7
The major potential problems with this are:
■ Such an authentication system may not be used in a given industry due to
cost considerations.
■ The data may be purged regularly and thus may not be available.
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■ There may be different electronic signature standards for different sup
pliers, varying over time.
The authentication system uses what is known as “public key” encryption.
This can be used either to encrypt data (make it private) or to authenticate it
(sign it). It works as follows. Each entity has a pair of “keys” (numbers), one pri
vate key (known only to the originating entity’s system) and one public (like a
telephone number). Assume Company A wants to send an authenticated message
to Company B. A encrypts the message using its private key.
The keys are designed such that the encrypted message can be decrypted
using A’s unique public key (which is of course known to B). Thus B, and B’s
auditor, knows that the message came from A. Unfortunately, for this to work
securely, the key numbers have to be quite long, so a considerable processing
overhead is needed, which makes it expensive. This can be reduced in EDI trans
actions by only encrypting a hash total of important fields in the message.
As a matter of interest encryption for privacy (as opposed to authentica
tion) works the other way round. For A to send a private message to B, the
message must be encrypted using B’s public key. B decrypts it using his or her
own private key. From this, one can see that the authenticated messages received
by B could be a valuable source of external evidence to the auditor.
Combined Approach

Another alternative that would not involve cooperation from third parties would
be to use the log file created by the communications software layer (see Figure
8-8). This file would need some reformatting to “open” the communications
envelopes and to separate and sort the EDI transactions out of the different func
tional groups into a homogeneous file of matching transaction sets. Because of
the standardization used this complicated step should still be feasible.
One important piece of information in this process would be the identifica
tion code and perhaps password of the sender. This information would be
contained in the “Interchange Control Header” (see the Appendix of Chapter 1)
and could be tagged onto all the associated transactions. This piece of informa
tion, once it is compared to the authorized trading partner file, would provide
the external evidential quality the auditor requires.
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New Electronic Evidential Matter Substantive Procedures
With Reliance on Internal Controls
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Figure 8 -8

The next step as indicated in Figure 8-8 would be to match all or a sample
of these transactions to the files in the MIS layer of the software.
The title of this technique refers to the necessary existence and testing of
internal control structure policies and procedures contained in the communica
tion layer. Most important would be the access controls over the communication
programs and the log files used for the audit test.
The major potential problems with this technique are:
■ The data may be purged regularly and thus may not be available.
■ The access controls may not be adequate to support an assessment of
control risk below the maximum.
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Glossary
Access Control

Access control is a component of logical security which itself should be seen as a
continuum covering the whole computing platform from systems to applications
and related data, including communications, networks, servers and utilities.
Specifically, access control refers to limiting access to the computing environ
ment resources only to those having either ownership rights or the right to use.
This is a key area of control and must be consistent and seamless with change
control management practices.
Algorithm

A clearly specified mathematical process for computation; a set of rules which, if
followed, will give a prescribed result.
Analog

Transmission method that carries intelligence in the form of data, voice, sound
and images using variable wave patterns.
ANSI

American National Standards Institute: developer of the ANSI X12 generic EDI
standards. The ANSI Accredited Standards Committee - EDI publishes Standards
for EDI in the U.S. The Canadian Standards for Inter-Financial EDI are based on
ANSI X12.
Auditability

A characteristic (attribute) of information which exists in the context of modern
information system when it can be substantiated by tracing it to source docu
ments, or when reliance can be placed upon pre-verified and continually
monitored control processes.
Authentication

The verification of the source, uniqueness, and integrity of a message.
Business Process Reengineering (BPR)

Modern expression for Organizational Development stemming from IS/IT
impacts. The ultimate goal of BPR is to yield a better performing structure, more
responsive to the customer base and market conditions, while yielding material
cost savings. To reengineer means redesigning a structure and procedures with intelli
gence and skills and be well informed about all of the attendant factors of a given
situation, to obtain the maximum benefits from mechanization as basic rationale.
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Canadian Payments Association (CPA)

The federally regulated organization charged with the planning, development,
and administration of the Canadian payments system. This function includes the
national clearing and settlement system, both paper-based and electronic.
Challenge and Response

A form of extended user authentication. After entering an ID and password, the
user is issued a challenge by the system which must be responded to. When the
user’s response is received, the system compares it with the computed response.
If they match, the user is allowed access to the system. The system issues a differ
ent challenge every time and therefore requires a new response each time. The
response to a particular challenge will be different for every individual. In effect,
a new password is used in every logon.
Change Control

This is part of the operations and a critical area of control. Change control is a
process composed of structures, procedures, documentation, and access control
having to do with library control and management over program changes in the
production environment. Change control involves both application program
changes as well as systems changes and is subject to review at any time by auditors
to provide assurance that the policies, methods and procedures prevent unautho
rized access to object code and execution libraries, that all the changes are
properly logged, approved, authorized, documented, and properly scheduled. It
includes adequate segregation of duties and sufficient checks and balances to
prevent accidental or willful injury to the computing environment, while leaving
a sound trail of all related steps and procedures over several generations of
changes. In modern computing environments, change control can be engi
neered to meet all the key control criteria.
Check Digit Verification

A programmed edit check where an extra digit is included to a piece of data like
a customer number, vendor number, or part number. Using a routine the com
puter checks the validity of the incoming data.
Ciphertext

Encrypted (enciphered) data, which may be stored and transmitted in a nonreadable format.
Compliance Program

A means of periodically reporting conformity to mutually agreed upon standards
of control and audit by two or more parties in an EDI system over a specified
period of time. Any exceptions are briefly noted with corrective action imple
mented or planned according to operating rules. Management produces a
Statement of Compliance to agreed upon standards of control and the auditor
reports an independent and objectively determined Statement of Opinion on
management’s statement.
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Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE)

The rationale of CASE can be simply described as, an attempt to mechanize the
mechanization process. The approach is, using appropriate systems tools, design
ers in upper CASE, define entities, relationships, dependencies and so on, and if
this is done properly, in lower CASE the systems will be coded automatically.
Objectives are to speed up development and ease the enhancement and mainte
nance burden.
Computer Virus

It is an unwanted piece of software, specifically designed by its programmer, to
destroy, damage, disturb, disrupt, or nag. It affects adversely, data, the computing
platform, and the users. For a virus to be a virus it must meet the following char
acteristics. It is a piece of software, which executes according to a prespecified
trigger, like a date, an event, or sequence. It has the ability to move from environ
ment to environment by attaching to data moving over networks. Then, the
system is known to be infected and in turn will infect the other unprotected
resources which are in communication with it exchanging data. It replicates
itself, lying dormant until the trigger executes it. Problems can go from mere
nagging situations with flashing unexpected messages on the screen, all the way
to complete destruction and scrambling of the data on mass storage devices, by
destroying file allocation tables, poke holes and break chains. Countervailing
procedures must be enacted to prevent, detect, and correct for viruses. Bulletin
boards and universities are famous breeding grounds for computing viruses. The
more knowledgeable the designer regarding the computing architecture the
more vicious the viruses that can be designed. The worst scenario is when all
backups have been infected with an unknown virus which suddenly executes to
damage the environment.
Console Logs

It is a control whereby all actions taken by an operator are logged automatically.
Jobs executed, terminations, and any activity perform ed by the operator is
recorded.
Control Data

This is the data raised on the performance and behavior of controls. There
should be no restriction on the generality of this definition. However, in general
terms it refers mostly to the data flowing from monitoring systems.
Control Objectives

With respect to information, these are accuracy and completeness, security
(including authorization), auditability, timeliness and recoverability.
Control Structure

The internal control structure of an organization consisting of the policies and
procedures established to provide reasonable assurance that its objectives will be
achieved. T h e re are three basic components to the control structure: the control
environment, the accounting system, and the control procedures. From an
accountability perspective there are two premises underlying the control struc
ture, the first is m anagem ent responsibility and the second is reasonable
assurance.
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Cryptographic Equipment

Hardware that performs cryptographic functions, e.g., Encryption, Authen
tication, Key generation.
Cryptographic Key

A parameter that determines the transformation from plaintext to ciphertext or
vice versa.
Cryptographic Service Message (CSM)

A message for transporting keys or related information to control a keying
relationship.
Data Element

The smallest named item in each transaction set. Together with a segment ID
and other data elements, they form data segments. A data element can represent
a qualifier, a value, or text such as a description.
Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA)

The cryptographic algorithm specified by ANSI X3.92. DEA is also referred to as
Data Encryption Standard (DES) in the U.S.
Data Key

A working key used to encrypt and decrypt or to authenticate data.
Data Segment

Subsections of data into which each transaction set is divided, composed of a seg
ment ID and a fixed number of functionally-related Data Elements.
Decryption

The process of transforming ciphertext into plaintext.
Dependency Check

It is a programmed edit routine testing whether the contents of two or more data
elements or fields within a transaction bear the correct logical relationship.
Digital Signature

Sometimes called electronic signature, is an electronically generated, digitized
(as opposed to graphic which is done by hand) authorization uniquely linkable
and traceable to a specifically empowered officer. It is a number, essentially a
checksum added to a message to accomplish the required services.
Double Electronic Envelope

An electronic message bracketed by header and trailer records for the Commu
nications Transport Protocol and also header and trailer records for the
Interchange Envelope. See Interchange Envelope for further definition.
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Dual Control

A process of utilizing two or more separate entities, usually persons, operating in
concert, to protect sensitive functions or information. Both entities are equally
and separately responsible for the physical protection of materials involved in vul
nerable transactions, such that no single person shall be able to access or utilize
the materials.
Dual Read Check

A hardware control where records are read twice to ensure that the data is read
correctly.
Echo Check

The CPU sends a signal to a peripheral device which returns it to the CPU to ver
ify proper functioning.
EDI Transmission

A Functional Group of one or more EDI Transactions sent to the same location,
in the same physical transmission, identified by a Functional Group header and
trailer.
EDIFACT

EDI for Administration, Commerce and Trade, refers to the EDI standards being
established by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
EFT

Electronic Funds Transfer: Information passed between banks or other financial
institutions which results in debits and credits, i.e., value transfer. Examples are
wire transfer, American Clearing House or Canadian Payments Association debit.
It carries very limited payments information.
Electronic Commerce (EC)

Those are other means of electronic transmission which do not involve standard
formats, or necessarily computer to computer exchanges in terms of computer
application job streams. Examples are: fax, bar coding, public E-mail like the
Internet, videotext, processing documents using proprietary formats, bulletin
boards (BBS), and others.
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)

The electronic exchange of data between organizations, in a structured com
puter processable message format, using public or industry standards. Examples
are purchase order, invoice, payment and remittance advice.
Electronic Security Module (ESM)

See Hardware Security Module.
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Embedded Audit Module (EAM)

Programming which has been added to system software which permits monitor
ing or testing of controls or audit procedures. As an automatic monitoring device
it may monitor integrity controls, for authorization, accuracy, security, authentica
tion, encryption, and detect and report to the auditor, where applicable, their
failure to perform as required.
Encryption

Process transforming plaintext into ciphertext which is unintelligible to the
human eye.
Envelope

A header and trailer record, attached to the front and back respectively, of a set of
data, usually a message. The purpose is usually to direct the message to an address
and to provide assurance that the data was not changed during transmission.
Exclusive or Combination Method

A method of combining key components manually to initiate a keying relationship.
Expert System (ES)

It is an information system that emulates the problem-solving techniques of
human experts, in subject specific applications, like medicine, geology and so on.
FEDI

Financial EDI is information passed between financial institutions and compa
nies that relates directly to payments and payments-related data. At the option of
the payer, the remittance information can be collected, analyzed and reported
back to the payer as specified, thus compressing the reconciliation cycle and
unloading some of the accounts payable functions. Examples are: payment order,
balance inquiry, bank statement, deposit notice, remittance advice.
File Server

A file server is a resource normally found associated with networks representing
mass storage for data and software.
Functional Group

One or more similar transaction sets exchanged between partners in a single trans
mission. Example: A group of purchase order related transaction sets would be a
functional group. A functional acknowledgment is an electronic confirmation of
receipt of such a message.
Function Group Header and Trailer

A header and trailer record, attached to the front and back, respectively, of one or
more EDI transactions of the same type, like invoice, purchase order and so on.
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Gateway

Link, bridging two different networks which provides seamless processing
between computing platforms. It is a connectivity term.
Hardware Security Module (HSM)

It is a self-contained, physically secure, special purpose computer that performs
security-related processes and stores security parameters and/or other sensitive data.
Header Record

A record attached to the front of a group of computer records that contains infor
mation relevant to that group of records.
Information Center

This is basically an organizational staff unit designed to enhance end user com
puting (EUC), assist, coordinate, and support the users. Corporate policies and
control plans must be enacted to insure compliance with acceptable practices.
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)

A public network for multimedia transmission. Voice, image, data, sound and so
on. The impact over time will be to converge applications and devices to digital
based technology. Analog devices like radios, TV and so on would be designed to
operate in that mode.
Integrity Controls

Those manual or programmed controls whose purpose is to ensure that the
objectives of accuracy, completeness, security and confidentiality of data during
input, processing, output and storage are met.
Interchange Envelope

See Interchange Header and Trailer.
Interchange Header and Trailer

The header and trailer records, attached to the front and back, respectively, of a
group of EDI transactions going to the same trading partner. Example: all of the
purchase orders in a transmission from Company A to Company B.
Key Custodian

The persons, assigned by the security administrator of the trading partner, given
the responsibility of either sending or receiving a component of either the master
key or key exchange key used to encrypt data encryption keys. The control tech
nique here is dual control with split knowledge which requires two key custodians.
Key Encryption Key

Normally referenced as KPE is a key used exclusively to encrypt/decrypt keys,
also known as data key or working key.
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Key Exchange Key (KEK)

Is used to protect other keys, either other key encryption keys or data keys, dur
ing an exchange between two parties.
Key Material

The data necessary to establish and maintain cryptographic keying relationships.
Keying Relationship

The state existing between trading partners a n d /o r financial institutions in
which they share at least one cryptographic key.
Mailbox

An electronic facility into which a trading party deposits business documents for
distribution to one or more receiving parties who can subsequently store or
retrieve the documents at their own convenience.
Mapping

Converting data from an organization’s internal format to standard format.
Master Key

The encryption key used to encrypt key encryption keys and data keys during
their period of storage on file.
Message Authentication Code (MAC)

A cryptographically computed value that is the result of passing data through the
authentication algorithm using a specific key. MAC can be used as a hash total or
control total when data must be protected from alteration.
Object Oriented Programming (OOP)

This approach treats the organizational units as entities with relationships
between them, and how they interact. The major advantage is that objects are
reusable. It is like developing a series of building blocks which can later be used
in various ways and combinations. It is faster and easier than developing each
application from scratch.
Open Systems

Refers to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) standard, developed by the
International Standards Organization (ISO). One should think of this as opposed
to proprietary. The OSI model represents seven layers. Those are given in reverse
order from seven to zero: 7. Application, 6. Presentation, 5. Session, 4. Transport,
3. Network, 2. Data-Link, 1. Physical, 0. Physical Medium.
Payment Data

The portion of the Financial EDI transaction which is directly related to pay
ment. It includes items such as identity of creditor and debtor, transaction value,
value date, and date of message origination.

134

Gl o s s a r y
Physically Secure Device

A device designed to preclude successful penetration to reveal all or part of any
cryptographic within the device. The art of successfully penetrating the device
must cause any cryptographic key stored within to be erased or rendered unus
able. Successful penetration must require specialized skills, equipment and
facilities not generally available. The device must be designed such that any tam
pering will produce noticeable damage.
Plaintext

Unencrypted data: intelligible data that can be directly acted upon without
decryption. An example is an ordinary ASCII text file.
Pre-Verification of Controls

In the on-line, real-time data processing environment, it refers to the on-line real
time testing of controls such as user identification codes, user authorization
profiles, terminal source, message authenticity and encryption.
Programmed Control

Control performed by the computer. It can be application, systems, and process.
Prototyping

In environments using state-of-the-art technology, prototyping represents a quick
way to get a handle on development of applications. It is highly interactive with
the user to establish functionality, then derive the full specs and development.
Recoverability

The control objective of recoverability in the context of EDI is to ensure that in
the event of a failed transaction set or system outage, recovery is obtained within
a mutually acceptable time frame, through adequate backup, retention and con
tingency plans.
Remittance

Other data transmitted in a Financial EDI transaction except payment data. It
includes supporting documentation such as purchase orders, invoice stubs, and
invoice numbers.
SAS

Statement of Auditing Standards, issued by the AICPA.
Security

The control objective of security is to ensure that all EDI related software and
data defined as confidential are adequately protected against unauthorized dis
closure or change during storage or transmission, and that physical access to
equipment is restricted.
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Security Related Incidents (Security Incidents)

Incidents related to the security of Financial EDI, which may include: MAC verifi
cation failure; Cryptographic Service Message counter out of sequence; known
or suspected compromise during the manual key distribution process; known or
suspected penetration of a physically secure device; known or suspected compro
mise of a key.
Split Knowledge

A condition under which two or more parties separately have key components
that individually convey no knowledge of the resultant cryptographic key.
TDCC

Transportation Data Coordination Committee, which developed and published
the first set of EDI standards in the U.S.
Third Party Network Provider

Also known as Value Added Network (VAN) provider or Intermediate Network
Connector, is a service bureau supplier of communications facilities including
translation software and integrity controls to trading partners and financial insti
tutions in an EDI network.
Totally Systems Dependent (TSD)

This describes a condition whereby an organization is completely paralysed if sys
tems are down. Substantial losses are sustained even if down for a short period of
time. It also refers to situations where an auditor has no acceptable alternative to
relying on systems.
Tracing Request

A request for information on location/routing of a specific EDI transaction for
purposes of resolving problems between trading partners.
Trading Partners

Organizations engaging in EDI. Includes the originator and the receiver.
Trading Partner Agreements (TPA)

A written contract between two trading partners wishing to conduct business using
EDI. The agreement describes how the partners will interact electronically, the
EDI transaction types that will be used, which EDI standards will be followed and
other communications concerns such as protocols and frequency of connections.
Transaction Reference Number

Unique number, to be contained in each EDI transaction identifying that EDI
transaction.
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Transaction Set

One complete business transaction, corresponding to a business transaction
which would normally be exchanged between trading partners. Several related
transaction sets may be placed into a functional group.
Translation Software

The process whereby the EDI Software translates incoming documents or flat
files into a format which the receiving party wishes to receive. The EDI format is
either an industry standard like TDCC, UCS, and WINS, or a public standard like
ANSI X12 and EDIFACT.
UCS

Uniform Communication Standard — used by the grocery industry.
Value Added Bank (VAB)

This describes a bank which offers the services of a VAN along with the payments
capability of financial EDI (FEDI).
Value Chains

Linkages created with suppliers who furnish goods and services which add value
to a company’s product or service. A value chain includes all of the goods and ser
vices from raw material to the product. It can be extended to include value added
services provided by third party network suppliers and the paying agencies.
VAN

A Value Added Network is a third party which provides communications switch
ing and other value added services between trading partners. Those services are
EDI translation services, conversion from one EDI standard to another, message
control reporting, authentication, electronic mail box services for notification of
receipt of messages, line speed matching and so on.
Vendor Agreements

Agreements written by the counsel of vendors of third party network service
providers or EDI software suppliers to maximize the vendor’s rights and mini
mize the vendor’s exposure to liability.
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Abbreviations Used
4GL
ABA
ACH
AI
AICPA
AIS
ANA
ANS
ANSI
ASC
ASCII
ASI
ASM

Fourth Generation Language
American Bar Association
Automated Clearing House
Artificial Intelligence
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Accounting Information Systems
Article Number Association
American National Standards
American National Standards Institute
Accredited Standards Committee
American Standard Code for Information Interchange
Application Seamless Integration
Association for Systems Management

BPR

Business Process Reengineering

CA
CAAT
CAD
CAM
CASE
CBA
CBA
CBIS
CCP
CDP
CD-ROM
CGSB
CIA
CICA
CIO
CISA
CMA
CPA
CPA
CPM
CSA
CSM
CSP

Chartered Accountant
Computer Assisted Audit Techniques
Computer Aided Design
Computer Aided Manufacturing
Computer Aided Software Engineering
Certified Banking Auditor
Cost Benefit Analysis
Computer Based Information Systems
Certified Computer Programmer
Certified Data Processor
Compact Disk ROM
Canadian Government Standards Board
Certified Internal Auditor
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
Chief Information Officer
Certified Information Systems Auditor
Certified Management Accountant
Canadian Payments Association
Certified Public Accountant
Critical Path Method
Canadian Standards Association
Cryptographic Service Message
Certified Systems Professional

DA
DBA
DBMS
DEA
DES

Data Administration
Data Base Administrator
Data Base Management System
Data Encryption Algorithm
Data Encryption Standard

DISH

D ata In te rc h a n g e fo r S hipping

DP
DRP

Data Processing
Disaster Recovery Planning

EAM
EBCDIC
EC

Embedded Audit Module
Extended Binary Coded Decimal Interchange Code
Electronic Commerce
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ECE
EDI
EDICC
EDIFACT
EDP
EDPAA
EEC
EFT
EIS
ES
ESM
EUC

Economic Commission for Europe
Electronic Data Interchange
EDI Council of Canada
EDI For Administration Commerce and Transport
Electronic Data Processing
EDP Auditors Association
European Economic Community
Electronic Funds Transfer
Executive Information Systems
Expert System
Electronic Security Module
End User Computing

FA
FI
FASB
FEDI
FIS
FITP
FOB

Functional Acknowledgement
Financial Institution
Financial Accounting Standards Board
Financial EDI
Financial Information Systems
Facilitation of International Trade Procedures
Freight on Board

GAAP
GAAS
GAO
GEDIS

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
General Accounting Office
Generic EDI Standards Committee

HSM

Hardware Security Module

IAD
IC
IC
ICCP
ICS
IEEE
IEC
IIA
IRS
IS
ISA
ISDN
ISO
ISP
IT
ITA
ITF

Internal Audit Department
Integrated Circuit
Information Center
Institute for the Certification of Computer Professionals
Internal Control System
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
International Electrical Committee
Institute of Internal Auditors
Internal Revenue Service
Information Systems
Information Systems Auditor
Integrated Services Digital Network
International Standards Organization
Information Systems Professional
Information Technology
Income Tax Act
Integrated Test Facility

JEDI
JIT

Joint EDI
Just-in-Time

JT1

J o in t T echnical C om m ittee-1

JTC/EDI

Joint Technical Committee on EDI

KEK

Key Exchange Key

LAN
LSI

Local Area Network
Large Scale Integration

MAC
MICR
MIPS

Message Authentication Code
Magnetic Ink Character Recognition
Millions of Instructions Per Second

A b b r e v ia t io n s Used

MIS
MRP

Management Information Systems
Manufacturing Resource Planning

NACHA
NWDA

National Automated Clearing House Association
National Wholesale Druggists Association

OA
OCR
ODETTE
OMB
OOP
OS
OSC
OSI
OSF

Office Automation
Optical Character Recognition
Organization for Data Exchange Through Tele-Transmission
in Europe
Office of Management and Budget
Object Oriented Programming
Operating System
Ontario Securities Commission
Open Systems Interconnection
Open Software Foundation

PAEB
PC
PERT
POS

Pan American EDIFACT Board
Personal Computer
Program Evaluation and Review Technique
Point Of Sale

QA
QC

Quality Assurance
Quality Control

RAM
REP
RFQ
ROI
ROM

Random Access Memory
Request For Proposal
Request For Quotation
Return On Investment
Read Only Memory

SAS
SDLC
SEC
SQL

Statement on Auditing Standards
Systems Development Life Cycle
Securities and Exchange Commission
Structured Query Language

TDCC
TDI
TPA
TQM
TSD
TT&C

Transportation Data Coordination Committee
Trade Data Interchange
Trading Partner Agreement
Total Quality Management
Totally Systems Dependent
Trade Terms and Conditions

UCC
UCS
UN/EDIFACT

Uniform Commercial Code
Uniform Communication Standard
United Nations/EDI for Administration Commerce
and Transport
Universal Product Code
Uninterruptible Power Source

UPC
UPS

VLSI

Value Added Bank
Value Added Network
Voluntary Inter-industry Communications Standard
Very Large Scale Integration

WAN
WINS
WORM
WP4

Wide Area Network
Warehouse Industry Network Standards
Write Once Read Mostly
Working Party Four

X12

ANSI EDI Standards

VAB
VAN
v ie s
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